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ABSTRACT 
 
ANGLICAN-ROMAN CATHOLIC ECUMENICAL DIALOGUE 
A CASE FOR A RAHNERIAN LOGIC OF SYMBOL 
 
 
 
By 
Eric S. Dart 
May 2016 
 
Dissertation supervised by Fr. Radu Bordeianu, Ph.D. 
 This dissertation examines the ecumenical relationship between the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion and the necessity for a symbolic cognitive 
and narrative conversion in both communions.  Drawing upon Karl Rahner’s theology of 
symbol, this dissertation argues that such a cognitive and narrative conversion is 
determined by the interpretation and appropriation of God’s mystery as the origin and 
goal of Christian activity and belief.  As such, there is a demand for a second naïveté in 
both communions, whereby, the methods employed by ecumenical dialogue extend 
beyond the logic of criticism and seek to embrace a postcritical logic of symbol. 
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 1 
Introduction  
The impetus for the following pages developed out of a fascination with the 
complexities involved with Benedict XVI’s apostolic letter, Anglicanorum Coetibus, 
which provides a corporate structure for groups of Anglicans to enter into communion 
with the Roman Catholic Church and the subsequent events that surrounded the 
development and eventual failure of the Anglican Covenant.   
The complexities and issues surrounding both Anglicanorum Coetibus and the 
Anglican Covenant are strikingly similar to the complexities and issues that surround the 
present-day ecumenical dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican 
Communion.  Anglicanorum Coetibus, for instance, is both an affirmation of the 
ecumenical convergence that has developed between both communions since Vatican II, 
but it is also an undeniable rejection of the ontological validity of the Anglican 
Communion.  In short, the apostolic letter, on the one hand, is an affirmation of the 
phenomenological validity of the Anglican Communion, but, on the other hand, denies its 
ontological validity.  The events surrounding the Anglican Covenant, however, 
demonstrate a logic counter to that of Anglicanorum Coetibus.  The failure of the 
Anglican Covenant was largely due to the rejection of ontological conformity in light of 
the phenomenological differences that characterize the churches of the Anglican 
Communion.  Put simply, Anglicanorum Coetibus characteristic of the preference for an 
ontological cognitive and narrative disposition while the ultimate failure of the Anglican 
Covenant demonstrates a preference for a phenomenological cognitive and narrative 
disposition.  The following pages contend that it is precisely the tension between the 
Anglcican phenomenological disposition towards difference and the Roman Catholic 
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ontological disposition towards unity that underlies the tensions between the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.  However, this tension need not be the 
context of division, but, instead can be the fertile ground for ecumenical growth and 
development. 
As Christianity moves into its third millennium, the current state of the 
ecumenical movement and ecumenical dialogue are undoubtedly at a crossroads.  Emilio 
Castro observed that, “during the last forty or fifty years such tremendous progress has 
been made in discovering one another, that we are a little impatient today.”1  The 
‘impatience’ to which Castro refers on the one hand fosters disillusionment, frustration, 
and skepticism for some in regards to the ecumenical movement and its future 
possibilities.  On the other hand, however, the tension that undoubtedly exists within the 
contemporary ecumenical landscape nurtures the desire to delve more intensely into the 
possibilities and difficulties of ecumenical dialogue and its reception within separated 
Christian churches.  
The impatience characteristic of the ecumenical movement is better understood as 
an indication that the ecumenical movement is in the midst of a transition from an initial 
stage of mutual recognition and discovery governed by a logic characteristic of traditional 
Western ontology and metaphysics to a new and more challenging stage that is marked 
by the realization that for all the remarkable achievements of the last fifty years towards 
Christian unity and communion, there are significant differences that not only remain, but 
also continue to develop.  Hence, the question as to how one makes sense of past 
ecumenical developments, present happenings, and future prospects requires a new 
                                                 
1 Emilio Castro, "The Ecumenical Winter," Mid-Stream 32, no. 2 (1993): 1. 
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perspective that accounts for the realities of unity and difference within Christian 
communion or koinonia.   
Nowadays, the dialogue partners of the ecumenical movement are not only 
challenged to make sense of other Christian churches, but also their own Christian 
identity in relation to their ecumenical encounters with other Christian churches.   In 
other words, ecumenical dialogue is in need of what Paul Ricoeur terms a second naïveté, 
whereby, Christian churches critically make sense of their shared Christian identity 
symbolically and not simply through a process of correlation.  This is particularly true of 
the ecumenical relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic 
Church. 
The relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican 
Communion has a long and complex history.  Despite the emergence of many difficulties 
and differences between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church, there 
has been remarkable ecumenical progress towards the goal of Christian unity in the last 
fifty years.  However, these ecumenical achievements, which are largely the result of 
officially recognized dialogue between the Anglican Communion and the Roman 
Catholic Church, have been eclipsed recently by what the Roman Catholic Church 
considers irreconcilable differences vis-à-vis belief, practice, doctrine, and theology.  For 
example, challenges such as the ordination of women as priests and bishops, the 
ordination of persons living openly in same-sex relationships, and same-sex marriage 
threaten to stand in the way of realizing what the Anglican-Roman Catholic International 
Commission (ARCIC) terms “substantial” agreement.2  Underlying the ecumenical 
                                                 
2 For a definition of “substantial agreement” see Anglican-Roman Catholic International 
Commission, "Final Report (1981)," in Growth in Agreement: Reports and Agreed Statements of 
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tension are questions pertaining to the realities of unity and difference and how these 
realities are interpreted in relationship to one another. 
Traditionally, questions regarding unity and difference within ecumenical 
dialogue are understood and elucidated by means of metaphysical and ontological 
thinking that are governed by the logic of the one over the many which is typical of a first 
naïveté.  Hence, according to Heidegger, Western ontology and metaphysics are more 
accurately termed onto-theology.  The onto-theological thought of the West establishes 
unity by subsuming what is different or “other” into its own paradigm.  Taking their cue 
from Heidegger, Western philosophers and theologians raise convincing arguments that 
challenge the uncritical acceptance of onto-theological patterns of thought in the West.  A 
logic governed by the one over the many, which permeates the ecumenical discussions 
between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church, establishes unity by 
reconciling what is “other” to itself and making what is dissimilar - similar.  In turn, onto-
theological thinking that is governed by a logic of the one over the many presents 
significant difficulties when brought to bear upon ecumenical dialogue, which, as the 
contemporary hermeneutic tradition has shown, entails both unity and difference. 
The contemporary Anglican-Roman Catholic (ARC) ecumenical dialogue, its 
present development, and future success require resources that western ontology cannot 
provide alone.  In order to deepen and further Christian communion between the 
Anglican Communion and Roman Catholic Church, it is necessary to think beyond the 
limits imposed by western ontological thought.  Put as a question, “Is there a logic that 
can be employed to facilitate the movement of ecumenical dialogue in general and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ecumenical Conversations on a World Level, ed. H. Meyer and L. Vischer (Paulist Press, 1984), 
72.  
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ARC ecumenical dialogue in particular from the ontological presuppositions indicative of 
a first naïveté towards the symbolic rethinking of the second naïveté?” 
The following pages contend that the ecumenical movement in general and the 
dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion in particular 
are in need of a second naïveté that is governed by a logic of symbol.  Karl Rahner’s 
theological and philosophical insights regarding symbol and ecumenism provide 
important resources for the development a logic that accounts for and respects unity and 
difference as necessary and mutually enriching principles vis-à-vis Christian communion.  
The retrieval and application of Karl Rahner’s logic of symbol and his theology of 
ecumenism provide much-needed resources to reach beyond the limits imposed upon the 
ARC ecumenical dialogue by a logic of ontology.   
The following accomplishes the task of establishing a second naïveté that is 
governed by a logic of symbol for the dialogue between the Anglican Communion and 
the Roman Catholic Church in two basic steps.  Firstly, the following develops a theology 
of ecumenism that is supported by Paul Ricouer’s hermeneutical philosophy and built 
upon with Karl Rahner’s theology of symbol.  This work maintains that ecumenical 
relationships necessitate an attentiveness to hermeneutical activity.  The hermeneutic 
philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and his attentiveness to the interpretative moments of 
understanding, explanation, and appropriation provide a general methodological 
structure.  Secondly, the following applies the ecumenical theology developed to the 
contemporary Anglican-Roman Catholic ecumenical dialogue.  
Chapter one develops a critique of the onto-theological presuppositions that 
accompany Western thought in general and Roman Catholic thought in particular.  The 
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presuppositions of the onto-theological characterize an initial stage of understanding and 
interpretation that Paul Ricoeur terms the first naïveté.  Chapter one elucidates the 
uncritical acceptance of beliefs regarding reality and meaning that accompany the first 
naïveté and suggests that postmodernity and the inescapable confrontation with plurality 
and difference that characterizes a globalized world provide an impetus for questioning 
traditional onto-theological presuppositions of western thought that is centered on Being.  
This prompts the appearance of critical postures, or what Paul Ricoeur calls a 
hermeneutic of suspicion, towards presuppositions that were once uncritically held.  Such 
a critical posture is a productive moment in the movement towards a second naïveté 
where understanding moves from an ontological vehemence to a symbolic interpretation 
and understanding.3   
After developing the characteristics and the need for a second naïvete that 
understands and interprets the world symbolically, Chapter two develops the principles of 
Karl Rahner’s theology and philosophy of symbol.  The symbol, as Rahner understands 
it, is a differentiated unity or a unity-in-difference.  Rahner contends “all beings are by 
their nature symbolic, because they necessarily ‘express’ themselves in order to attain 
their own nature.”4  As such, reality has a symbolic structure in which being expresses 
itself in its own other.  The symbol and the symbolized, or the expression and what is 
being expressed, stand in opposition to one another within an original unity.  
Accordingly, being realizes itself or ‘becomes’ through a process of emanation into its 
                                                 
3 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor the Creation of Meaning in Language (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 291-302. 
4 Karl Rahner, "The Theology of Symbol," in More Recent Writings,  Theological 
Investigations (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1966), 224. 
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own other (expression) and return to itself.  Being, at least for human persons and 
communities, is always in the process of becoming what it already is. 
Chapter three applies the characteristics and principles developed in chapter one 
and chapter two to the ecumenical movement and the activity of dialogue.  Firstly, the 
possibility and necessity of ecumenism is rooted in the fundamental conviction that all 
Christians are united as brothers and sisters in and through Jesus Christ.  Despite this 
fundamental recognition of one another as Christian, there are significant differences as 
to how Christian churches interpret and understand what is necessary to fully realize and 
express Christian koinonia.  Chapter three examines the contemporary situation of 
ecumenical dialogue and the roles of unity and difference.  Secondly, chapter three 
examines Karl Rahner’s understanding of symbol developed in chapter two in 
relationship to his theology of ecumenism and dialogue.  Rethinking Christian koinonia 
in light of Rahner’s understanding of symbol provides a framework for interpreting 
ecumenical dialogue with a second naïveté.   
The one Church of Christ, animated by the Holy Spirit, is brought to expression 
within the historical, social, and cultural diversity of the world.  Hence, if the Church of 
Christ is truly universal, it must be understood as such within the context of the diversity 
of the world.  Christian churches mediate the Church of Christ in their particular social, 
historical, and cultural context.  From this perspective, it is realistic to expect a diversity 
of expression.  Contemporary experiences of division within Christianity are largely the 
result of confusing or correlating expressions of the Church with the actual Church of 
Christ.  While all Christian churches must maintain the conviction that their community 
is an authentic and even the fullest or most meaningful expression of the Church of Christ 
 8 
within their context, from a symbolic understanding, they cannot hold an exclusive 
identification between their community and the Church of Christ.  Chapter three argues 
that a symbolic interpretation and understanding calls for greater depth than simply the 
recognition of the uniqueness and fullness of one’s own community.  It also recognizes 
that the relationship between the expression and what is being expressed is in the process 
of constantly “becoming” what it already is.  The purpose of ecumenical dialogue, from a 
symbolic perspective, is not simply the reconciling of differences or establishing unity by 
determining the least common denominator of Christian identity on the one hand or 
proselytizing and converting others to one’s own understanding of Christian identity on 
the other hand.  A symbolic approach to ecumenical dialogue, instead, begins with the 
recognition that the Church of Christ comes to expression, however imperfectly, 
wherever belief in Jesus Christ is proclaimed as God and savior.  Hence, the purpose of 
ecumenical dialogue when it is governed by a logic of symbol focuses on the cooperative 
effort of separated and imperfect Christian churches to “become” what they are already 
are; the visible expression of the Church of Christ.  This does not imply that all symbolic 
expressions are equal.  Instead, difference and diversity are the fertile soil that compels 
Christians to delve more deeply into the one Church of Christ and how one’s own 
community brings it to expression in the world.  Ecumenical dialogue in light of a 
symbolic understanding and interpretation calls Christian churches to challenge one 
another both internally (one’s own symbolic expression) and externally (the symbolic 
expression of other Christian churches). 
 The fourth chapter develops a brief sketch of the pertinent social, historical, 
cultural, and theological features of the ecumenical relationship between the Anglican 
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Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.  This chapter analyzes the constitutional 
break that occurred between the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England 
during the reign of Henry VIII, the development of the Via Media as an identity of the 
Anglican Church, Leo XIII’s papal bull, Apostolicae Curae, the noticeable change that 
occurs in the relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic 
Church at the Second Vatican Council, and the Anglican Roman Catholic International 
Commission (ARCIC) dialogues.  Finally, chapter four examines Benedict XVI’s 
apostolic letter Anglicanorum Coetibus and the proposed Anglican Covenant.  The 
complexity of both documents elucidates the ecumenical tensions indicative of the 
present-day relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic 
Church.  
 The final chapter undertakes the task of re-thinking the contemporary ecumenical 
relationship and dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican 
Communion in light of the symbolic process detailed in earlier chapters.  Chapter five 
argues that mutual recognition requires that both the Anglican Communion and the 
Roman Catholic Church recognize one another as real-symbolic expressions of the 
Church of Christ.  As such, mutual recognition elicits a shift from recognizing one’s-self 
as the particular expression of Christ’s church to the mutual recognition of one another as 
particular expressions in relationship to the Church of Christ.  Such an approach need not 
necessitate ‘substantial’ agreement. Hence, a real-symbolic approach opens avenues for 
discussion and dialogue that are closed off to the present-day dialogue, which is governed 
almost exclusively by western ontology and a logic of the one over the many.  This shift 
is indicative of a second naïveté whereby the Anglican Communion and Roman Catholic 
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Church must accept that koinonia thought exclusively through ontology or 
phenomenology is simply not adequate.      
 Chapter five argues that the fullest expression of Christian identity is intimately 
bound to ecclesial identity.  As such, a proper interpretation of orthodoxy and orthopraxis 
and their relationship to one another are central concerns for ecumenical discussion and 
ecumenical activity.   Chapter five examines how the Anglican Communion and Roman 
Catholic Church can move towards a fuller real-symbolic recognition of Christian 
koinonia in and through the marks of Christian identity (i.e. one, holy, catholic, and 
apostolic) and the activities of Christian life (i.e. leitourgia, martyria, and diakonia).  A 
symbolic re-interpretation and re-appropriation of the marks of Christian identity and the 
activities of Christian life shed new light on present-day ecumenical controversies and 
tensions surrounding issues such as orders, Eucharist, and shared worship.  A symbolic 
approach extends beyond the categorical concerns of ontology, takes seriously various 
expressions of the priesthood of Christ, and opens up a space for further dialogue and 
growth towards mutual recognition, however imperfect, of orders and by extension 
Eucharist and worship.  Symbol also broadens the possibilities of shared martyria.  In 
particular doctrinal agreement is not an agreement of conformity.  Finally, a symbolic 
approach to ecumenical dialogue between the Anglican Communion and Roman Catholic 
Church creates promising prospects for diakonia.  A symbolic approach understands 
shared diakonia as a way in which both Churches express the Church of Christ through 
“love of neighbor”.  This approach to diakonia does not envision service as a cooperative 
effort in lieu of doctrinal agreement; it envisions shared service to one another and the 
world as a real indication and manifestation of the Church of Christ that also brings about 
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and confirms both Churches as real expressions (or symbols) of the Church of Christ.  
Thus shared diakonia both elicits and furthers unity in a real-symbolic way. 
 While the following pages engage the ecumenical process with respect to the 
realities of pluralism and globalization, the scope of the project is intentionally confined 
to Western ecumenical sensibilities.  At first glance, this may appear to be problematic 
given the growth of both the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church in 
areas outside of the West.  However, the dialogues between both communions and the 
authoritative structures of both communions remain predominantly Western in terms of 
their cognitive and narrative sensibilities.  Hence, the cognitive and narrative conversion 
for which the following argues must take seriously the deep seated influence of Western 
thought in both communions.  
 The overarching conviction of the following pages is that the success of the 
ecumenical movement is not a function of its ability to resolve disagreements, 
controversies, or arguments between churches.  The goal of the ecumenical movement 
and its success, instead are functions of recognition and unity.  Tension has always and 
will always exist within the church.  The real challenge of the ecumenical is not in the 
development of theologies of resolution; the real challenge of the ecumenical movement 
is the development of theologies of recognition that can cope with the tensions that will 
continue to arise within Christ’s Church.  In what follows, the case is made that a 
theology of symbol provides many of the resources to further a theology of recognition. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
POSTCRITICAL THOUGHT AND THE NEED FOR SYMBOL IN THE WEST 
1. Introduction 
 Largely indebted to the philosophical constructs available during a particular 
period in history, theological reflection is intimately connected to the broader 
sociocultural and intellectual interpretive paradigm of a particular time and place.  It is 
essential, if an apt and sincere interpretation of the current ecumenical landscape is to be 
undertaken, that one first recognizes how Western theology profits from the larger 
sociocultural and intellectual milieu. 
   The history of Western Christianity is indicative of three essential basic 
situations.  These situations include the brief period of Jewish Christianity, the lengthy 
period of an almost exclusive association of Christianity with Hellenistic and European 
culture and civilization, and finally the recent realization during the twentieth century that 
the “Church’s living space is from the very outset the whole world.”5   
A central concern in each of the basic essential situations of Christianity is the 
koinonia of the Church.  Maintaining and visibly expressing the relationship between the 
many and one is of fundamental importance for interpreting the bonds of communion of 
the Church in any situation.  This inevitably requires an interpretation of unity and 
diversity that considers the intrinsic relationship between the two.  John Zizioulas writes:  
The most important condition attached to diversity is that it should not destroy 
unity. The local Church must be structured in such a way that unity does not 
destroy diversity and diversity does not destroy unity. This appears at first sight to 
be a totally unrealistic principle. And yet, the careful balance between the “one” 
                                                 
5 Karl Rahner, "Basic Theological Interpretation of the Second Vatican Council," in 
Concern for the Church,  Theological Investigations (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 82-84. 
 13 
and the “many” in the structure of the community is to be discovered behind all 
canonical provisions in the early Church.6 
 
The focus of this chapter is the development of the “careful balance” required to interpret 
the roles of unity and difference within the changing essential basic situation of 
contemporary Western Christianity that is increasingly characterized by the realities of 
pluralism and globalization.  The contemporary sociocultural and intellectual climate 
indicative of a pluralistic and globalized context implicates theological reflection and 
interpretation in a variety of significant ways, not least of which are contemporary 
concerns of ecumenical theologians regarding proper unity and acceptable difference.   
The intention of this chapter is to address questions regarding unity and difference 
in a pluralistic and globalized context by developing a constructive postcritical logic that 
is governed by symbol.  This chapter accomplishes this task by utilizing various insights 
regarding the concept of mystery and its interpretation in order to establish the necessity 
of a postcritical approach to unity and difference that avoids abandoning, discarding, or 
reducing difference to sameness, and recognizes the symbiotic significance of unity and 
difference.  Put simply, unity does not mean uniformity. 
2. Unity and Difference in Western Theology 
Western thinkers have elucidated the nature and purpose of unity and difference 
in a variety of ways throughout history.  In order to avoid falling into an overly simplistic 
portrait of the complex historical landscape of Western thought, while also remaining 
within the scope and confines of the task at hand, this section employs Avery Dulles’ 
methodology for interpreting various periods of Western thought and Christian theology 
                                                 
6 John Zizioulas, The One and the Many : Studies on God, Man, the Church and the 
World Today, 1st ed., Contemporary Christian Thought Series (Alhambra, CA: Sebastian Press, 
2010). Kindle location 1457-1460. 
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via a description of three successive attitudes towards criticism.7   Dulles provides a 
framework for a concise narrative that develops the chief contours and 
interconnectedness of the diverse epochs of Western thought and Christianity.  The three 
successive attitudes include: the precritical period, the critical period, and the postcritical 
period.  Drawing on Dulles’ methodological insights, this section expounds how unity 
and difference are interpreted in precritcial, critical, and postcritical Western thought and 
Christianity.       
2.1 Precritical Western Thought and Theology 
The Hellenistic/European paradigm dominates most of the history of Western 
Christian thought and is indicative of period marked by precritical thinking.  For Roman 
Catholicism, the precrictical stage, which accords preference to unity over difference via 
thought that weds theological belief and ontology, practically speaking, lasts until the 
Second Vatican Council.8 
                                                 
7 Avery Dulles, The Craft of Theology : From Symbol to System (New York: Crossroad, 
1995), 3-5. 
8 Karl Rahner observes that “…the Second Vatican Council is the beginning of a tentative 
approach by the Church to the discovery and official realization of itself as world-Church… the 
Church was always in potentia world-Church and because the actualizing of this potentiality itself 
involved a long historical process of coming-to-be, the origins of which coincide with the 
beginning of European colonialism and of the modern world-mission of the Church from the 
sixteenth century, an actualizing which is not completely finished even today. But if we look at 
the macroscopic and official action of the Church and at the same time become more clearly 
aware that the concrete, real activity of the Church… was what we might venture to describe as 
that of an export firm, exporting to the whole world a European religion along with other 
elements of this supposedly superior culture and civilization, and not really attempting to change 
the commodity, then it seems appropriate and justified to regard Vatican II as the first great 
official event in which the Church came to be realized as world-Church.  Rahner, "Basic 
Theological Interpretation of the Second Vatican Council," 78.  This historical description 
admittedly wants in relation to the diversity of Eastern Orthodoxy and Protestant Christianity that 
develops in the West from the Sixteenth century onward.  In other words, while Roman 
Catholicism inhabits a precritical space until the Second Vatican Council, this cannot be said of 
Christianity as a whole.  For instance, the recognition of legitimate diversity and its theological 
articulation receives recognition and develops in Protestant and Orthodox Christianity well before 
Roman Catholicism.  This is evidenced by the refusal of the Roman Catholic Church to officially 
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The precritical is not to be mistaken as characteristic of the absence of critical 
thought or argument; instead, it is more appropriately conceived of as what Paul Ricoeur 
terms a first naïveté.  In this initial naïveté, doubt and criticism are not leveled against 
authoritative sources, i.e. sacred texts, hierarchical authority, and deeply rooted 
sociocultural beliefs and ideas.  Authoritative texts and beliefs are used as interpretative 
keys for making sense of reality and experience, but they are thought and uncritically 
assumed to be exempt from critical interpretation and doubt.  As such, these authoritative 
sources are naively taken at face value and their meaning is assumed to be literal and 
immediate.  Sources such as these provide canonical norms in so far as they establish a 
common standard and universal reference for explaining, appropriating, and 
understanding reality and existence.  In the precritical context, making sense of one’s 
experience of reality and existence occurs via an unquestioned reliance on sources of 
authority.  Precritical unity is thus achieved and maintained through the common 
adherence to these canonical sources of authority.   
Western theology during the precritical period enshrines three interrelated sources 
of authority: Scripture, Tradition, and Hellenistic ideas about the nature of existence.9  
These sources establish an interpretative triad whereby each of the sources enlightens the 
                                                                                                                                                 
participate in meaningful ecumenical dialogue until the latter half of the Twentieth century while 
Protestants and Orthodox had already established meaningful structures for ecumenical dialogue 
by the beginning of the twentieth century that ultimately led to the establishment of the World 
Council of Churches (WCC).  For a brief history of the development of the ecumenical movement 
in relation to the formation of the WCC see: World Council of Churches, "History" 
http://www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us/wcc-history (accessed June 22, 2014 2014). 
9 It is difficult to demarcate and distinguish Christian thought and theology from the 
larger sociocultural and intellectual context of the precritical West.  In general, the two develop 
side by side and in relationship to one another in such a way that they cannot be separated.  This 
is evidenced by the fact that most philosophers of the precritical West from Augustine onwards 
were also Christian theologians.  See: Bertrand Russell, The History of Western Philsophy (New 
York: Somon & Schuster, 1945), 301-490.   
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others.  During this period Western Christianity adopts the Hellenistic logic that gives 
priority to unity over difference and the articulation of this logic via ontology and 
metaphysics.10   
Aristotle initiates an approach to interpreting reality and existence that implicitly 
shapes precritical Western thought and theology.  As Aristotle envisages it, metaphysics 
or first philosophy is the “science of causes and principles of what is most knowable.”11 
In so doing, Aristotle introduces a basic tension within traditional metaphysical thought; 
namely, metaphysics is conceived of as both a general and a special science.  As a 
general science metaphysics is ontology, but as a special science it is theology.12  As a 
general science, ontological inquiry inevitably leads to the special science of theology 
and vice versa.  Hence, Aristotle’s metaphysical thought envisions a basic and 
                                                 
 10 Both metaphysics and ontology include a wide range of ideas, beliefs, and conceptions 
about the nature and structure of reality and existence. Without undermining the significance of 
these distinctions, this study maintains a broad and general understanding of metaphysics and 
ontology.  Ontology is the “doctrine about that which is.” Sacramentum Mundi (London,: Burns 
& Oates, 1968), s.v. "Ontology." Ontology is the study of ‘being’, but more exactly, attempts to 
answer the question, “why is there something rather than nothing?”  Louis K. Dupré, Metaphysics 
and Culture, The Aquinas Lecture (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1994), 1.  
Metaphysics, on the other hand, “rests on the assumption that the mere appearance of things does 
not include their justification, that it requires a foundation.”  
11 Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 48. 
 12 Describing metaphysics as a special science, Aristotle writes, “But there is also a 
science of that which has being qua possessed of being and separable. So we must decide whether 
this science is to be considered the same as the science of nature or rather different. Well, the 
science of nature has to do with those things that have a principle of process within them, whereas 
mathematics is a theoretical science and is indeed a science of permanent things, but not of 
separable things. So there is some science, different from either of these, which is about what has 
separable being free from process, if indeed there be any such substance, a substance, that is, 
which is separable and unprocessed…. This would be the primary and fundamental principle. 
And this shows that there are three kinds of theoretical science, physics, mathematics and 
theology. And the highest kind of science is the theoretical kind, and of theoretical sciences the 
highest is the last in our list. It has to do with the most valuable of the things that are, and it is the 
proper object of a science that determines its relative excellence.” Aristotle, Metaphysics 
(London: Penguin Books, 1998), 335.; ibid., 324. 
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fundamental relationship between ontology and theology that is founded on the logic of 
the one over the many.  Alois Holder writes:  
[T]he “first philosophy” is the knowledge, supremely meaningful for its own 
sake, of permanent “first causes and principles” of all that is… The inquiry into 
beings as such leads to a superexcellent being, and the search for the many “first” 
principles to an ultimate ground: the divine, which is thought thinking of itself in 
pure contemplation.  Thus in this science of Aristotle which is entitled 
metaphysics, theology and ontology are linked in primordial unity...13 
 
Precritical Western theology adopts the Hellenistic logic of the one over many expressed 
in metaphysical/ontological ideas and concepts as an interpretative resource for 
understanding and explaining Scripture and Tradition.  Recognizing Western theology’s 
indebtedness to Hellenistic categories of thought, Louis Dupré writes: 
…Plato and Aristotle had reformulated Parmenides’ distinction between being 
and non-being as the relation between the reality of appearances and the reality of 
the ground.  Plato had done so in terms of participation, Aristotle of causality.  
Christians adopted their theories, alternating between one and the other… when 
he [Aquinas] conceived the dependence in causal terms, the cause remained 
immanent in the effect and was also functioning as ground.14  
 
This precritical synthesis in Western theology undergoes significant development in the 
Patristic and Scholastic periods; Augustine of Hippo (354 CE – 430 CE) exemplifies the 
former and Thomas Aquinas (1225 CE – 1274 CE) the latter.15  
 The theology of Augustine synthesizes Scripture and Tradition with Platonic 
thought as it is mediated through Neo-Platonism.16  Augustine adopts Plato’s doctrine of 
                                                 
13 Sacramentum Mundi (London,: Burns & Oates, 1968), s.v. "Metaphysics." 
14 Dupré, Metaphysics and Culture, 2. 
15 This is not a claim that all Christian theology is either Augustinian or Thomistic, but 
rather that these two figures represent the general contours of the articulation of unity and 
difference in precritical Western theology and are illustrative of the synthesis between 
Hellenistic/European thought and Christian belief.    
 16 The relationship between the Hellenistic conception of metaphysics and Augustine’s 
theological thought is evident throughout Augustine’s writings.  It is apparent that Augustine 
perceives an affinity between the Christian belief articulated in Scripture and Tradition and 
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matter and form that holds material substances are subject to corruption and change while 
immaterial substances of form are eternal and incorruptible.  The material world, 
however, is good in so far as it participates in the form of the Sacred.17  Augustine’s use 
of the Platonic logic of participation yields several attributes of the divine nature and 
according to Augustine, God’s true nature is ‘Being’.  All things that exist really do have 
existence but in a manner that is contingent and dependent on God; in relation to God 
“other existing things have being in a way… but in a way lack being.”18      
 Augustine construes difference in terms of the degree and the manner of 
participation in God who is Creator.  According to Augustine’s logic of participation, 
difference is legitimated only if it can be subsumed under and shown to participate in the 
principle common to all beings; the Christian God.  If difference is not subsumable under 
the net cast by the unfolding levels of participation, then according to Augustine’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
Platonic thought.   For example, Augustine writes, “By having thus read the books of the 
Platonists, and having been taught by them to search for the incorporeal truth, I saw how your 
invisible things are understood through the things that are made. And, even when I was thrown 
back, I still sentenced what it was that the dullness of my soul would not allow me to 
contemplate. I was assured that you were, and that you were infinite, though not diffused in finite 
space or infinity; that you truly are, who are ever the same, varying neither impart motion; and 
that all things are from you, and is proved by this sure cause alone: that they exist.” Augustine, 
Confessions (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2007), 106. 
17  Augustine develops the concept of participation in relation to his hierarchy of natures. 
Augustine writes, “Then, when they go on to look into the nature of the life itself if they find it 
mere nutritive life, without sensibility, such as that of plants, they consider it inferior to sentient 
life, such as that of cattle; and above this, again, they place intelligent life, such as that of men. 
And, perceiving that even this is subject to change, they are compelled to place above it, again, 
that unchangeable life, which is not at one time foolish, at another time wise, but on the contrary 
is wisdom itself. For a wise intelligence, that is, one that has attained to wisdom, was, previous to 
its attaining wisdom, unwise. But wisdom itself never was unwise, and never can become so. And 
if men never caught sight of this wisdom, they could never with entire confidence prefer a life 
which is unchangeably wise to one that is subject to change. This will be evident, if we consider 
that the very rule of truth by which they affirm the unchangeable life to be the more excellent, is 
itself unchangeable: and they cannot find such a rule, except by going beyond their own nature; 
for they find nothing in themselves that is not subject to change.” Augustine, On Christian 
Doctrine, trans., J.F. Shaw (New York: Courier Corporation, 2009), 7.     
18 Eleonore Kretzmann and Norman Stump, The Cambridge Companion to Augustine 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 83. 
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understanding of participation, it is other than God and thus is either an unreal illusion or 
will ultimately perish and be abolished.  Hence, the many obtains it’s meaning and 
significance only in relation to and from the One.  This logic permeates Augustine’s 
teachings and Western theology after him.19 
 Augustine’s influence on the whole of Western thought is undeniable, and 
Western theology tends to recapitulate Augustine’s metaphysical dualism and the logic of 
one over many.20  Augustine’s theological synthesis is a point of departure for Western 
theology and marks the beginning of the preoccupation with the theological articulation 
of Christian experience, existence, and reality via Greek metaphysics and ontology.21 
Thomas Aquinas develops a remarkable synthesis between Christianity and Greek 
thought.  Like Aristotle, Aquinas sees an intimate connection between theology and 
ontology.  Unlike Aristotle, Aquinas interprets reality, existence, and experience through 
the Christian sources of authority of which Augustine’s teaching holds a central place.  
                                                 
19 For instance, the metaphysical dualism indicative of the human person as body and 
soul in which the soul is “a certain substance, sharing in reason and suited for the task of ruling 
the body” is corrected by envisioning the soul as the unifying and animating principle of the body 
within the hierarchical structure of the human being. Joseph M. Colleran, Saint Augustine: The 
Greatness of the Soul, The Teacher (New York: Newman Press, 1978), 13:22. The sacraments as 
visible signs of God’s invisible grace; the city of God and the earthly city; the inner-self and 
outer-self; even difference within the Trinity cannot escape the hierarchical principle of the one 
over the many.  Augustine holds that the three divine persons of the Trinity share the same divine 
nature in such a way that any person of the Trinity could have theoretically become incarnate.  
Augustine unfolds his theology of the Trinity beginning with a common divine essence.  Karl 
Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Crossroad Pub., 1997), 17-19. 
20 Augustine’s understanding of sign is particularly important in this regard.  Augustine 
develops his theory of signs within his theory of language.  The concept consists of a signified 
and signifier that when properly established conveys meaning.  Communication for Augustine is 
possible when meaning is attached, either naturally or intentionally, to a sign.   The sign is a 
central concept for the possibility of divine communication.  Hence, Augustine’s theology of the 
sacrament is understood as an instance of divine communication via some earthly sign.   
21  While Christianity, even before Augustine, adopts Geek philosophical terminology to 
explicate various Christian beliefs i.e. homoousios, hypostases, Augustine initiates a theological 
and systematic turn for theological discourse whereby Western Theology becomes dependent on 
Greek philosophy. 
 20 
According to Thomas, there is a distinction between metaphysics as the indirect 
philosophical examination of God as the First Cause that is discovered and brought to 
expression through the human intellect – both as a special science (theology) and general 
science (ontology) – and theology that begins its examination with the revelation of God 
through Scripture and tradition.  Commenting on the Thomistic relationship between faith 
and reason John Wippel writes: 
Aquinas is convinced that there can be no real conflict between faith and reason 
or between faith and philosophy because, in his view, both derive from one and 
the same ultimate source: on the one hand, God viewed as the author of 
revelation; on the other hand, God viewed as the creative source of the human 
intellect and the created universe, which it studies and from which it draws 
principles.  To admit that faith and reason could really be in contradiction with 
one another would be the acknowledgement that in such a case one or the other 
was false.  For Aquinas this would ultimately make God himself the author of 
falsity, which he rejects as impossible.22 
 
Understanding and explaining the relationship between the one and the many is of 
particular importance for Aquinas.  Aquinas understands this relationship in terms of 
participation; however, the explanation of the concept of participation undergoes a 
significant revision in light of Aristotelian metaphysics.  Aquinas describes three ways of 
participation: 1) logical, 2) ontological, and 3) causal.23  Logical participation is 
illustrative of how a particular species participates in a genre.  There is logical way in 
which entities that are complex and diverse participate in the less complex and simple.24  
Ontological participation is indicative of the way difference is united in a single entity.  
For instance, the human being, according to Thomas, is a composition of body and soul. 
                                                 
22 John F. Wippel, "Metaphysics," in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman 
Stump Eleonore Kretzmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 73-74. 
23 Ibid., 81. 
24 Joseph Koterski, "The Doctrine of Participation in Thomistic Metaphysics," in The 
Future of Thomism, ed. Deal W. Hudson and Dennis W. Moran (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1992), 189-190. 
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There is a hylomorphic-like structure of participation whereby under a single subject 
there is a complex of relationships involved. 25  Lastly, Aquinas envisions causality as a 
way of participation. Borrowing from Aristotle, Aquinas describes four types of causes: 
material, formal, efficient, and final. According to Thomas, all effects participate in a 
cause. 
Aquinas espouses that all created things find their cause for existing in something 
else.  Because the effect participates in the cause, there is always a trace or resemblance 
of the cause in its effect.  God, however, is the cause that causes but has no cause.  As 
first cause, everything that issues from God resembles God while God does not resemble 
anything, but is the source of all resemblance.  Hence, for Aquinas, God is wholly other 
and can be known only through analogy.26  According to the logic of causality, unity is 
established in the diversity of existence through one common cause.  The farther an effect 
is removed from its ultimate origin the greater its difference and complexity.  Difference 
is thus a negative attribute of the creature.   Difference is not an illusion; it is real, but 
ultimately it is problematic.  Interpreting the Christian God of Revelation as the cuasa sui 
means that the further the creature is causally removed from its creator, the less like the 
creator it is.  Hence, the many effects observed by the intellect find their ultimate origin 
in the one true first cause, namely the Trinity revealed in Christian Scripture and 
Tradition.  
 The precritical period of Western thought and theology develops several 
significant contours for thinking unity and difference.  Firstly, the unity of existence is 
discovered via conceptual interpretation.  Precritical Western thought and theology 
                                                 
25 Wippel,  94. 
26 Koterski,  190-194.  
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adhere to the principle of one over many and the interpretation of this principle via 
participation.   Secondly, there is a presumption that the “one” of the one over the many 
in Hellenistic thought and philosophy and the Christian God of revelation are 
synonymous or at least compatible with one another.  Thirdly, the Hellenistic belief of the 
one over many is mediated to Christian theology via sources that utilize the ontological 
and metaphysical philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.  This is evidenced, for example, in 
the vocabulary of Western theology that adopts Hellenistic philosophical terms such as 
being, causality, nature, accidents, substance, etc. to articulate Christian belief and 
doctrine.  Lastly, the precritical synthesis of Hellenistic ideas with the Christian sources 
of authority, especially the synthesis that occurs in the thought of Augustine and Aquinas, 
provide important foundations for later interpretative logics that develop within Western 
thought and Christianity.  Despite the limits of the precritical, one would be mistaken to 
disregard its significance too quickly.  The modern understanding of unity and difference 
is deeply attached to its precritical roots.  The precritical attitude also holds community in 
high esteem insofar as the sources of authority are shared and belong to everyone.  
Hence, there is strong connection between morality and the shared sources of authority. 
2.2 - Critical Western Thought and Theology 
The second successive stage takes a critical posture towards the beliefs and 
assumptions of the precritical stage.  The critical stage is indicative of two “subattitudes” 
that, while remarkably different with respect to how criticism is directed, nevertheless 
share a common affinity for criticism.  These “subattitudes” are commonly designated by 
the terms modernity and postmodernity. 
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2.2.1 - Modernity 
The modern critical attitude takes umbrage with precritical sources of authority 
and the precritical assumption that such sources are immune from criticism and doubt.  
Associated with demythologization, the modern critical stage begins with universal 
methodic doubt and culminates with presumably self-evident facts and principles arrived 
at through rational testing and observation.27  Truth and fact are interchangeable terms 
that are envisioned as universally valid realities and can be arrived at through universally 
valid processes that abstract truth and fact from what is otherwise untrue and false.  
Reality is distinguished from illusion and truth from falsehood on the basis of critical 
verification obtained through empirical observation that is beyond any reasonable doubt. 
The shift in Western consciousness from a precritical attitude to modern criticism 
represents a significant movement in sociocultural and intellectual attitudes in the West.  
Jürgen Habermas recognizes that: 
Only up to the threshold of modernity are a culture’s accomplishments of 
reaching self-understanding joined together in interpretive systems that preserve a 
structure homologous to the lifeworld’s entire structure of horizons.  Until that 
point, the unity, unavoidably supposed, of a lifeworld constructed concentrically 
around “me” and “us”, here and now, had been reflected in the totalizing unity of 
mythological narratives, religious doctrines, and metaphysical explanations.  With 
modernity, however, a devaluing shift befell those forms of explanation that had 
allowed these very theories to retain a remnant of the unifying possessed by 
myths of origin.28 
 
The modern critical attitude believes that the nature of reality is discerned 
epistemologically and seeks to uncover the epistemic ground and foundations of reality.  
Comparing the modern critical attitude with the precritical attitude Jean-Luc Marion 
writes, “For ontic excellence gives way to noetic excellence in the hierarchization of first 
                                                 
27  Dulles, The Craft of Theology, 4. 
28 Jürgen  Habermas and William Mark Hohengarten, Postmetaphysical Thinking: 
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), 17. 
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terms, which only become first in being known, never again in so far as they are 
beings.”29  Thus, Aristotle’s metaphysical/ontological ground gives way to Descarte’s 
epistemological first known.  This transition significantly alters the metaphysical 
relationship between being and knowledge.  Dupré writes: 
For most modern philosophers cause belonged to the ontological order and 
ground to the epistemic… As cause became separated from ground, the effect was 
increasingly conceived as extrinsic to the cause. The metaphysical search for the 
ultimate ground became transformed into the quest for epistemic foundations.  
The mechanistic causality of the seventeenth century annulled the traditional 
metaphysical question as meaningless: being meant no more than the sum of all 
beings.  Instead, it posited a series of independent substances extrinsically related 
to one another, one of which was the First Cause.30 
 
 The modern critical attitude accords a special status to the rational subject as the central 
arbiter of reality.  It is subjects who discover and determine objects.31  There is, however, 
an important affinity between modern criticism and the precritical attitude; both share a 
general preference for theory over practice whereby reality is governed by “general 
                                                 
29 Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess : Studies of Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner 
and Vincent Berraud, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 9. 
30 Dupré, Metaphysics and Culture, 3-4. 
31 There are two reactions towards criticism within Western Christian theology: the 
“paracritical” and the “countercritical” movements. The Kantian distinction between 
faith and reason is illustrative of the paracritical reaction to criticism.  The 
paracritical distinguishes between the realm of science and empirical proof and the 
realm of religious belief.  The former is governed by the critical method and is 
animated by doubt while the latter is governed by sentiment and volition. This 
attempt to reconcile precritical belief with modern criticism ultimately establishes 
two compartmentalized domains that have little, if anything, to offer one another.  
The countercritical movement, which is exemplified in neo-scholastic or manual 
theology, relies heavily upon its sources of authority to develop a type of criticism 
that utilizes syllogistic logic and is directed towards the modern world.  The 
countercritical movement, especially within Roman Catholicism, developed a rigid 
logic of unity based upon truths gleaned from Scripture and Tradition and Scholastic 
Theology, of which Thomistic theology and metaphysics held pride of place.  Dulles, The 
Craft of Theology, 4-6.  This type of rigid countercritical logic culminated in Pius X’s 
“Oath Against Modernism” that was required to be sworn by anyone undertaking 
ecclesiastical authority and responsibility from 1910 until 1967. See Jodock, Darrell 
Jadock, Ed. Catholicism Contending with Modernity: Roman Catholic Modernism and 
Anti-Modernism in Historical Context. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 1-19. 
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theories either of mind or matter” in varying degrees.32  The preference for theory over 
practice in modern and precritical thought has implications for thinking the relationship 
between the one and the many.  Habermas writes: 
The one and the many, abstractly conceived as the relationship of identity and 
difference, is the fundamental relation that metaphysical thinking comprehends 
both as logical and ontological: the one is both axiom and essential ground, 
principle and origin.  From it the many is derived – in the sense both of grounding 
and of originating.  And, thanks to this origin, the many is reproduced in an 
ordered multiplicity.33  
 
The affinity for theory over practice and the methodological dissolution of difference is a 
central concern and target of criticism for the postmodern mindset.   
2.2.2 – Postmodernity  
Modern criticism and precritical thought share a common conviction that 
existence and reality are accessible through rational thought.  Even the reality and 
experience of God is subject to the concepts of rational thought.34  Postmodernity, 
however, deals in expressing what modernity is not capable of thinking, i.e. allowing the 
otherwise absent ‘other’ to manifest itself; presencing the absent. 
The term postmodern is generally associated with the critique and destabilization 
of the beliefs and assumptions of modernity.  The postmodern critique disrupts modern 
assumptions and beliefs by challenging its foundational structures and systems.35  
Seeking to “demythologize” the beliefs of modernity, the central task of the postmodern 
agenda is to disrupt, leave behind, overcome, and deconstruct modern beliefs and 
                                                 
32 Habermas and Hohengarten, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 18.  
33 Ibid., 32. 
34 Anselm’s famous definition of God as “that which no greater can be conceived” is one 
indication of the significance Western thought and theology give to rationality.  M.J. 
Charlesworth, St. Anselm's Proslogion: With a Reply on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo and the 
Author's Reply to Gaunilo. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965, 60-62. 
35 Robyn Horner, Jean-Luc Marion : A Theo-Logical Introduction (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Pub. Co., 2005), 16. 
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assumptions.36  Animated by suspicion and doubt, postmodernity manifests a logic 
governed by critical deconstruction that is directed at attempts, which claim to establish 
or arrive at the definitive ‘one’.  In so doing, postmodern thought accords primacy to 
universal diversity over bringing diversity together under a common universal principle.  
Criticism, however, is the common tool that animates both the postmodern project 
and the modern project.  Both share a common critical attitude and distrust towards the 
assumptions and systems of beliefs inherited from preceding eras.  In a sense, especially 
in view of criticism, postmodernity is modernity’s logical conclusion; it is modern 
criticism turned in on itself.37     
Criticism, whether modern or postmodern, promises possibilities but at the 
expense of closing off and bracketing other possible experiences of existence and reality 
for which it rejects or cannot provide an account.  This, however, need not mean that a 
critical attitude that is animated by doubt or suspicion ought to be perceived as 
superfluous and unnecessary.  Criticism, instead, is more properly envisaged as an 
                                                 
36 Broadly understood, the term postmodern is “a complex cluster concept that includes 
the following elements: an anti- (or post-) epistemological standpoint; anti-essentialism; anti-
realism; anti-foundationalism; opposition to transcendental arguments and transcendental 
standpoints; rejection of the picture of knowledge as accurate representation; rejection of truth as 
correspondence to reality; rejection of the very idea of canonical descriptions; rejection of final 
vocabularies, i.e., rejection of principles, distinctions, and descriptions that are thought to be 
unconditionally binding for all times, persons, and places; and a suspicion of grand narratives, 
metanarratives of the sort perhaps best illustrated by dialectical materialism.” Audi, Cambridge 
Dictionary of Philosophy, 725.  
37 It should be noted that the postmodern context arises out of and the addresses the 
concerns that surface as result of the crisis of modernity, especially in light of experiences such as 
World War II, the Holocaust, and use of atomic weapons.  See: Thomas G. Guarino, 
"Postmodernity and Five Fundamental Theological Issues," Theological Studies 57, no. 4 (1996).; 
Lieven Boeve, "Method in Postmodern Theology a Case Study," in The Presence of 
Transcendence : Thinking 'Sacrament' in a Postmodern Age, ed. L. Boeve and John Ries 
(Leuven: Peeters, 2001).; Paul Sheehan, "Postmodernism and Philosophy," in The Cambridge 
companion to postmodern theology, ed. Kevin J Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006).; Merold Westphal, Overcoming onto-Theology toward a Postmodern Christian 
Faith (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001). 
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integral moment in the larger process of interpretation.  In other words, criticism 
challenges the immediacy of belief, but it need not destroy such belief.  Instead, criticism 
provides the possibility for belief that is mediated and informed.   
2.3 Postcritical Western Thought and Theology  
As Western thought and theology begins to recognize the limitations of the 
critical attitude embodied in both modernity and postmodernity, the process of 
interpretation must begin anew. Paul Ricoeur writes, “… if we can no longer live the 
great symbolisms of the sacred in accordance with the original belief in them, we can, we 
modern men, aim at a second naïveté in and through criticism. In short, it is by 
interpreting that we can hear again.”38   
The naively held immediacy of belief that undergoes criticism need not mean   
that its validity is vanquished.  Criticism instead provides for the possibility of an 
“informed” belief and affords the prospect of a belief that is understood, appropriated, 
and explained differently—a belief that is mediated and expressed by the contemporary 
sociocultural and intellectual paradigm.  The postcritical attitude is not interested in 
overcoming criticism; bust instead, it is animated by a hermeneutic of trust that is 
fundamentally constructive in so far as it seeks to discover meaning after and in relation 
to criticism.  The postcritical is characterized by a second naïveté.  Describing the second 
naïveté and its relationship to criticism, Paul Ricoeur writes:       
In its return to the spoken word, reflection continues to be reflection, that is, the 
understanding of meaning; reflection becomes hermeneutic; this the only way in 
which it can become concrete and still remain reflection.  The second naïveté is 
not the first; it is postcritical and not precritical; it is an informed naïveté.39 
 
                                                 
38 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 351. 
39 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy : An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970), 496. 
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A postcritical attitude seeks to establish a second naïveté within the contemporary context 
of globalization and pluralism and understands these realities as instructive resources.  
Most importantly, the postcritical attitude facilitates a movement beyond criticism by 
providing the resources for an interpretation of unity and difference that does not naively 
assume a metaphysical or ontological preference for unity over diversity, that does not 
hold critical abstraction as the universal principle for arriving at truth, and finally 
understands criticism not as an end, but as an integral moment within the interpretation of 
the human experience of existence and reality.  John MacQuarrie astutely recognizes the 
significance of interpretation within a context marked by plurality and difference when he 
writes: 
There is all the difference in the world between the a comprehensiveness that has 
seriously faced differences and sought to embrace the very truth expressed in the 
difference itself, and a vacuousness which, by accepting every point of view, 
denies any truth claim to all of them.40 
 
The postcritical strives for a comprehensiveness that is developed via critical dialogue 
with difference.  Neither a logic that governs the precritical nor the critical attitude is 
equipped to handle the complexities of interpreting unity and diversity within a pluralistic 
and global world.             
3 – Mystery, Symbol, and a Second Naïveté for Western Thought 
 Postcritical thought and theology strive to attend to the whole of human 
experience.  As such, postcritical thought and theology not only focus on experiences that 
are empirically verifiable, but also listens to the “mysterious” aspects of human 
experience that are not easily interpreted and appropriated.  Attending to the mysterious 
establishes space for the possibility of difference, but a difference that is mediated 
                                                 
40John Macquarrie, Christian Unity and Christian Diversity (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1975), 47.  
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through the familiar.  The interpretation and appropriation of mystery requires a logic 
governed by symbol that provides the potential for thinking one and many as opposed to 
the one over many or as the many over one, as in the case of the precritical and critical 
approaches, respectively. 
3.1 – Mystery and Western Thought   
 A logic governed by the one over the many directs metaphysic and ontology 
throughout most of the history of Western thought, especially since Plato and Aristotle.  
The contemporary postmodern mindset, however, is markedly different.  Influential 
thinkers such as Jacques Derrida (1930 – 2004), Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005), Emmanuel 
Levinas (1906-1995), and Jean-Luc Marion (1946 – present), to name only a few, 
continue to take up Martin Heidegger’s critique of Western thought in a variety of ways 
and provide contemporary challenges to traditional objectivistic metaphysical and 
ontological foundations and presuppositions of Western thought and theology.    
3.1.1 – Onto-Theo-Logy and the Ontological Difference 
 Martin Heidegger claims that Western thought takes a fundamental misstep when 
it formulates the concept of ‘Being’41 as universal, indefinable, and self-evident.42  
Wrathall and Murphey observe in An Overview of Being and Time that,  
[f]rom Aristotle to Descartes and beyond, for instance, both human beings and 
nonhuman things were understood to be alike in that they were substances: 
                                                 
41 The use of Being – with a capital B – as opposed to being – with a lower case b – in 
Heidegger’s work is significant.  For the sake of consistency and clarity it should be noted that 
being designates an entity or thing, Being designates existence, and Dasein designates that entity 
for which its Being is an issue. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans., John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (New York: HarperPerennial/Modern Thought, 2008), 67-68.   
42 Ibid., 22-24. 
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discretely individuated, self-sufficient entities that possess determinate properties 
and stand in contingent, external relations to one another.43  
 
 The well-founded observation that traditional Western thought interprets ‘Being’ via a 
metaphysical logic of substantial ontology is taken up by Heidegger in his seminal work 
Being and Time. Heidegger contends that the traditional metaphysical understanding of 
‘Being’ is only one of three modes or ways of being.  He maintains that Western thought 
has come to think of Being only in terms of Vorhandenheit and overlooks Dasein and 
Zuhandenheit.44  
 Vorhandenheit, or presence-at-hand, is a derivative mode of Being and is 
indicative of entities that “we discover when we abstract from our practical engagement 
with the world and take up a reflective or theoretical or scientific attitude towards it.”45  
According to Heidegger, from Aristotle onwards Western thought increasingly thinks of 
Being as an individuated “substance” that is present-at-hand.  Simply put, Western 
thought envisions Being as an entity alongside other entities.   However, Heidegger 
recognizes that:  
The Being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity.  If we are to understand the problem 
of Being our first philosophical step is… in not ‘telling a story’ that is to say, in 
not defining entities as entities by tracing them back in their origin to some other 
entities, as if Being had the character of some possible entity.46  
  
Heiddeger’s fundamental critique of Western thought is that it envisions existence as an 
entity.  Being is not a thing or an object; there is no such “thing” as “to be”, but Western 
                                                 
43 Mark A Wrathall and Max Murphey, "An Overview of Being and Time," in The 
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time, ed. Mark A. Wrathall (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 4. 
44 Heidegger defines Dasein “as an entity which does not occur among other entities.  
Rather, it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. 
Heidegger, Being and Time, 32. Zuhandenheit or “readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities 
as they are ‘in themselves’ and defined ontologico-categorically. Ibid., 101. 
45 Ibid., 9. 
46 Ibid., 26. 
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thought has forgotten this.47  The forgetfulness of Being in the West establishes thought 
that gives priority to conceptual interpretations of existence over practical engagement 
and culminates in modern science and technology.  The distinction between Being and 
entities is famously coined by Heidegger as the “ontological difference”.48  Summarizing 
the unfolding of the ontological difference in Western thought, Louis-Marie Chauvet 
writes: 
[f]rom the moment [being] is conceived as at the base of all entities, being 
necessarily and simultaneously “twins” into a unique summit; it refers to the a 
first entity – the Good or the One (Plato); the divine (Aristotle); God in God’s 
very self, absolute entity, “uncreated being” (ens increatum) (Aquinas); both “first 
cause” (causa prima) and “ultimate reason” (ultima ratio) (Leibniz); “beginning 
and “end” (arche and telos) – that cannot be this without being “its own cause” 
(causa sui).  Thus from its inception with Plato, metaphysics appears to have 
been… a kind of thinking which everywhere ponders the entity as such and 
justifies it within the totality of being as foundation.49    
   
Forgetting the ontological difference leads to thinking that is “onto-theo-logical.” That is, 
Western thought confuses the domains of theology and philosophy by contaminating 
                                                 
47 Despite subsequent interpretations of Aquinas there is an undeniable thread of the 
apophatic tradition within his writings.  In particular, Aquinas draws upon the works of Pseudo- 
Dionysus.  According to Pseudo-Dionysius, “God is known… both through knowing… and 
through not-knowing... Of it there is understanding, reason and knowledge, touch, sense-
perception, opinion, imagination, name and everything otherwise. Yet it is neither understood nor 
spoken nor named. It is not something amongst beings. Neither is it known as something amongst 
beings. It is ‘all in all’ (1 Cor. 15: 28), and nothing in nothing: from all things it is known to all, 
and from nothing it is known to no one… Moreover, knowing by not-knowing… is the most 
divine knowledge (gnosis) of God. According to union beyond understanding, whenever the mind 
is withdrawn from all being, and has been set free itself, then it is united with the brightness 
beyond light, being enlightened then and there by the unsearchable abundance of wisdom.” As 
quoted in Micahel Craig Rhodes, Mystery in Philosophy: An Invocation of Pseudo-Dionysius 
(New York Lexington Books, 2012), 3.   
48 See: Martin Heidegger, "The onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in 
Identity and Difference (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002).; Martin Heidegger, 
"The Principle of Difference," in Identity and Difference (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2002). 
49 Louis Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament : A Sacramental Reinterpretation of 
Christian Existence (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1995), 27. 
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theology with ontology and ontology with theology.50  Merold Westphal writes that, “it is 
in modernity's wedding of science and technology that onto-theology has its greatest 
triumph, placing the world at its disposal, first conceptually and then practically.”51  
Aristotle initiates the problem of onto-theo-logy by envisioning Metaphysics as both 
ontology and theology. Jeffrey Robbins articulates how Western metaphysics is onto-
theo-logical when he writes: 
Metaphysics comes to its limits and recognizes the abyss over which it stands.  
Thus, in order to give account of its ungrounded ground, it makes appeal to a 
logic not its own, and therefore metaphysics becomes theological. Theology, on 
the other hand, seeks to know the Supreme Being, which is by nature unknowable 
and ungraspable. God is wholly other. Thus, in order to make its faith secure, it 
speaks of God as though God belonged to the order of knowledge, and therefore 
theology becomes metaphysical.52   
 
While Heidegger’s call for a strict separation between philosophy and theology is 
overstated, his central insights are correct.  Firstly, the positing of an ungrounded ground 
in philosophy amounts to a conceptual limit that resolves the problem of an infinite 
regress.  The mystery of Being proper to philosophy is thus resolved by positing a 
foundational principle (God).  In so doing, philosophy takes what does not belong to it 
from the domain of theology and reduces the infinite possibilities of the mystery of Being 
to an object that is conceptually knowable.  Secondly, when Western theology 
appropriates, explains, and understands the ungraspable alterity of the Christian God by 
beginning with metaphysics and ontology, it subsumes the radical otherness of God - 
                                                 
50 Heidegger contends that there is distinct divide between ontology and theology.  He 
writes: ”Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god.  Before the causa sui, man can neither fall 
to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before this god.” Heidegger, "The onto-
Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics," 72. 
51 Merold Westphal, "Onto-Theology. Metanarrative, Perspectivism, and the Gospel," in 
Christianity and the Postmodern Turn Six Views, ed. Myron Penner (Grand Rapids: Baker Pub. 
Group, 2005), 145. 
52 Jeffrey W. Robbins, "The Problem of Ontotheology: Complicating the Divide between 
Philosophy and Theology," The Heythrop Journal 43: 144. 
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known through Revelation - to conceptual and theoretical knowledge that is known 
independently from Revelation.  On the one hand, Western theology upholds the primacy 
of revelation and acknowledges the limits of human reason. Yet, on the other hand, when 
it does speak of God, it tends to be rationalistic and attempts to resolve the mystery of 
God.53   
 Theology and philosophy, however, need not be hermetically sealed off from one 
another, as there is a basic affinity between them.  They share a common undertaking in 
so far as they seek to articulate mystery.  On the other hand, the proper “object” of 
theology (God) and the proper “object” of philosophy (Being) are interpreted from 
different vantage points, belong to different domains, adhere to different methods, and 
maintain different commitments.  As Heidegger astutely observes, confusing the two 
leads to thinking that is self-enclosed.  Onto-theo-logical thought keeps “itself secure 
from the complicating truth of mystery, the ever-illusive realm of the unthought, the 
absence of presence, or the presence of absence.”54  The forgetfulness of the ontological 
difference is essentially equivalent to the forgetfulness of mystery and it is precisely the 
‘complicating truth of mystery’ that postcritical thought and theology must attend to in 
                                                 
53Western thought uses the philosophical data of the mystery of existence and the 
theological data of the mystery of God and applies them to one another as if they belong to the 
same domain.  However, the data gained through reason and the data of Revelation are not 
synonymous with one another, nor do they appropriately resolve the mystery proper to theology 
and philosophy. John Paul II recognizes the interconnectivity of philosophy and theology while 
also upholding the rightful autonomy of each.  He writes, “Were theologians to refuse the help of 
philosophy, they would run the risk of doing philosophy unwittingly and locking themselves 
within thought-structures poorly adapted to the understanding of faith. Were philosophers, for 
their part, to shun theology completely, they would be forced to master on their own the contents 
of Christian faith, as has been the case with some modern philosophers. Either way, the 
grounding principles of autonomy which every science rightly wants guaranteed would be 
seriously threatened.”  John Paul II, "Fides Et Ratio," Inside the Vatican, no. Special Issue 
(1998). 
54 Robbins, "The Problem of Ontotheology," 141. 
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order to speak intelligibly within a world that is increasingly marked by the realities of 
pluralism and globalization.   
3.1.2 – Reclaiming Mystery  
The desire of contemporary Western thinkers to overcome onto-theo-logy and to 
reinvigorate mystery emerges out of three interrelated observations.55 Firstly, there is 
recognition of an abiding elusive quality to existence, reality, and human experience that 
is not easily understood, explained, and appropriated.56  Secondly, there is recognition 
that human reason is limited and contingent. Lastly, there is recognition that uncovering 
the significance of experience, reality, and existence is not strictly bound to the 
interpretative province of abstract and conceptual thought.  These insights initiate a call 
for renewed attention to the tacit aspects of human experience and to an interpretation of 
mystery that extends beyond conceptual mastery towards openness to the difference of 
the ‘other’.   
The tacit experience of mystery challenges the limits and relative rational safety 
of traditional metaphysical/ontological thought.  Regarding the relationship between 
human thought and mystery, Karl Rahner observes: 
The mystery is self-evident… Existentially… it is at once a menace to man and 
his blessed peace.  It can make him chafe and protest, because it compels him to 
leave the tiny house of his ostensibly clear self-possession, to advance into the 
trackless spaces, even in the night.  It seems to ask too much of him, to 
overburden him with monstrous claims.  It forces upon him the dilemma of either 
throwing himself into the uncharted, unending adventure where he commits 
                                                 
 55 The Expression ‘onto-the-ology was coined by Martin Heidegger and extensively 
examined in his work: Heidegger, "The onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics."  
56 For critiques of Onto-Theo-logy see: Westphal, Overcoming onto-Theology; Chauvet, 
Symbol and Sacrament, 7-45; John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, God, the Gift, and 
Postmodernism, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.; Sheehan. 
 35 
himself to the infinite, or – despairing at the thought and so embittered – of taking 
shelter in the suffocating den of his own finite perspicacity.57 
 
Mystery orients and confronts the human person with meaning.  Mystery is neither a 
tentative reality nor a provisional reality.  Instead, mystery is the unshakable reality that 
encounters and threatens the human person with what is radically other and 
unmanageable.  This confrontation with mystery reveals the limits and radical 
dependence of the human person and human knowledge.  For human persons, this single 
aporetic experience of mystery is at once an experience of the infinite and finite.   
Phillip Gleeson affirms that, “‘Mystery’ is a word which warns us against placing 
false limits and boundaries.”58  As such, the interpretation and appropriation of mystery 
requires hermeneutic caution and restraint despite the tendency in Western thought and 
theology to reduce mystery to what is wholly unknowable (infinite) or to a problem that 
simply lacks the proper knowledge at present, but will find future resolution (finite).  As 
the above observations testify, mystery is experienced as a reality that is infinitely 
knowable.59  The justification and merits of understanding mystery as infinitely knowable 
will become apparent in the subsequent reflection; however, a few basic remarks are in 
order relative to this provisional and observational claim.  Firstly, an approach to mystery 
that is governed by the logic of traditional Western metaphysical/ontological thought 
cannot provide an adequate hermeneutic for interpreting mystery alone.  Traditional 
Western thought, which culminates in modern criticism, interprets reality by subsuming 
                                                 
57 Karl Rahner, "The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology," in More Recent 
Writings,  Theological Investigations (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 58. 
58 Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, and Dermot A. Lane, The New Dictionary of 
Theology (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1991), 692. 
59 Heidegger develops a similar definition of Mystery when he writes: “that which shows 
itself and at the same time withdraws is the essential trait of what we call mystery.” Martin 
Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1966), 55. 
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what is other under the auspices of a common system or framework and reduces what is 
other and different to the same and familiar.  In this case, unity is given priority over 
difference.  Secondly, an approach to mystery that is governed by the logic of 
contemporary Western postmodern thought and adopts a propensity for critical 
deconstruction and suspicion does not provide an adequate hermeneutic for interpreting 
mystery either.  In the case of postmodern thought, difference is upheld as a good in and 
of itself.  As such, postmodern thought tends to adjudicate difference an importance 
above unity. 
Postcritical thinking requires a hermeneutic that is rigorous enough to explicate 
and expound mystery and also adaptable and tentative enough to avoid the temptation of 
conceptually dominating mystery.  A hermeneutic for a postcritical theology recognizes 
the significance of the believer, the situation or context of the believer, and the 
knowledge of the believer.  Postcritical thought and theology inhabits the relational space 
between the subjectivity and objectivity.  Melvin Keiser explains that: 
Although we may choose to begin a theology from some explicit principle, our 
actual starting point is not any articulate form of our creativity but the realities of 
our living.  We live and think from our tacit indwelling of reality.  Although we 
know various aspects of reality by drawing tacit patterns into explicit forms, the 
fullness of reality forever transcends all our formalizing activity.  To live from 
tacit commitment is to live in mystery.  60 
 
Postcritical thought and theology begins with the recognition that before conceptual 
knowledge is possible, a prior relational structure already exists between the human 
being, the situation of the human being, and the tacit knowledge of the experience. 
3.2 Gabriel Marcel and Recollection 
                                                 
 60 Melvin Keiser, "Beginning Where We Are: The Postcritical Starting Point of 
Systematic Theology," Religion and Intellectual Life 5, no. 4 (1988): 79. 
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Both Martin Heidegger and Gabriel Marcel share a common conviction that 
modern Western thought leaves little, if any, room for mystery and wonder.  While 
Heidegger uncovers a space within Western thought for mystery through his recognition 
of the ontological difference, the philosophical reflections of Gabriel Marcel provide key 
insights for a postcritical articulation of mystery via his understanding of the distinction 
between the “problematic” and the “mysterious” and his understanding of “recollection”. 
Marcel’s general distrust of the modern program is directed towards its promise of 
universal objectivity.  Marcel’s critique of Western thought, however, is not directed 
towards Metaphysics per se; instead, Marcel takes issue with the unchecked confidence 
and privileged status modernity gives to conceptual knowledge as the sole arbiter of 
truth.61  According to Marcel, modernity overestimates the autonomy and centrality of 
critical thought and threatens to extinguish the human being’s longing for the mysterious 
and subsequent reflection trained on it.   
The decline in the attention given to mystery is proportional to the increased 
emphasis on conceptual knowledge arrived at through criticism.  Marcel writes:  
In such a world the ontological need, the need of being, is exhausted in exact 
proportion to the breaking up of personality on the one hand and, on the other, to 
the triumph of the category of the "purely natural" and the consequent atrophy of 
the faculty of wonder.62 
 
Marcel, however, is not advocating for the abandonment of criticism.63  In fact, Marcel 
recognizes the indispensable need for criticism within the economy of reflection, but he 
decries the modern belief that one arrives at truth only through criticism animated by 
                                                 
61 See: Kenneth T. Gallagher, "Metaphysics as Mystery: From Kant to Marcel," in God 
Knowable and Unknowable, ed. Robert J. Roth (New York: Fordham University Press, 1973). 
62 Gabriel Marcel and Brendan Sweetman, A Gabriel Marcel Reader (South Bend, Ind.: 
St. Augustine's Press, 2011), 24. 
63 Marcel and Descartes Brendan Sweetman, The Vision of Gabriel Marcel: 
Epistemology, Human Person, the Transcendent (New York: Rodopi, 2008), 7-21. 
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doubt that culminates in abstraction from practical engagement with the world.64  Critical 
thought is essential but not central to reflection and “experience cannot fail to transform 
itself into reflection.”65  Within the economy of reflection, there are three interrelated 
moments: personal experience, primary reflection, and secondary reflection or 
recollection.  The first way of reflecting is proper to the domain of the purely natural.  
Primary reflection deals with the problematic and interprets reality and existence by 
breaking apart personal experience into manageable segments.  In this sense, primary 
reflection abstracts the originally unified aspects of experience and “tends to dissolve the 
unity of experience which is first put before it.”66  Put another way, primary reflection 
interprets experience in a way that tends toward the discovery of objective certainty by 
establishing an existential space or distance between the subject and the object.  Brendan 
Sweetman defines primary reflection as:  
…“ordinary” everyday reflection, which employs conceptual generalizations, 
abstractions, and an appeal to what is universal and verifiable.  This kind of 
reflection aims at abstracting from our everyday situation, and seeks “public” 
concepts that are accessible to everyone in the same way regardless of their actual 
“situated involvement” in existence.  This type of reflection typically deals with 
problems of various kinds that confront human beings in the course of their daily 
lives. 67 
 
Not all experiences of the human being, however, are easily objectified and abstracted.  
There are experiences that, because the human being is personally caught up in them, 
                                                 
64 Reflection for Marcel is simply paying attention to experience, which, for the human 
being, is always and fundamentally situated within the concrete world; human being is always a 
concrete being-in-a-situation. The experience of human being is embodied and concrete.  The 
concrete situation of the human being, however, does not necessitate that the human being arrives 
at meaning immediately in and through the concrete objects of the world.  Ibid., 23-38; Marcel 
and Sweetman, A Gabriel Marcel Reader, 73-76. 
65 Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, Volume 2: Faith and Reality (South Bend, Ind.: 
St. Augustine's Press, 2001), 83. 
66 Ibid., 84. p. 84 
67 Sweetman, Vision of Marcel, 56. 
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cannot be held at a safe and objective distance.  Such experiences are meaningful insofar 
as they reveal truths about the reality of human existence and resist objectification. 
 While Marcel upholds that truth is a reality for the human being, he challenges the 
necessity and possibility of arriving at universal truth via universal objective methods.  
Arriving at universal objective truth requires a universal objective method that disregards 
the personal, sociocultural, and intellectual horizon of a given time and place.68  Marcel 
writes: 
There is every reason to suppose that we remain dominated by an image of truth 
as something extracted – extracted or smelted out exactly as a pure metal is 
extracted from a mixed ore.  It seems obvious to us… that there are established, 
legitimate ways of arriving at truth… it is however, this very image of truth as 
something smelted out that we must encounter critically if we want to grasp 
clearly the gross error on which it rests.69 
 
Marcel does not argue that truth is an illusion, nor does he argue that truth is relative; 
instead, he advocates for the recognition of truth as a reality that differs from objects.  As 
such, one should not expect truth to adhere to the interpretative techniques associated 
with the manipulation of objects.  For instance, the experience of birth is rightfully 
interpreted differently by both a delivering doctor and a delivering mother.  A good 
doctor must adhere to an objective interpretation of birth.  Hence, a good doctor 
appropriates the objective explanation of birth and subsequently understands the birthing 
procedure objectively.  This allows the doctor to anticipate and respond to problems that 
may arise during birth.   The delivering mother, on the other hand, need not know 
anything about the objective birthing process in order to interpret the experience as 
                                                 
68 It is common in Western thought and theology to interpret truth as though it were an 
object or a thing.  A universally valid truth necessitates a universally valid and repeatable 
technique for arriving at truth and is accomplished by reducing truth to an observable object that 
is obtained through a process of extraction, or better abstraction, from the human being’s personal 
experience.   
69 Marcel, Mystery of Being II, 19. 
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meaningful.  If asked, the doctor can reduce many of the truths of the experience of birth 
to objective information; the mother, however, is likely to have difficultly reducing the 
experience to objective details.  An essential difference between objective truth and the 
actual experience of truth is that objects are reducible while experience is unified and 
irreducible.  Marcel explains:  
This irreducibility we must keep a grip on if we want to get beyond the illusory 
image of truth as a physical object, a substance, the contents of a vessel, a mere 
thing, and to recognize that the impossibility of adequately representing by 
material images those processes by which I can both conceive a true proposition 
and affirm it to be true.70 
 
Reflection on irreducible experience is proper to secondary reflection or recollection.  
This manner of reflecting focuses on and seeks to uncover or re-collect the meaning of 
the originally unified experience of the human being.   Recollection transcends the 
objective certainty sought in primary reflection because the knowledge appropriate to 
recollection is the mysterious experiences of life that are pre-reflectively or tacitly 
known.  Secondary reflection pulls together what was abstracted, pulled apart, and 
previously objectified; it is “…best understood as both the act of critical reflection on 
primary reflection, and the process of recovery of the "mysteries of being.”71  Through 
recollection one becomes aware of what is otherwise unthinkable and neglected by 
primary reflection.72  The human being intuitively knows more than she or he can grasp 
in and through primary reflection and knows mystery without mastering it objectively.   
                                                 
70 Ibid., 20. 
71 Marcel and Sweetman, A Gabriel Marcel Reader, 19.  
72 Marcel sometimes calls this awareness intuition. See: ibid., 62-66. 
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 As infinitely knowable Mystery is “a problem that encroaches upon its own data, 
that invades the data and thereby transcends itself as a simple problem.”73 Recollection 
thus calls for an investigation and interpretation that recognizes the infinite in the finite 
circumstances of experience and in so doing transcends the distinctions and methods of 
primary reflection that is trained upon the problematic.74 Marcel writes: 
The recognition of mystery… is an essentially positive act of the mind, the 
supremely positive act in virtue of which all positivity may perhaps be strictly 
defined.  In this sphere everything seems to go on as if I found myself acting on 
an intuition which I possess without immediately knowing myself to possess it – 
an intuition which cannot be, strictly speaking, self-conscious and which can 
grasp itself only through the modes of experience in which its image is reflected, 
and which it lights up by being reflected in them.  The essential metaphysical step 
would then consist in a reflection upon this reflection.  By means of this, thought 
stretches toward the recovery of an intuition which otherwise loses itself in 
proportion as it is exercised. 75 
 
Mystery is properly ontological if one considers “Being [existence] as the principle of 
inexhaustability.”76 This is justified if one recognizes that fundamental questions about 
the meaning of existence and reality are inexhaustible, but arise within the concrete and 
natural world.  The distinction between a problem and a mystery is one of range and 
scope.   Addressing the distinction between the mysterious and the problematic, Marcel 
writes: 
A problem is something met with which bars my passage. It is before me in its 
entirety. A mystery, on the other hand, is something in which I find myself caught 
up and whose essence is therefore not to be before me in its entirety. It is as 
                                                 
 73 Gabriel Marcel, Gabriel Marcel's Perspectives on the Broken World : The Broken 
World, a Four-Act Play : Followed by Concrete Approaches to Investigating the Ontological 
Mystery, Marquette Studies in Philosophy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1998), 178. 
74 Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, trans., Katherine Farrer (Nabu Press, 2014). 
75 Ibid., 118. 
 76 It is important to note that Marcel does not use the terms ontological, metaphysics, 
being etc. as they are commonly understood in philosophical discourse.  While he is committed to 
using a metaphysical/ontological register, Marcel goes through great lengths to reinterpret 
commonly used philosophical terms within an existential/phenomenological context. Ibid  
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though in this province the distinction between in me and before me loses its 
meaning.77   
 
The human being discovers one’s-self in recollection on mystery.  Mystery grabs a hold 
of the human person before the human person can grab a hold of mystery.  Hence, 
mystery presents itself as an unanticipated gift that confronts, constructs, and constitutes 
the human being. 78  A problem, however, is understood, appropriated, and explained by 
the human being within the context of defined and pre-established limits.  
 Roger Hazelton distills three characteristics of mystery based on Marcel’s 
analysis.  Firstly, a mystery has personal value.79 The experience of mystery is significant 
to the individual; it matters to the human being. There is a personal closeness or 
proximity between the human being and mystery that is absent in the case of the problem.  
Reflection on Mystery begins with the human being as subject, but as a subject that is 
already personally implicated and caught up in the inquiry.  In recollection, the human 
being cannot abstract one’s self from their experience of mystery.  Mystery is a reality 
that presents existential significance and meaning when it is experienced and therefore 
cannot be held away at a safe distance and examined like the object of scientific enquiry.  
                                                 
 77 Marcel, Being and Having, 76. 
 78 The notion of the gift is extensively discussed as a central theme in the phenomenology 
of Jean-Luc Marion.  Marion’s notion of the gift is key to his understanding of the saturated 
phenomenon, which is similar to the understanding of mystery that is proposed here.  The 
fundamental difference between mystery as it is understood in this work and Marion’s’ 
philosophical thought regarding the saturated phenomenon rests on Marion’s conviction that the 
Human person, or the Gifted one, is radically passive.  Marion’s phenomenology is ill equipped 
to deal with the realities of free will and choice of the human person.  Marion’s project to remove 
being, ontology, and subjectivity from philosophy and theology leads to the development of a 
system that accords freedom and priority to the “other”.  See: Marion, In Excess; Jean-Luc 
Marion, Being Given : Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2002); Jean-Luc Marion, Reduction and Givenness : Investigations of Husserl, 
Heidegger, and Phenomenology, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and 
Existential Philosophy (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1998). 
79 Roger Hazelton, "Marcel on Mystery," The Journal of Religion 38, no. 3 (1958): 159.  
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Secondly, there is a positive reason why mystery cannot be objectified or 
problematized.80  Mystery transcends objectification because of its surplus of meaning.  
Marcel writes: 
It is also worth noticing that I who ask questions about Being do not in the first 
place know either if I am nor a fortiori what I am. I do not even clearly know the 
meaning of the question ‘what am I?’ though I am obsessed by it. So we see the 
problem of Being here encroaching upon its own data, and being studied actually 
inside the subject who states it. In the process, it is denied (or transcended) as 
problem, and becomes metamorphosed to mystery.81 
 
Mystery, in a manner of speaking, interprets the human being. It presents inexhaustible 
meaning and significance to the human being. 
Lastly Hazelton notes that something is a mystery “if my being [existence] is 
involved in it.”82 As discussed above, the distinction between the internal and the external 
loses its significance in the experience of mystery.  It is a call towards the discovery of 
one’s vocation.  Mystery not only confronts the human person with meaning, it also 
issues a call and demands a response from the human being.  Hence, mystery’s call, 
which demands a response, implies the human being’s capacity to interpret and 
appropriate. Only through interpretation and appropriation can the human being 
“become” what mystery calls one to be. 
Gabriel Marcel’s phenomenological analysis of human experience provides 
important insights for the development of postcritical thought by demonstrating the 
human being’s need for mystery and the subsequent necessity of reflection on mystery 
via recollection.  As such, he moves beyond the typical attempts in Western thought to 
critically appropriate reality and existence and provides an entry point into the realm of 
                                                 
80 Ibid.  
81 Marcel, Being and Having, 89. 
82 Hazelton, "Marcel on Mystery," 159.  
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mystery.  Marcel endeavors to provide a phenomenological description of mystery and 
“to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself 
from itself.”83  Thus, Marcel teaches that mystery is lived before it is thought and that the 
reductive and totalizing systems of thought typical of the West are not appropriate for 
reflection on mystery.  The call to recollect the lived experience of mystery in secondary 
reflection exceeds the boundaries and competency of a logic that attempts to understand, 
explain, and appropriate by categorization and abstraction, a logic that subsumes 
difference into totalizing structures and places the one over the many.  
Is it possible to discern or interpret the paradoxical experience of mystery rather 
than abstractly speculate about it?  Melvin Keiser summarizes the activity of postcritical 
reflection:  
Postcritical reflection begins not with abstraction but with interpretation. As 
thinking emerges from tacit commitments, we ask about what is going on: What is 
the context of our tacit indwelling; what is the direction of our form-shaping 
emergence; what is the meaning of our lived faith? “Don’t think but look”… 84 
 
Postcritical reflection begins with phenomenological description, but requires a 
hermeneutic for interpretation.  Everything that appears within the horizon of experience 
for the human being, including mystery, is intelligible only through language and 
language in turn demands interpretation.85  It is to the activity of a postcritical 
interpretation that the discussion now turns. 
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3.3 Paul Ricoeur, Symbol, and the Second Naïveté  
 The relationships between lived experience, interpretation, and discourse are taken 
up in the philosophic thought of Paul Ricoeur and center on his hermeneutic theories of 
symbol and interpretation.  Ricoeur recognizes that reflection requires some degree of 
intelligibility and intelligibility requires interpretation.  Ricoeur’s early theory of 
hermeneutics and the interpretation of symbols and his later conviction that hermeneutics 
extends to the interpretation of discourse as a whole provide insights and resources that 
are indispensable for the development of postcritical thought and theology that reflects 
upon mystery.86  Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation allows for the possibility of thinking 
the one and the many by establishing a productive dialectic tension between primary 
reflection on the problematic and recollection on mystery.  This, in turn, accords the 
opportunity for thinking unity and difference outside of the confines of both the principle 
of one over many and the unbridled difference of postmodernity. 
 Ricoeur, like Marcel, endeavors to reach back and recollect the originally unified 
experience of mystery.  This reaching back, however, does not capture original 
experience immediately and instead it must be mediated through symbol and language.  
Hence, what Marcel terms secondary reflection or recollection Ricoeur recognizes as a 
moment that calls for interpretation in order to bring such experiences to intelligibility via 
symbol.  Ricoeur writes:  
We know the harassing backward flight of thought in search of the first truth and, 
more radically still, in search of a point of departure that might well not be a first 
truth.  The illusion is not in looking for a point of departure, but looking for it 
without presuppositions.  A meditation on symbols starts from speech that has 
already taken place, and in which everything has already been said in some fashion; 
it wishes to be thought with its presuppositions.  For it, the first task is not to begin 
but, from the midst of speech, to remember; to remember with a view to 
                                                 
86 Karl Simms, Paul Ricoeur (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 30. 
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beginning.87 
 
 This section develops Ricoeur’s philosophic reflection on symbol and its 
subsequent need for interpretation.  In particular, this section claims that a postcritical 
interpretation 1) does not begin with or seek only to discover the static common 
principles of primary reflection, but instead begins with the contingent presuppositions of 
language and 2) remembers or recollects the experience of mystery via a logic that is 
governed by symbol. 
3.3.1 – Symbolic Meaning 
 As reflection trained upon mystery, recollection or secondary reflection requires 
unique interpretative strategies because mystery is never fully exposed and always 
remains hidden in some sense.  Mystery, however, does become intelligible via the 
symbol while remaining free from concepts.  According to Ricoeur a symbol is “any 
structure of signification in which a direct, primary, literal meaning designates, in 
addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and which can be 
apprehended only through the first.”88  A symbol, thus, arises out of a dialogue of 
meanings that require two distinct, yet interrelated, moments of interpretation: literal and 
symbolic.  The interpretation of symbols thus presents difficulty for traditional Western 
thought for three reasons: 1) symbols are opaque, 2) symbols are culturally contingent, 
and 3) symbols depend on, but are not limited to, problematical interpretation.89   
 Firstly, “the symbol remains opaque, not transparent, since it is given by means of 
                                                 
87 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 348-349. 
88 Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 
2007), 12-13.  
 89 Paul Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: II," in The 
Conflict of Interpretations (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 317. 
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an analogy based on literal signification.”90  Accordingly, there is a complexity of 
meanings for symbol.  A symbol presents one meaning that is literal and a second 
meaning that is hidden and mysterious.  As the above attests, Western thought 
traditionally accords preference to interpretations that rely on clear and distinct categories 
and concepts.  Hence, Western thought tends to favor the first meaning that is literal and 
immediate and attempts to extend the interpretation proper to the literal meaning to the 
second symbolic meaning.  In effect, this obliterates the second opaque, hidden, and 
mysterious meaning by forcing a reduction upon it, disregarding it, or simply ignoring it.  
There is, however, an immediacy of the first meaning that is not characteristic of the 
second meaning, and the second meaning is arrived at only through the first meaning.  As 
such, the immediacy of the first meaning mediates the second meaning.  Patrick 
Bourgeois writes:  
Symbol is the movement of the primary meaning making us share in the latent 
meaning, thus assimilating us to the symbolized without our being able to 
intellectually dominate the similarity.  This is one sense which the symbol “gives”; 
it “gives” because it is a primary intentionality giving the second meaning.91 
 
As a symbol, water, for instance, carries a double meaning.  In its literal sense, water is 
experienced as the universal solvent and cleanser, it is a source of food and nourishment, 
it alleviates thirst, it gives life, it takes life, etc.  These various meanings literally and 
immediately belong to water.   As symbol, however, water also embodies all at once the 
mysterious complexities of life, death, the human desire for spiritual cleansing, etc.  
Water carries a deeper and mysterious meaning because of and through its literal 
meaning.  In other words, because the human being literally experiences water as life-
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91 Patrick Bourgeois, "From Hermeneutics of Symbol to the Interpretation of Texts," in 
Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ed. Charles E. Reagan (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1979), 86. 
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giving and life-taking and because life and death are meaningful realities for the human 
being, water can present deeper questions about the mysteries of reality and existence.  
Hence, the human being not only interprets water as a symbol, but water also interprets 
the human being.  
 Secondly, the symbol is a prisoner of the diversity of languages and cultures and, 
for this reason, remains contingent.”92  The symbol offends the Western preoccupation 
with and desire for necessity.  Symbolic interpretation does not seek to establish nor does 
it begin with what is necessary, but instead starts in the midst of language that already 
exists in a diversity of ways.  Symbolic interpretation begins with a wager that is closer to 
an educated guess than it is to the conceptual certainty sought after by modernity.  
Ricoeur writes: 
I wager that I shall have a better understanding of man and the bond between the 
being of man and the being of all beings if I follow the indication of symbolic 
thought.  That wager then becomes the task of verifying my wager and saturating it, 
so to speak with intelligibility.  In return, the task transforms my wager: in betting 
on the significance of the symbolic world, I bet at the same time that my wager will 
be restored to me in the power of reflection, in the element of coherent discourse.93   
 
As such, all discourse, including symbolic discourse, begins with presuppositions. Honest 
discourse makes these presuppositions explicit by stating them as belief, and wagers that 
the belief will pay off in understanding.94  Thus, Ricoeur articulates the hermeneutic 
circle, “we must understand in order to believe, but we must believe in order to 
understand.”95  Symbols are thought with and through the particularity of sociocultural 
                                                 
92 Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: II," 317. 
93 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 355. 
 94 ibid., 357. 
 95 ibid., 351. 
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and intellectual presuppositions. 96 
 Lastly, “the symbol is given to thought only by way of interpretation which remains 
inherently problematical.”97  There is a double intentionality characteristic of the symbol.  
The symbol intends meaning beyond, but only through its literal meaning. It intends what 
is other than itself, at least literally or objectively speaking.  Through a meaning that is 
properly its own, the literal signifier presents or gives a meaning that is not its own but is 
intelligible.  Succinctly put, “What the symbol gives, gives rise to thought.”98 Ricoeur 
writes: 
That sentence (“the symbol gives rise to thought”) which enchants me, says two 
things: the symbol gives; but what it gives is occasion for thought, something to 
think about… But what the symbol gives rise to is thinking.  After the gift, positing.  
The aphorism suggests at the same time that everything has already been said 
enigmatically and yet that it is always necessary to begin everything and to begin it 
again in the dimension of thinking.  It is this articulation of thought given to itself 
in the realm of symbols and of thought positing and thinking that constitutes the 
critical point of the whole enterprise. 99_    
 
The symbol speaks the mystery that cannot be spoken literally and speaks the mysterious 
without dominating or reducing it and in so doing articulates what is infinitely knowable.  
The second intentionality does not belong only to the literal carrier of the secondary or 
mysterious meaning.  Returning to the example of water, it cannot present itself as 
symbol without its literal meaning and the existential meaning that the human being 
                                                 
 96 This is similar to Gadamer’s understanding of tradition.  Gadamer writes, “A reflection 
on what truth is in the human sciences must not try to reflect itself out of the tradition whose 
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99 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 348-349. 
 50 
brings as well.  Without human beings and the ontological exigency, there are no 
symbols.  Water would cease to be a symbol that expresses the mystery of life and death 
if there were no human beings longing to make sense of their reality and existence or if 
human beings no longer found life and death meaningful.   
3.3.2 – The Need for Interpretation 
 Symbols articulate the mystery of reality and existence, bringing intelligibility to 
otherwise non-intelligible experiences that lie beyond the conceptual grasp of primary 
reflection.  Because symbols are polysemic and articulate mystery, they require an 
interpretation that is governed by a logic different from that of problematic and a logic of 
the one and the many.  Symbols require interpretation that is continuous and indefinite.  
 Interpretation for Ricoeur “is the work of thought which consists in deciphering the 
hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in 
the literal meaning.”100  The unfolding levels of meaning are uncovered through the 
interrelated hermeneutic activities of explanation, understanding, and appropriation.  
There is a dialectic tension between understanding and explanation and their respective 
relationships to meaning.  “In explanation we ex-plicate or unfold the range of 
propositions and meanings, whereas in understanding we comprehend or grasp as a 
whole the chain of partial meanings in one act of synthesis.101  Hence, explanation 
corresponds to the activity of primary reflection while understanding corresponds to the 
activity of recollection.  The process of interpretation, however, is not one-directional.  
Instead, interpretation is a dialogic process whereby an initial understanding is furthered 
through explanation in a constant oscillation between understanding and explanation.  
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101 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort 
Worth, Tex: Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1976), 72. 
 51 
Ricoeur writes:   
The first time, understanding will be a naïve grasping of the meaning of the text as 
a whole.  The second time, comprehension will be a sophisticated mode of 
understanding, supported by explanatory procedures.  In the beginning 
understanding is a guess.  At the end it satisfies the concept of appropriation… as 
the rejoinder to the kind of distanciation linked to the full objectification of the text.  
Explanation will appear as the mediation between two stages of understanding.  If 
isolated from this concrete process, it is mere abstraction, an artifact of 
methodology.102 
 
Hence, in the case of mystery, the process of interpretation, the oscillation between 
explanation and understanding, is endless, but not hopeless.  Interpretation, which is the 
dialectic process of explanation and understanding, relies on symbols within the larger 
cultural context from which symbols emerge. Through interpretation it becomes possible 
for the human being to appropriate mystery without mastering and conceptually reducing 
it to a problem.  In short, “it is by interpreting that we can hear again.”103   
 The need to “hear again” arises out of the tension and distance between otherness 
and ownness.104  Ricoeur calls this tension distanciation, which “is not a quantitative 
phenomenon; it is the dynamic counterpart of our need, our interest, and our effort to 
overcome cultural estrangement.”105  It is through a productive distanciation that 
appropriation is possible; a productive “distance” between otherness and ownness allows 
for the appropriation of the “other” through the interpretative process of explanation and 
understanding.  Ricoeur writes: 
This dialectic may also be expressed as that of tradition as such, understood as the 
reception of historically transmitted cultural heritages.  A tradition raises no 
philosophical problem as long as we live and dwell within it in the naïveté of the 
first certainty.  Tradition only becomes problematic when this first naïveté is lost.  
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Then we have to retrieve meaning through and beyond estrangement.  Henceforth 
the appropriation of the past proceeds along an endless struggle with distanciation.  
Interpretation, philosophically understood, is nothing else than the attempt to make 
estrangement and distanciation productive.106 
 
It is precisely this productive distanciation that postcritical thought and theology seek to 
access through an interpretation governed by a logic of symbol with the hope of a new 
and constructive appropriation of the other in its identity as other.  The goal is not 
assimilation, but appropriation as a second naïveté. 
3.3.3 – The Second Naïveté   
 
 A fundamental question that confronts contemporary Western thought and theology 
is “What comes after criticism?” Interpretation governed by a logic of symbol establishes 
the possibility of a second naïveté or a “mediated immediacy. “107 The movement from 
the loss of precritical belief via its confrontation with modern criticism through the 
critical deconstructive activity of postmodernity can now be assessed in a positive and 
constructive manner.  Ricoeur describes the transition / movement from precrtical belief 
when he writes: 
The dissolution of the myth as explanation is the necessary way to the restoration of 
the myth as symbol.  Thus, the time of restoration is not a different time from that 
of criticism; we are in every way children of criticism, and we seek to go beyond 
criticism by means of criticism, by a criticism that is no longer reductive but 
restorative.108 
 
This restoration is particularly important for theological discourse as it is not sufficient to 
simply explain prior Christian understanding.  It must also take up the task of 
appropriating prior understanding so as to make it comprehensible within a new context.  
In this sense theology demands both a critical retrieval of its inherited beliefs and 
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understandings as well as a creative interpretation of the received tradition.  A 
fundamental task of contemporary theological discourse is, thus, the appropriation of the 
Christian tradition amidst a pluralistic and globalized world.  Ricoeur summarizes:  
For the second immediacy that we seek and the second naiveté that we await are no 
longer accessible to us anywhere else than in hermeneutics; we can believe only by 
interpreting… Such is the hermeneutic circle: hermeneutics proceeds from a prior 
understanding of the very thing that it tries to understand by interpreting it.  But 
thanks to that circle in hermeneutics, I can still communicate with the sacred by 
making explicit the prior understanding that gives life to interpretation…. I believe 
that being can still speak to me – no longer, of course, under the precritical form of 
immediate belief, but at the second immediacy aimed at by hermeneutics.  The 
Second naiveté aims to be the postcritical equivalent of the precritical 
hierophany.109 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
 The realities of pluralism and globalization require an attentiveness to both unity 
and difference that precritical, modern, and postmodern thought are ill-equipped to offer.  
Instead, the changing sociocultural and intellectual context calls for thinking that is 
postcritical and symbolic.  The relationship between unity and difference, when 
understood postcritically, draws upon a logic governed by symbol that allows for 
thinking the one and the many by acknowledging the significance of mystery as a 
genuine source of knowledge.   
 These observations provide important resources for Western thought and theology 
and highlight the significance of the hermeneutic activities of understanding, explanation, 
and appropriation.  Having developed the need for postritical thought, the task of 
appropriating such thought within Western theological discourse must now be 
undertaken.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
KARL RAHNER’S LOGIC OF SYMBOL AND POSTCRITICAL THEOLOGY 
1. Introduction 
As theological discourse enters the Third Millennium, it is apparent that the larger 
sociocultural and intellectual context of Western Christianity is shifting.  On the one 
hand, this shift exhibits a scientific rationality indicative of the sociocultural and 
intellectual values of modernity and, on the other hand, this shift embraces a pluralistic 
rationality characteristic of the sociocultural and intellectual values of postmodernity.  
The confrontation between the ideologies of modernity and postmodernity yields a 
tension for the contemporary person in the West whereby the realities of unity and 
difference are in persistent yet illusory struggle for supremacy over one another.  This 
tension, which is particularly evident in contemporary Western theological discourse, 
prepares the foundations for artificial systems of thought that tend to reduce reality to 
either unexplainable difference in the case of postmodernity, or explainable unity in the 
case modernity.  Both reductions deprive reality of its fullness and significance.  As the 
first chapter argues, postcriticism’s logic, unlike modernity’s logic of the one over the 
many and postmodernity’s logic of the many over the one, appropriates unity and 
difference via an interpretation that is mediated by the relationship between the one and 
the many and as such attends to the possibility of unity-in-difference. 
 Western theological discourse, if it is to be successful and relevant within its 
present context, requires an attitude towards knowledge and reason that 1) originates in 
the mysterious and multifaceted experience of being human, 2) humbly recognizes 
reality’s surplus of meaning, and 3) can be spoken in courage and faith without the desire 
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or need to speak completely or with finality.  A theology that is postcritical must learn to 
reside in the interstitial space between the hermeneutical and the transcendental so as to 
profit from the creative tension between the two.110  Postcritical theology takes advantage 
of the human being’s capacity for mystery and interpretative faculties in order to explain, 
understand, and appropriate the relationship between the human being’s transcendent 
experience of radical openness to God and the limits of existence within the concrete 
circumstances of the world without obliterating the difference between them.   
Contemporary theological discourse is in need of interpretative strategies that 
navigate the dynamic movement between world/spirit, openness/limitedness, and 
unity/diversity and ultimately think beyond criticism towards a constructive hermeneutic 
space; a hermeneutic space that coincides with the possibility of a mediated belief or a 
second naïveté.  Theological discourse, which always attends to the relationships between 
the mysterious realities of God, humanity, and creation, must traverse between the 
hermeneutical insofar as it is discourse that is bound and rooted in the concrete 
circumstances of the world and transcendental insofar as its “object” of discourse is the 
encounter with the mysterious “other”.   
This chapter argues that Karl Rahner’s foundational thought and theological 
method, which are governed by a logic of symbol, provide meaningful resources for 
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postcritical theological discourse.   Rahner’s thought and theology are unabashedly 
concerned with the appropriation of Christian belief amid the changing context of history 
and is the consequence of explicit pastoral motivations and implicit hermeneutic 
concerns.  As such, Rahner understands the importance and necessity of confrontation 
and dialogue between the Christian tradition as it is received and the unique concerns and 
problems of human beings within their pluralistic sociocultural and intellectual context.  
Rahner’s theological method echoes John XXIII’s conviction that “the substance of the 
ancient doctrine of the Deposit of Faith is one thing, and the way in which it is presented 
another.”111  Reflecting upon his theological life’s work, Rahner admits: 
My life work, if we can call it that, has had no plan, proposed in advance, but was 
strongly influenced by the needs of the day… I would plainly and simply say that 
I am a Catholic Christian, I am attempting to reflect on my faith and relate it to 
the questions, needs and difficulties which confront me as a man and a Christian.  
From this everything else flows… I really have endeavored to pursue a theology 
that looks to concrete proclamation in the Church, to dialogue with people of 
today.112  
 
Rahner’s interest with the appropriation of the Christian tradition in a globalized and 
pluralistic world manifests itself in a theological method that is inherently dialogical and 
implicitly interpretive.113  Rahner contends that the human being’s experience of mystery, 
which is constitutive of human existence and only encountered in the world, provides the 
foundation for theology and is provisionally and tentatively expressed in theological 
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discourse.114  Rahner writes that, “[w]hether he is consciously aware of it or not, whether 
he is open to this truth or suppresses it, a man’s whole spiritual and intellectual existence 
is oriented towards a holy mystery which is the basis of his being.”115   
Rahner uncovers an intimate connection between transcendental and categorical 
experience, both of which are grounded in God’s Holy Mystery.  Attentiveness to the 
relationship between the categorical and the transcendental forms a remarkably grounded 
yet flexible framework for approaching and developing theological discourse and points 
to the hermeneutical and transcendental tendencies in Rahner’s theological method; a 
method that, as the following demonstrates, is governed by a logic of symbol and allows 
for the articulation of the human being’s experience of mystery as a “mediated 
immediacy”.116 
The intention of this chapter is twofold.  Firstly, this chapter develops a general 
sketch of Karl Rahner’s foundational thought and theology and its significance for 
postcritical theological discourse.  An analysis of Rahner’s understanding of the human 
being as 1) “spirit-in-the-world”, 2) openness to revelation, and 3) the event of God’s 
grace accomplishes this first task.  Secondly, this chapter demonstrates that Rahner’s 
logic of the symbol provides a hermeneutic that understands, explains, and appropriates 
unity-in-difference in his theological method and also provides a suitable hermeneutic for 
postcritical theological discourse.  
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2. – The Theological Foundations of Karl Rahner 
 There is a fundamental and complex relationship between anthropology and 
theology that is distinctive of Rahner’s theological method.117  On the one hand, Rahner’s 
theological method is deeply rooted in the concrete circumstances of the world.  On the 
other hand, his theology is the fruit of intense reflection upon mystery.  Anne Carr writes: 
Rahner’s formal reflections on theological method develop by a dual dynamism.  
One movement is toward complexity and differentiation as he defines the various 
components of Christian theology - revelation, Scripture, tradition, dogma, and 
theology itself.  The other, opposite, drive is toward simplicity and integration as 
he points with increasing emphasis to the experience of the single mystery of 
God’s self-communication to man which lies behind the propositions of dogma 
and the words of scripture, “the gospel behind the gospel.”118 
 
The dual dynamism towards unity and difference, which is characteristic of Rahner’s 
theology and method, centers on the human being as “reference to Mystery, the 
experience of which has foundational theological significance.”119   
Anne Carr details three interrelated and successive moments that illustrate 
Rahner’s theology and method.  Each of these moments elucidates Rahner’s abiding 
concern for the human being’s experience of mystery and its relationship to the 
meaningfulness of existence.120  While initially philosophical, these successive moments 
become increasingly theological.  In a first step, Rahner recognizes that human existence 
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metaphysical/ontological register, he makes a shift from “an object – focused theory of being… 
to a correlation – focused theory of meaning.”  Hence, when Rahner uses the term ‘being’ he 
means meaningfulness.  “[B]eing as phenomenologically reduced: the intelligible in terms of the 
conditions constituting intelligibility.” Thomas Sheehan, "Rahner's Transcendental Project," in 
Cambridge Companions to Religion, ed. Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 20-21.      
118 Anne Carr, "Theology and Experince in the Thought of Karl Rahner," The Journal of 
Religion 53, no. 3 (1973): 368. 
119 Harvey Egan, "Mysticism and Karl Rahner's Theology," in Theology and Discovery: 
Essays in Honor of Karl Rahner, S.J., ed. William J. Kelly (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette 
University Press, 1980), 142. 
120 Anne Carr, The Theological Method of Karl Rahner (Missouia, MN: Scholar Press, 
1977), 59-124; Carr, "Theology and Experince in the Thought of Karl Rahner." 
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is fundamentally experienced as “spirit-in-the-world.”121  He subsequently develops a 
philosophy of religion that envisages the human being as having a real “potency” for 
hearing for a “Word” from God within history.  Lastly, Rahner describes the universality 
of God’s gracious offer via the “supernatural existential.”122   
2.1. – Spirit-in-the-World and the Human Capacity for Mystery 
  In an initial philosophical step, Rahner envisions human existence as spirit-in-the-
world or as embodied spirit and subsequently establishes a transcendental turn to the 
subject for theology.123 This transcendental turn re-envisions traditional Christian 
anthropology by explaining and understanding human existence as a complex 
coadunation between infinite openness to “holy mystery” and the radical limits of bodily 
existence.  Human existence is characteristic of a unity-in-difference and is illuminated 
via the activity of human knowing for Rahner.  Thomas Sheehan recognizes that human 
knowledge is fundamentally relational for Rahner.  Sheehan writes that the human being: 
… is an otheredness that is always self-related, and a self-relatedness that cannot 
exist without being othered.  Since relation-to-another is the only way humans can 
relate to themselves, we may define human being as self-related otheredness.  
“Self-relatedness” means self-awareness and self-responsibility – in a word, spirit.  
“Otheredness” means that human beings need to be affected by others – but are 
limited to being affected only by this-worldly corporal others.  In Rahner’s phrase 
“Geist in Welt,” a this-worldly spirit that cannot see beyond, or exist without – 
much less leave- this material world.124 
  
                                                 
121 According to Rahner there is “an inescapable unity in difference between one’s 
original self-possession and reflection.” Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 15.  As spirit-
in-the-world, the human being comes to realize self-possession through reflection on experience 
that always and only occurs in the concrete circumstances of the world.  It is in the concrete 
bodily experience of the world that the human being realizes and enacts one’-self as spirit.  This 
is possible, according to Rahner, because there is an original relationship between knowledge and 
existence or being and knowing. 
122 Carr, "Theology and Experince in the Thought of Karl Rahner," 361-364. 
123 Rahner provides an in depth philosophical analysis of the human as an embodied spirit 
in Geist this a distinctive feature of Rahner’s theology method in theology, Burke, Eco.  
124 Sheehan,  18.  
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Rahner upholds the Thomistic identity between knowing and being such that 
“[k]nowing is the being-present-to-self of being, and this being-present-to-self is the 
being of the existent.”125  As such, knowing is subjectivity in so far as knowing one’s-self 
is being one’s-self.  However, Rahner does not envision knowledge and subjectivity in 
terms of the isolated Cartesian subject.  Instead, the human being comes to self-
knowledge and self-possession only through knowledge of an “other”; human beings 
come into their own being – “become” what they are – only in and through the sensible 
world.  The human being’s search for and discovery of meaning is restricted, for good or 
ill, to the concrete sensible world of bodily existence as spirit-in-the-world.  Hence, it is 
necessarily through the concrete experience of the world that the human being knows 
one’s-self as a transcendent being.126   
2.1.1 – Questioning and the Transcendental Capacity of the Human Being   
The human being enacts and manifests the dynamic and relational structure of 
human existence as spirit-in-the-world in the activity of questioning.127  Questioning is 
the one simple and fundamental fact of human existence.  Rahner writes:  
Man questions.  This is something final and irreducible.  For in human existence 
the question is that fact which absolutely refuses to be replaced by another fact, to 
be reduced back to another fact and thus unmasked once again as being itself 
derivative and provisional.  For every placing-in-question of the question is itself 
                                                 
125 Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 69.  
126  The use of the term “transcendental” by Rahner is not always consistent.  It is not 
uncommon for Rahner to shift between two different usages.  In the first instance, Rahner uses 
transcendental in its most common understanding as that which transcends or is beyond what is 
typically expected or beyond experience.  Rahner, however, also uses the term philosophically as 
the a priori and necessary conditions of the possibility for a particular experience. See: Karen 
Kilby, Rahner : Theology and Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2004), 32-48. 
127 The ability to ask a question such as “what is this?” is significant for Rahner and his 
inquiry into human knowledge and existence.  When something like the above question is asked, 
it reveals both an awareness of a particular – a “this” – and an awareness of a universal – a 
“what”.  Abstraction is essentially the capacity to recognize a universal within a particular or 
place a particular under the category of a universal.  Questioning ultimately requires a tacit a 
priori knowledge of universals.   
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again asking a question, and thereby a new instance of the question itself.  So the 
question is first of all the only “must”, the only necessity, the only thing beyond 
question to which questioning man is bound, the only circle in which questioning 
is caught, the only apriority to which it is subject.  Man questions necessarily.128 
 
As such, “the infinite horizon of human questioning is experienced as a horizon which 
recedes further and further the more answers man can discover.”129 Everything can at 
least be a question for the human being, including questions about one’s own existence.  
In a particularly significant way, questions about the ultimate meaning of existence reveal 
the transcendent capacity of the human being.  Michael McCabe describes the 
transcendental capacity of the human being when he writes: 
[t]he transcendental element, this implicit orientation to an unlimited horizon, is 
found in all human activities, in our questioning and questing, our willing and 
loving.  We are restless, dynamic beings, always moving towards a larger horizon, 
always on the way.”130 
 
Rahner terms the transcendental element of human experience and knowledge the 
Vorgriff, or pre-apprehension of being.131  The Vorgriff is a capacity of the “spirit” where 
                                                 
128 Rahner, Spirit in the World, 57. 
129 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 32. 
130 Michael McCabe, "The Mystery of The Human: A Perspective from Rahner," in 
Christian Identity in a Postmodern Age, ed. Declan  Marimion (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 
2005), 50. 
131 According to Rahner, “The Vorgriff is the condition of possibility of the universal 
concept, of abstraction… It is an a priori power given with human nature.  It is the dynamic 
movement of the spirit toward the absolute range of all possible objects.  In this movement, single 
objects are grasped as single stages of this finality; thus they are known as profiles against this 
absolute range of all the knowable.  On account of the Vorgriff the single object is always already 
known under the horizon of the absolute ideal of knowledge and posted within the conscious 
domain of all that which may be known.  That is why it is also known as not filling this domain 
completely, and hence limited.” Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word (New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1969), 47-48. Rahner continues, “There are in the history of Western philosophy three 
typical directions in which an answer to this question has been attempted: the direction of the 
perennial philosophy which, in this case, goes from Plato to Hegel, the direction of Kant, and that 
of Heidegger.  There first one answers: the range of the Vorgriff extends toward being as such, 
with no inner limit in itself, and therefore includes also the absolute being of God.  Kant answers: 
the horizon of sense intuition, which does not reach beyond space and time.  Heidegger says: the 
transcendence which serves as the basis from man’s existence, goes towards nothingness.” Ibid., 
49. 
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spirit is understood as “the power which reaches out beyond the world and knows the 
metaphysical.”132  However, the Vorgriff is not an object alongside other objects of 
knowledge.  Kilby clarifies possible misconceptions regarding the Vorgriff and objective 
knowledge: 
[i]t is of critical importance… not to confuse the kind of awareness we have of 
being and of God with our knowledge of finite objects… the being of which we 
are aware in the Vorgriff is never known or grasped or disposed of in the way that 
individual beings can be – it never becomes an object of knowledge itself, but 
remains always only that which we are aware in knowing concrete objects.133 
 
In short, it is not possible to “abstract” the Vorgriff from human knowledge.  Without the 
pre-apprehension of being (Vorgriff), there would be no authentic human knowledge 
because both the limits of the categorical and the infinite possibilities of the 
transcendental are necessary “ingredients” for human knowledge.     
2.1.2 – Mystery and the Provisional Nature of Human Knowing 
The human being tacitly recognizes or pre-apprehends absolute being and reaches 
beyond one’s limits towards the infinite horizon of possibility in the activity of 
questioning.   Hence, objective knowledge is only possible because of the broader 
horizon of an ever-present and eternal mystery.  Rahner explains that: 
[b]asically he is always on the way.  Every goal that he points to in knowledge 
and in action is always relativized, always a provisional step.  Every answer is 
always just the beginning of a new question.  Man experiences himself as infinite 
possibility because in practice and in theory he necessarily places every sought-
after result in question.  He always situates it in a broader horizon which looms 
before him in its vastness.  He is spirit who experiences himself as spirit in that he 
does not experience himself as pure spirit.  Man is not the unquestioning and 
unquestioned infinity of reality.  He is the question which rises up before him, 
empty, but really and inescapably, and which can never be settled and never be 
adequately answered by him.134 
 
                                                 
132 Rahner, Spirit in the World. 
133 Kilby, Rahner : Theology and Philosophy, 20. 
134 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 32. 
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Human knowledge and existence arise at the intersection between the experience of 
mystery and the experience of the categorical and sensible world.135  Hence, with Gabriel 
Marcel, Rahner recognizes that the finitude of being in the world and the concreteness of 
human existence are not conditions that simply present as problems for human beings to 
overcome.  Instead, the human being is “the perfection of finitude, a finite infinity that 
consists not in God’s all-at-once-ness but in our own finite infinity: unlimited self-
synthesizing, self-mediation, and self-interpretation, unlimited responsibility, knowledge, 
and creativity.”136  In this sense, the meaning of human existence is always in process and 
is always receptive to the ungraspable “more” that is mediated through the immediacy of 
the concrete world.   As spirit-in-the-world, human existence is surely limited, but within 
the limits of concrete bodily existence the human being, as spirit, has the capacity to 
reach beyond or transcend the immediacy of bodily experience and inquire about the 
meaningfulness of experience and existence.137 
 Rahner’s transcendental observations on the human being as spirit-in-the-world 
elucidate the human openness and capacity for mystery in the midst of finitude.  In fact, 
mystery, as it is transcendentally experienced within human existence, obtains via a 
                                                 
135 Karl Rahner, ""Behold This Heart!": Preliminaries to a Theology of Devotion to the 
Sacred Heart," in The Theology of the Spiritual Life,  Theological Investigations (Baltmore, MD: 
Helicon Press, 1967), 323. 
136 Sheehan,  41. 
137 Human freedom and responsibility are not absolute.  Rahner recognizes that freedom 
is always in some sense a limited freedom, but is nevertheless a real freedom.  Rahner writes, “ 
What it really means to be something other than God and nevertheless to have come from him 
radically and in one’s deepest self, what it means to say that the radical dependence grounds 
autonomy, all of this can be experienced only when a spiritual, created person experiences his 
own freedom as a reality, a freedom coming from God and freedom for God.  Not until one 
experiences himself as a free subject responsible before God and accepts this responsibility does 
he understand what autonomy is, and understand that it does not decrease, but increases in the 
same proportion as dependence on God.” Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 78-79. 
 64 
complex unity whereby the human being anticipates the infinite in and through concrete 
engagement with the finite world.138  
Taken in isolation, Rahner’s contention that human knowledge and existence 
obtain because of mystery suggests or at least raises the concern that ultimately there is 
no distinction between theology and philosophy.  It is legitimate to question whether 
Rahner’s metaphysics of knowledge suggests that the human being can come to know 
mystery via one’s own intellectual power or if the human being’s capacity for knowledge 
owes itself to the revelation of mystery.  In short, Rahner’s metaphysics of knowledge 
recognizes the importance of mystery within human knowing, but he says little about the 
origins of mystery and how the human being interprets an encounter with mystery.   
2.2 – Hearers of the Word and Hermeneutics 
 The second step in Rahner’s foundational thought and theology elucidates the 
possibility of revelation.139  As spirit-in-the-world, Rahner explores the human being’s 
openness to mystery and capacity for transcendence: however, the possible hearing of a 
revelation, which for the human being must occur in history, is not expounded.140  Rahner 
anticipates the possibility of a historical revelation at the end of Spirit in the World when 
he writes: 
                                                 
138 Summarizing Rahner’s position, Mark Fischer writes, “In transcendental experience, 
there is an intuition of God.  Granted this intuition is not always conscious of itself.  The one who 
has it may not even know that it is an intuition of God.  But that knowledge is still present.  How?  
Because whenever we are aware of ourselves as knowers or seekers trying to understand the 
mystery of life, then God is present in that self-awareness: present as mystery, as the absolute 
incomprehensible source of all that is.  What we know in knowing anything is that our knowledge 
is a small vessel in a vast sea of mystery.  Our knowledge, small and incomplete, owes its 
existence to that vast sea as the mystery that bears it up.” Mark F. Fischer, The Foundations of 
Karl Rahner : A Paraphrase of the Foundations of Christian Faith, with Introduction and Indices 
(New York: Crossroad Pub. Co., 2005), 6. 
139 The term “revelation” is used rather generically in this section.    
140 Rahner, Hearers of the Word, 15. 
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In order to be able to hear whether God speaks, we must know that He is; lest His 
word come to one who already knows, He must be hidden from us; in order to 
speak to man, His word must encounter us where we already and always are, in an 
earthly place, at an earthly hour. Insofar as man enters into the world by turning to 
the phantasm, the revelation of being as such and in it the knowledge of God’s 
existence has already been achieved, but even then this God who is beyond the 
world is always hidden from us.141 
 
2.2.1 – Revelation, Theology, and Philosophy 
Revelation presupposes theology and theology presupposes philosophy.142  Put 
another way, “If revelation is to occur, it must be a historical event, commensurate with 
man’s way of knowing and being in the world.”143  Hence, for Rahner the transcendental 
turn in theology is also an anthropological turn in so far as the prior condition for the 
possibility of theology is that the human being is spirit-in-the-world and thus at least open 
to a possible revelation.    
From the standpoint of theology, which in its primary sense is the original hearing 
of God’s revelation and is only subsequently systematized and arranged by human 
beings, the relationship between theology and philosophy is one that centers upon the 
human being.144  
As soon as man is understood as the being who is absolutely transcendent in 
respect of God, ‘anthropocentricity’ and ‘theocentricity’ in theology are not 
opposites but strictly one and the same thing, seen from two sides. Neither of the 
                                                 
141 Rahner, Spirit in the World, 408. 
142 Karl Rahner, "Philosophy and Theology," in Concerning Vatican Council II,  
Theological Investigations (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1969), 79.   
143 Carr, "Theology and Experince in the Thought of Karl Rahner," 363. Rahner writes, 
“revelation… is heard by a human being who already knows other things besides this revelation, 
a revelation which does not occur always and everywhere but only here and now.  But the hearing 
of the message by a someone who already has other knowledge can only be possible… in 
confrontation with this other knowledge, however undefinitive this confrontation may be; it is 
hearing by means of categories already possessed from elsewhere, a reception within previously 
given horizons, however much these horizons themselves may be altered by this hearing; in other 
words, it is already an active effort of thought by man; in short, it is theology, however much this 
theology may in certain circumstances be thought of as being subject also to the direction and 
control of the original process of revelation.” Rahner, "Philosophy and Theology," 73. 
144 Carr, "Theology and Experince in the Thought of Karl Rahner," 90. 
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two aspects can be comprehended at all without the other. Thus, although 
anthropocentricity in theology is not the opposite of the strictest theocentricity, it 
is opposed to the idea… that it is possible to say something about God 
theologically without thereby automatically saying something about man and vice 
versa….145  
 
The mysterious “other” must initiate revelation but from the vantage point of the 
human being, the possibility of revelation necessitates the capacity to listen for a 
revelation from the mysterious “other”.  However, because human knowledge is 
fundamentally in the world, a word from God as the absolute mysterious “other”, if it is 
to be heard, must occur within the horizon of the human being’s experience, which is 
fundamentally historical.  Hence, “[w]hen the reality of man is understood correctly, 
there exists an inescapable circle between his horizons of understanding and what is said, 
heard, and understood.”146  The human being cannot hear outside a word that is outside of 
the human being’s horizon of understanding.    
Rahner maintains that, “theology itself implies a philosophical anthropology 
which enables this message of grace to be accepted in a really philosophical and 
reasonable way, and which gives account of it in a humanly responsible way.”147  Hence, 
the possibility of theology presupposes philosophy in so far as philosophy is “in the 
strictest sense… is the methodologically exact, reflected and most expediently controlled 
representation and articulation of this original and never quite attained self-
understanding.”148  Philosophy can ask about the possibility of revelation; however, it 
cannot say whether an actual revelation has taken place in history, nor can such a 
philosophy anticipate the content of revelation.   
                                                 
145 Karl Rahner, "Theology and Anthropology," in Writings of 1965-1967, 1,  Theological 
Investigations (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 28. 
146 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 24. 
147 Ibid., 25. 
148 Rahner, "Philosophy and Theology," 74; Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 25. 
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2.2.2 – The Necessity of Hermeneutics in Rahner’s Foundational Thought  
Rahner develops his argument for the possibility of historical revelation by way of 
three fundamental propositions in Hearers of the Word and in so doing also upholds the 
necessity of hermeneutics within theological discourse.149   
Firstly, Rahner draws upon the philosophical observation from his previous work, 
Spirit in the World, and reaffirms that the human being has the capacity to reach beyond 
the world from within the world.  Thus he concludes that: 
…the proposition about the necessarily explicit transcendence of knowledge 
correlative to being in general as the basic constitution of man as spirit, is the first 
proposition of a metaphysical anthropology, an anthropology that is slanted 
towards a philosophy of religion as foundation for the possibility of a verbal 
revelation.150 
 
Succinctly put, the openness and receptivity of the human being to mystery is the 
necessary condition for a possible revelation. 
Secondly, the human being’s openness and receptivity to mystery does not 
necessitate a revelation, but instead points to the necessity of anticipating it as a 
possibility.  Because of the openness and receptivity to mystery, the human being, on the 
one hand, must question to obtain as a subject; that is to realize one’s-self as being-
present-to-self.  On the other hand, however, the human being must question because 
one’s being-present-to-self is limited and dependent on the “other”; the being-present-to-
self of the human being owes itself to the mystery that is not entirely one’s own.  Hence, 
“[i]n this framework God is not seen as an immovable ideal, but as a free autonomous 
power.”151  Revelation requires both the free initial activity of God and the free and 
                                                 
149  Christopher F. Schiavone, Rationality and Revelation in Rahner: The Contemplative 
Dimension (New York: P. Lang, 1994), 67-75. 
150 Rahner, Hearers of the Word, 67. 
151 Schiavone, Rationality and Revelation in Rahner: The Contemplative Dimension, 72. 
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unrestricted openness of the human being to receive God’s revelation.  Revelation, 
properly understood, is both freely given and freely received.  Rahner concludes that:  
… man is that existent thing who stands in free love before the God of a possible 
revelation.  Man is attentive to the speech or the silence of God in the measure in 
which he opens himself in free love to this message of the speech or the silence of 
the God of revelation.  He hears this message only if he has not restricted the 
absolute horizon of his openness to being in general by a perverted love, only if 
he has not removed in advance the possibility of the word of God addressing him 
as he pleases, of meeting him in the form he desires to assume.152 
 
 Thirdly, Rahner affirms the significance of human historicity.153  For Rahner, 
freedom and responsibility always go hand in hand.154  Listening for a possible word of 
revelation from God necessitates a responsible freedom on the part of the human being.  
Because human beings realize and actualize themselves in history and in the world, such 
listening requires attentiveness to the existential situation of the human being.    
  The human being comes to self-realization and is self-actualized in and through 
the world, time, and space.  Hence, history and the world for the human being are 
ultimately and inescapably existential conditions whereby the human being “even as doer 
and maker is still receiving and being made.”155  The human being becomes both person 
and subject in the world and in time and space.  Thus, Rahner affirms that a revelation 
must be a historical revelation if the human being is to be open and receptive on the one 
hand and able to freely respond on the other.  Rahner maintains that:  
Man is the existent thing who must listen for an historical revelation of God, 
given in his history and possibly in human speech… Man is one who listens in his 
history for the word of the free God.  Only thus is he what he must be.  
                                                 
152 Rahner, Hearers of the Word, 108. 
153 Rahner defines historicity as “that characteristic and fundamental determination of 
man by which he is placed in precisely as a free subject, and through which a unique world is at 
his disposal, a world which he must create and suffer in freedom, and for which in both instances 
he must take responsibility.” Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 41. 
154 See: ibid., 35-39. 
155 Ibid., 42.  
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Metaphysical anthropology has thus reached its conclusion when it has 
comprehended itself as the metaphysics of potetia oboedientialis for the 
revelation of the supernatural God.156 
 
Hence, Rahner’s understanding of the human being as the hearer of a possible revelation 
from God reimagines the traditional concept of potetia oboedientialis (obediential 
potency) in Christian philosophy.  Classically explained, obediential potency is the 
“openness of every creature to the Creator’s power to effect in it something beyond its 
powers of ordinary natural causes.”157  However, the traditional explanation of 
obediential potency neglects the hermeneutic capacity of the human being.  The 
traditional explanation of obediential potency in Western theology fails to account for: 1) 
how the human being can understand, explain, and appropriate God’s radically foreign 
otherness, 2) why the human being is compelled to look for a possible revelation, and 3) 
why the human being is open and receptive to a possible revelation from God as the 
fulfillment of human knowledge.158   
Rahner addresses the above concerns by upholding and demonstrating that the 
transcendental and historical nature of the human being forms a unity-in-difference.  In so 
doing, he affirms that the human being is a hermeneutic being and as such is 
fundamentally interpretive.  As the entity who listens for a possible revelation in history, 
the human being is also that entity who must interpret and appropriate mystery. 
Theology, both in the primary sense of listening to a word from God and in its 
classic sense of “faith seeking understanding”, necessitates an attentive and responsible 
reflection on the hermeneutic capacity of the human being.  Because theology 
                                                 
156 Rahner, Hearers of the Word, 161-162. 
157 New Catholic encyclopedia (New York,: McGraw-Hill, 1967), s.v. "New Catholic 
Encyclopedia."  
158 Schiavone, Rationality and Revelation in Rahner: The Contemplative Dimension, 68. 
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presupposes the capacity to listen for a mysterious word of God’s grace within history 
and the world, neglecting the significance and necessity of hermeneutics ultimately 
endangers theology’s tasks of hearing and of interpreting God’s revelatory word.  In sum, 
Rahner, like Paul Ricoeur, recognizes the significance and mediating function of one’s 
place in history.  The human being’s spatio-temporal and socio-cultural position does not 
merely provide the “lens” through which the human being interprets experience; instead, 
the historical reality of the human being provides the possibility of interpreting in the first 
place.  In short, “it is by interpreting that we can hear again.”159   
2.3 – The Supernatural Existential: The Human Being as the Event of Grace 
 The third step in the development of Rahner’s foundational thought and theology 
is what he terms the “supernatural existential.”160  The supernatural existential marks a 
shift in Rahner’s thought towards concerns that are explicitly and primarily 
theological.161  The doctrine of the supernatural existential develops in relation to the 
debate over the relationship between nature and grace in Roman Catholic theology.162  
From the perspective of theology, the transcendental capacity of the human being that is 
directed towards and also elicits the desire for God owes itself to the supernatural 
                                                 
159 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 351. 
160 The term existential is defined as “a permanent determination penetrating all elements 
of human existence, which reveals its meaning and structure, characterizing the human being 
before she engages in any free action.” Ethna Regan, "Not Merely the Cognitive Subject: 
Rahner's Theological Anthropology," in Karl Rahner : Theologian for the Twenty-First Century, 
ed. Pádraic Conway and Fáinche Ryan (Oxford: P. Lang, 2010), 127. 
161 Rahner’s metaphysics of knowledge and his articulation of the obediential potency of 
the human being for a historical revelation from God are both explicitly rooted in philosophical 
inquiry.  The supernatural existential, while it takes up the logic that permeates these two 
previous moments, is developed and articulated within an explicitly theological context.  Hence, 
for Rahner, the transcendental method demonstrates that philosophical and theological concerns 
are both moments of the same inquiry into the meaning of what it means to be human.  
Philosophy formulates questions regarding existence that can only be answered by theology and 
the answers that theology provides can only be properly understood in the context of the 
questions provided by philosophy.    
162 Rahner, "Nature and Grace," 166-169. 
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existential; “’supernatural’ because it is the initial step in God’s gratuitous self-
communication, and ‘existential’ because, abidingly present to all, it permeates the 
totality of life.”163  The supernatural existential ordains and alters the “nature” of the 
human being, directing the human being towards a supernatural end.  Geffrey Kelly 
writes: 
Human nature is… enhanced in Rahner’s theology by his portrayal of the person 
being drawn by God beyond mere openness to being toward the attractive horizon 
of one’s most intensified aspiration, God’s own fulfilling existence in the free gift 
of God’s self.  Rahner uses his theological construct of the supernatural existential 
to indicate that human nature with its openness to being – or, to borrow a 
traditional scholastic term, “obediential potency” for fulfillment in being – is 
transformed through the advent of God’s unending presence. In such a way, a 
person’s concrete existence or the “existential” becomes ordered to God and 
touched irrevocably by God.164 
 
 Drawing upon the philosophical insights developed in both Spirit in the World and 
Hearers of the Word, Rahner argues against the extrinsicism of the Scholastic 
understanding of grace on the one hand and the position of nouvelle théologie that 
proposes an “unconditional reference of nature to grace” on the other hand.165  Rahner’s 
abiding theological concern is to articulate and defend the universal saving will of God 
while also protecting the gratuitousness of God’s loving and free gift of God’s-self. 
 Firstly, Rahner observes that “human beings should be able to receive this love 
which is God: they must have a real congeniality for it.  They must be able to accept it... 
as people who have room and scope, understanding and desire for it.”166  The Vorgriff, 
                                                 
163 Stephen  Duffy, "Experience of Grace," in The Cambridge Companion to Karl 
Rahner, ed. Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 34. 
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theologically speaking, is the pre-apprehension or anticipation of God which is a reality 
for the human being because of God’s free initial offer of God’s self.  This pre-
apprehension is not an objective knowledge of God, but is better understood as “an 
unthematic but ever-present knowledge of the infinity of reality.”167  As such, the 
supernatural existential alters the natural transcendental horizon of the human being and 
reorients the human being towards the supernatural horizon of God’s grace.  This 
reorientation towards the supernatural horizon, however, “is not the object of an 
individual, a posteriori and categorical experience of man alongside of other objects of 
experience.”168  Instead and more precisely understood, the human being, before any kind 
of conceptual or thematic experience and expression, is tacitly aware that he or she is 
fundamentally “the event of God’s absolute self-communication.”169 
 Secondly, “man or woman as God’s real partner should be able to receive this 
love as what it necessarily is: as free gift.”170 The initial offer of supernatural fulfillment 
through God’s loving and gracious gift of God’s-self, not only reorients the 
transcendental horizon of human being, but also reorients human subjectivity.  The 
concrete experience of the human being reveals that the human being is “more” than 
one’s concrete experience.  The tacit awareness of the supernatural existential of human 
existence manifests God’s love as “gift and unexpected wonder.”171  As the event of 
God’s absolute self-communication, the human being, as subject, freely accepts or rejects 
God’s gracious offer.  The supernatural existential of the human being is thus the 
precondition for the human being’s thematic belief in and relationship with God.  Put 
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succinctly, the supernatural existential, as God’s initial offer, is the condition of 
possibility for accepting or rejecting God in the concrete circumstances of human 
existence.  Rahner writes: 
God’s self-communication is given not only as gift, but also as the necessary 
condition which makes possible an acceptance of the gift which can allow the gift 
to really be God, and prevent the gift in its acceptance from being changed from 
God into a finite and created gift which only represents God, but is not God 
himself.  In order to be able to accept God without reducing him, as it were, in 
this acceptance to our finiteness, this acceptance must be borne by God himself.  
God’s self-communication as offer is also the necessary condition which makes 
its acceptance possible.172 
 
Hence, the supernatural existential is not owed to the human being nor is it expected, but 
because it is freely given, it irrevocably alters the human being. The abiding supernatural 
existential, which is possible because of God’s initial promise of God’s gracious initial 
self-gift, is the “secret ingredient” of transcendent experience that reveals itself in the 
mystery of human existence.  As a consequence, the supernatural orientation of the 
human being allows for the human being to be God’s partner.  In short, the free and 
gracious offer of God elicits and provides for the possibility of a free and gracious 
response to the mystery that permeates the whole of human existence.   
Thirdly, because of this central and abiding existential the relationship between 
nature and grace is, practically speaking, a hypothetical one, according to Rahner.  The 
human being never experiences one’s-self as pure nature nor does one encounter God’s 
grace outside of the world.  “[T]hose who receive this love… will know this very 
existential for this love as not owed to them, unexacted by them the real human 
beings.”173  The unexpected and unexacted experience of God’s grace, which is always 
an experience in the world, reveals that the human being’s capacity for grace exceeds the 
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natural capacity of the human being.  In short, nature with respect to the supernatural 
existential is a remainder concept.174  If one could hypothetically subtract the 
supernatural existential from human existence, pure nature would remain.  However, this 
is never practically the case.  Rahner writes: 
There is no reason why it [the spiritual nature] could not retain its meaning and 
necessity even without grace if, on the one hand, one can learn to see it as the 
indispensable transcendental condition of the possibility of a spiritual life at all, 
and, on the other hand, this spiritual life, although in comparison with the beatific 
vision remains eternally in umbris imagibus [in the shadows], can at any rate be 
shown to be neither meaningless nor harsh but can always be seen as a positive, 
though finite good which God could bestow even when he has not called man 
immediately before his face.175 
 
The relationship between nature and grace is ambiguous and uncertain because the 
experience of the human being is always already ordained towards God’s grace.     
Finally, Rahner’s understanding of the supernatural existential explains that the 
human being’s openness to God’s grace is not a mere non-repugnance.  Instead, the 
human being has a real affinity for grace; the human being has a real potency for God’s 
grace.176   
2.4 – The Postcritical Significance of Karl Rahner’s Foundational Thought 
 Karl Rahner’s theological method provides several significant insights for 
theological thought that is postcritical.  Firstly, Rahner recognizes that the existential 
situation of the human being is saturated with the mystery of radical “otherness”. This 
existential situation is such that the human being’s limitless hunger and thirst for 
knowledge and existence owes itself to an initial and unthematic encounter with God as 
the absolute mysterious other.  Hence, the fundamental encounter with mystery lures the 
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human being towards the necessity of interpretation in order to appropriate the infinite 
meaning and significance of existence within the experience of the limits of the concrete 
world.   
Secondly, Rahner’s foundational thought and theology avoid the typical objective 
and subjective extremes of Western theological discourse and establish a hermeneutic 
thrust that interprets and appropriates reality’s surplus of meaning in light of both faith 
and reason.  As the above articulates, Rahner’s theological method is indicative of an 
inquiry that: 
starts from the phenomenological presupposition that, before ever it is the 
question of God, theology is the question about the one who is able to raise the 
question of God, and for whom such a question might possibly have significance. 
For Rahner, an existential theology would proceed from “below” to “above.”177  
 
Rahner’s theological anthropology provides an articulation of the human being that does 
not limit faith to subjectivity nor reason to objectivity; instead, the human being is always 
in the midst of making sense of the personal encounter with mystery. Rahner thus 
articulates his own unique take on the hermeneutic circle.   
It [Rahner’s hermeneutic circle] consists of a view of man and his world, or 
nature, as already in dialectical unity (and thus abiding diversity) with grace, the 
self-communication of God in being and knowledge.  Duality in unity is what 
man experiences in his being and activity and it is first opaque.  But upon 
reflection, it opens to reveal the implicit differentiations which are the foundation 
upon which experience rests, the unthematized but conscious structures of 
existence.178 
 
Hence, theology and anthropology, subjectivity and objectivity, and nature and grace 
cannot be abstracted from one another within the real and lived experience of human 
existence.  As such, anthropocentrism and theocentrism are not contrary positions within 
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theological discourse.  “Statements about God and about man are interconnected, but not 
only because of their content but also because of the nature of knowledge itself. “179  
Lastly, Rahner’s theological method acknowledges that all theological reflection 
begins and ends with mystery.180  All theological formulas, propositions, and articulations 
are marked by the limitations of a particular time and place and call for a deepening and 
greater interpretation and appropriation of the mystery they communicate.  Declan 
Marmion writes: 
A theology that does not acknowledge this dimension of mystery, the reductio in 
mysterium or, more precisely, a ‘reductio in mysterium Dei’, of theological 
propositions, has, in his [Rahner’s] view, failed its true mission.  It has failed to 
recognize the analogical nature of such theological propositions, and remained 
stuck on the conceptual level.181 
 
All theological discourse, Rahner rightly acknowledges, is by its nature symbolic.  
Theological discourse is rooted in and points towards the unfathomable otherness of the 
mystery of God.  Hence, it must be kept in mind that the role of theology is not to capture 
and sediment mystery; instead, theology symbolically interprets and appropriates 
mystery.   
3 –Karl Rahner’s Logic of Symbol 
The centrality of mystery and the hermeneutic impulse of Rahner’s foundational 
thought are integrated in his understanding of the symbol.  With symbol, Rahner 
develops and deepens the traditional problem of the relationship between the one and the 
many with the logic of unity-in-difference that also permeates his foundational thought 
and theology.      
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According to Rahner, existence is really symbolic; existence is meaningful and 
seeks to express its meaning and as such, a symbol is “the representation of which allows 
the other ‘to be’ there.”182  The common usage, however, conceives of symbols within 
arbitrary and superficial relationships of agreement between two or more entities and uses 
a comparative hermeneutic to establish symbolic relationships.  Prescinding from this 
common understanding of symbol, Rahner contends that real symbols arise out of a 
primordial relationality of an original unity-in-difference between meaningfulness and 
expression that is characteristic of Being.  
Rahner’s insights regarding symbol are properly ontological and theological.  His 
insights are theological in so far as they are rooted in the Trinity as it is revealed in the 
Person of Jesus Christ and ontological in so far as Trinity analogously reveals the 
structure of all reality.  Rahner challenges both the certainty of modernity by insisting 
upon the necessity of mystery and the uncertainty of postmodernity by insisting upon the 
necessity of human knowing (however limited it may be) through his theological 
ontology of symbol.  The following sections demonstrate that Rahner’s theological and 
ontological understanding of symbol offers a flexible yet organized hermeneutic for 
explaining, understanding, and appropriating the structures of finite and infinite being, 
ecclesiology, human existence, human knowledge, and language.183   
3.1 – Rahner’s Philosophy of Symbol 
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 Rahner, with Thomas Aquinas, holds that “being means oneness (ens et unum 
convertuntur).”184  There are, however, two ways that Rahner interprets oneness 
throughout his writings.  Firstly, with respect to an ontic inquiry, “being, as considered in 
itself… can be one in the oneness of simplicity.  In this sense, the capacity to symbolize 
cannot belong to the structure of being.”185  Secondly, with respect to an ontological 
inquiry, being is dynamic because being is to be present-to-self.  Hence, being must 
express itself in order to realize and actualize its own fulfillment.  It is Rahner’s 
ontological focus that provides the resources for postcritical theology.     
3.1.1 – Ontology and Symbol 
 
Rahner reframes traditional Western ontology by employing a logic that is 
governed by symbol.  The reality of being is not a static and isolated principle or 
substance.  Instead, being obtains through a complex plurality of origin and expression.  
Unity-in-difference characterizes existence in such a way that being moves towards 
expression so as to be realized and known first for itself and subsequently for the other.   
Firstly, Rahner asserts with Thomas Aquinas that being is ontologically structured 
by a movement of emanation and return.  Rahner holds that “all beings are by their nature 
symbolic, because they necessarily ‘express’ themselves in order to attain their own 
nature.”186  Being is fundamentally self-expressive.  Being posits its own other and 
emanates through its own other in order to express itself and make itself known.  There 
is, however, an ontological affinity that obtains between being and its expression because 
of a primordial unity that surpasses relationships of agreement or similarity that are 
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characteristic of arbitrary signs.  The difference that manifests in the symbolic 
relationship between being and its expression owes itself to a unity prior to its own 
expression.   
Rahner’s notion that being is characteristic of unity-in-difference challenges the 
traditional hylomorphic conviction of Western ontology, which asserts that form works 
on matter externally.187  Using the traditional language of matter and form, Stephen 
Fields explains that: 
[f]orm and matter must be understood as ontologically congenial, because they 
constitute an original unity as the source of their difference.  Because this unity 
obtains prior to matter’s being informed, form and matter constitute a unity-in-
difference as the condition for the possibility of any being.  This unity-in-
difference is abstract because it is yet to be concretely realized as an individually 
existing substance.  This obtains when form structures matter, thus constituting 
matter as its own other by giving matter meaning and intelligibility.188 
 
Rahner reinterprets the traditional Western conviction that plurality and difference 
somehow upset unity.  In place of the traditional interpretation of the one over the many, 
the original unity of the symbol establishes the condition for thinking the one and many; 
original unity provides the condition for the possibility of difference and difference is the 
condition for the possibility of original unity’s expression.  As such, difference owes 
itself to unity and the expression of unity owes itself to difference.   
Secondly, Rahner contends that Being’s expressive movement into its own other 
is completed by its return to itself and it is through this return to self that being realizes 
itself.  According to Rahner, “[t]he symbol strictly speaking (symbolic reality) is the self-
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realization of a being in the other, which is constitutive of its essence.”189 In short, “a 
symbol is effective because it brings a being to reality” both for itself and for others.190    
 The above analysis of being’s dynamic movement of emanation and return 
demonstrates Rahner’s dissatisfaction with traditional ontological interpretations of 
existence in Western thought and theology.  As Stephen Fields recognizes, the structure 
of being: 
…entails a dynamic, intrinsic, and reciprocal causality.  It is dynamic because 
Being emanates its own other and returns through it.  It is intrinsic because Being 
causes its own unity by causing its own other.  It is reciprocal because Being 
constitutes itself only by returning through its self-caused other.191 
 
Accordingly, beings consist of three aspects: an original unity, an other, and a perfected 
unity.  This means that individual beings ‘become’ what they already are in and through 
their own ‘other’. Thus, the plurality of being is not simply the mark of an entity’s 
finitude.  George Vass writes: 
Finite being by knowing and willing infinitely, tends towards, but never succeeds 
in overcoming, the ontological difference, whereas the infinite and the absolute 
has overcome this difference.  Thus Rahner also differentiates between 
symbolism and analogy.  While a real symbolism belongs to the very structure of 
being, ‘as the self-realization of a being in the other… analogy is related to the 
human perception of the way a being is symbolic in itself.192             
 
While the structure of all being is symbolic, there is an immeasurable difference between 
infinite or unrestricted ‘Being’ and finite or restricted ‘beings’. 
3.1.2 – The Symbolic Nature of Human Existence and Knowing 
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The human being, as spirit-in-the-world, exists as the unity-in-difference of both 
spirit and body.  The spirit, which is the human being’s capacity for the infinite, realizes 
itself in and through the body.  Thus, the body is the symbol of the spirit. In The 
Theology of Symbol, Rahner formulates the principle that: 
… the body is the symbol of the soul (spirit), in as much as it is formed as the 
self-realization of the soul, though it is not adequately this, and the soul (spirit) 
renders itself present and makes its ‘appearance’ in the body which is distinct 
from it… in this unity of symbol and thing symbolized, constituted as body and 
soul (spirit), the individual parts of the body are more than mere pieces put 
together quantitatively to from the whole body; they are rather parts in so special 
a way that they comprise in themselves the whole, though this is not true in the 
same strict way of each of the individual parts.193 
 
Hence, Rahner envisions human existence as a whole.  It is appropriate to speak of the 
body and spirit as distinct for the sake of conceptual clarity; however, Rahner cautions 
that within the experience of human being one cannot separate the two from one another.  
In short, one human being exists as a plurality of body and spirit.  “The person is able to 
think, to will, imagine, and feel only because the soul is mediated to itself in and through 
the body.”194 
 Human knowledge is also symbolic in structure according to Rahner.  This is 
because “the intellect obtains self-consciousness through the immanent object of 
sensuous intuition, which is its intrinsic sign.”195  As demonstrated above, human 
knowledge originates in the unity-in-difference of spirit and body and obtains via the 
synthesis of the transcendental and the categorical.  Hence, one must speak of two poles 
of human knowledge: the transcendental aspect of knowledge that seeks expression and 
the expression that finds its meaning in transcendence.  Put another way, the original 
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transcendental knowing of the human being finds its expression in the categorical, but the 
categorical expression must return to its transcendental origin in order to be fully 
realized.  William Dych writes: 
There is the movement of original knowledge gained through actually being in 
existence towards further and fuller objectification in concepts, towards 
understanding and judgment, towards expression, language and communication.  
There is, secondly, the need to relate the concept back to the original experience 
from which they have been derived and towards which they point.  Through this 
second movement we discover the “real” meaning of words and concepts which 
we have learned from a common language in which we have been formed and 
which we have perhaps been using for a long time.196  
 
Thus, human knowledge is dynamic; there is symbolic relationship between reflection 
and existence whereby experience is blind without words and concepts and words and 
concepts have no meaning outside of experience.197  Rahner writes:   
For when it grasps and understands any object, it has already transcended the 
latter into an infinity that is present as unexplored, precisely as such and not 
otherwise; it always seizes the individual object by being tacitly aware of the fact 
that the object always is and remains more than what is grasped of it.  It locates 
the individual object within reference systems which themselves are not precisely 
fixed and determined and in which such an individual reality has a place without 
absolutely and forever settled there.198 
 
Hence, the human being “becomes aware that a spirit-in-the-world knows itself only by 
mediating itself in the objects of sensation.”199  
Reflection upon experience reveals the symbolic nature of human knowledge, 
which owes itself to human capacity for what Rahner, calls, with Thomas Aquinas, 
excessus.  “Reason must be understood… as the capacity of excessus, as going out into 
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the inaccessible.200  The human being via reason is capable of recognizing the “more” of 
the experience.  In a first instance, the human being recognizes the “more” of experience 
when one recognizes the universal in a particular.  Put crudely, the human being has the 
ability, for instance, to recognize a particular tree (sensible singular) as a tree (universal) 
without knowing every particular tree.  Hence, each sensible singular instance of a tree 
that is immediately experienced must mediate universal treeness.  This capacity, 
according to Rahner, is possible of a second excesssus that is ontologically prior to the 
first.  The second excessus is possible because of the Vorgriff.  Simply put, the human 
being recognizes that each instance of a universal is not the universal.  This is significant 
because the ontological difference, according to Rahner, is at least implicitly affirmed 
and mediated in every act of human knowing.201   
All human knowing is possible because of the ability to interpret and appropriate 
the excessus of experience.  In short, the human being possesses tacit knowledge that is 
both ontological (as evidenced by the capacity to appropriate universals) and theological 
(as is evidenced by the supernatural existential) and comes to expression in and through 
the world.  For instance, the reality of loving and being loved exceeds its concrete 
expression and subsequent articulation in language and concepts, but in order to know 
that one is loving or being loved requires appropriate expression.  A kiss, an embrace, 
and words of endearment are all concrete expressions that really manifest (make present) 
the more original experience of loving and being loved.  One cannot know they are 
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loving or being loved without such expressions; however, these expressions do not 
exhaust the original experience.202    
3.2 – Rahner’s Theology of Symbol  
  Trinitarian theology is the source of Rahner’s observations regarding the symbol 
and its unity-in-difference.  As reality’s prime analogue, the infinite mode of being is the 
Trinity.  The Trinity reveals the symbolic structure of being as perfect unity-in-
difference.203  Because of Western Christianity’s preference for perfect unity and the 
absolute equality of the divine Persons of the Trinity, Rahner believes that it minimizes 
the “sense of uniqueness of each of the divine Person’s activity in salvation history.”204  
Doctrinally speaking, upholding the ‘real’ difference of the Persons of the Trinity as well 
as the diversity of activities attributed to each Person is necessary.205  The recognition 
that Western Christianity neglects to reflect upon the real difference that is characteristic 
of the Trinity in Revelation leads Rahner to assert, “[t]he ‘economic’ Trinity is the 
‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity.”206   
3.2.1 – Symbol, Trinity, and Incarnation 
The immanent Trinity and its economic expression cannot be understood as 
separate realities.  Separating the reality of the Trinity ad intra from its expression ad 
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extra in salvation history leads to a monist understanding of God with respect to God’s 
expression whereby particular instances of God’s activity in the world can be arbitrarily 
assigned to any Person of the Trinity.  Put another way, the neglect of the intrinsic 
connection between the distinct Persons of the Trinity and the expression proper to each 
fosters an understanding that, at least in theory, any Person of the Trinity could have 
become incarnate, redeem, sanctify, etc.  Instead, Rahner contends that the Persons of the 
Trinity and their immanent relations evidence the symbolic structure of perfected unity-
in-difference in such a way that the perfect unity-in-difference of the internal relations of 
the Trinity are really expressed outwardly in the economy of salvation.   
Rahner explains that the immanent relationship between the Father and the Son is 
one of origin and expression. He writes: 
One, the Word – as reality of the immanent divine life – is ‘generated’ by the 
Father and the image and expression of the Father. Two, this process is 
necessarily given with the divine act of self-knowledge, and without it the 
absolute act of divine self-possession in knowledge cannot exist… The Father is 
himself by the very act that he opposes to himself the image which is of the same 
essence as himself, as person who is other than himself, and so he possesses 
himself. But this means that the Logos is the ‘symbol’ of the Father… the inward 
symbol which remains distinct from what is symbolized, where what is 
symbolized expresses itself and possesses itself.207 
 
It is precisely because of the immanent relationship ad intra between the Father and the 
Logos, as one of origin and expression, that God can utter himself ad extra in and 
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through the Logos.208  The humanity of Jesus also demonstrates a symbolic structure.  
Rahner writes: 
The humanity is the self-disclosure of the Logos itself, so that when God, 
expressing himself, exteriorizes himself, that very thing that appears which we 
call the humanity of the Logos.  Anthropology itself is finally based on something 
more than the doctrine of the possibilities open to an infinite creator – who would 
not however really betray himself when he created.  Its ultimate source is the 
doctrine about God himself, in so far as it depicts that which ‘appears’ when in his 
self-exteriorization he goes out of himself into that which is other than he.209 
 
Put simply, in the incarnation the humanity of Jesus is the symbol, the visible expression 
of the divine Logos in the world and in history.210  Noticeably absent in Rahner’s account 
of the Trinity is the Holy Spirit. It should be noted that Rahner’s neglect of the Holy 
Spirit is most likely because of his focus on reframing Christology within the context of 
the symbol.  However, as Stephen Fields observes, it is appropriate to discuss the Holy 
Spirit within in the context of the emanation and returning to self of Being.  “Rahner does 
not explicitly locate the Holy Spirit within this scheme, the drift of his thought suggests 
that this Person is constituted by the return of the Father through the Son.”211 
3.2.2 – Symbol and Church    
 Rahner begins a lengthy discussion on the nature of the symbolic and sacramental 
nature of the Church by asserting that, “[t]he Church is not merely a religious 
institution… But neither was it simply founded from above by Christ as a spiritual 
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welfare establishment.”212  If the salvific presence of God’s grace is to be really present 
in the world through the human being, it must arise in what is other than God.  In short, it 
must come to the human being in and through symbol.213  Thus, Rahner’s understanding 
of symbol has significant ramifications for ecclesiology.  Rahner maintains that the  
… Church is the continuance, the contemporary presence, of that real, 
eschatologically triumphant and irrevocably established presence in the world, in 
Christ, of God’s salvific will.  The Church is the abiding presence of that primal 
sacramental word of definitive grace, which Christ is in the world, effecting what 
is uttered by uttering it in sign.214 
 
The Church continues the symbolic function of the Logos.  Hence, the Church is the 
symbol of Jesus Christ; the church, while differentiated from Jesus Christ, nevertheless 
presents Jesus Christ.   
Rahner notes that there are two important points that must be considered in light 
of this observation.   Firstly, because the Church, as a symbol, continues the symbolic 
activity of Jesus Christ, it is necessarily social.  The Church is real people of God and as 
such is the historical community that in particular socio-cultural circumstance continues 
to express the message of salvation that originates in the Person of Jesus Christ. 
 Secondly, the Church is not only a social reality, but it is also a salvific reality.  
The Church does not express a reality that is foreign to its expression.  According to 
                                                 
212 Rahner, "The Church and the Sacraments," 193. 
213 Rahner contends that one must uphold “The principle that God’s salvific action on 
man, from its first foundations to its completion, always takes place in such a way that God 
himself is the reality of salvation, because it is given to man and grasped by him
 
in the symbol, 
which does not represent an absent and merely promised reality but exhibits this reality as 
something present, by means of the symbol formed by it.” Rahner, "The Theology of Symbol," 
245. 
214 Rahner, "The Church and the Sacraments," 200. 
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Rahner, “The grace of salvation, the Holy Spirit himself, is of its essence.  But this is to 
affirm that this symbol of the grace of God really contains what it signifies…”215 
 Thus as symbol the Church, in freedom and responsibility, remains faithful to its 
mission given to it by Jesus Christ when it presents the message of salvation in a really 
human manner.  In other words, as the visible, tangible symbol of God’s grace, the 
Church must actualize itself as such.216 
3.2.3 – Symbol, Sacrament, and Word  
   Rahner holds that the Church symbolically actualizes itself in both word and 
sacrament. 217 Rahner explicates the relationship between sacrament and word in his 
essay Word and Eucharist and in so doing further clarifies his theology of symbol and its 
hermeneutic significance.  Rahner develops six theses that demonstrate the relationship 
between word and sacrament.  Firstly, Rahner states that, “[t]he word of God is uttered by 
the Church, where it is preserved inviolate in its entirety, and necessarily so, in its 
character as the word of God.”  The Church and the word, while distinct, are united with 
one another in such a way that wherever the word is preached the Church is present and 
wherever the Church is the word is present.  George Vass observes that,  
Rahner does not start by distinguishing between word and sign; he rather asserts 
the signifying character of the word along with the verbal character of the sign.  
Both sign and word are symbolic realities in the preaching of the Church.  This 
                                                 
215 Rahner, "The Theology of Symbol," 241. 
216 See: Roger D. Haight, "Historical Ecclesiology : An Essay on Method in the Study of 
the Church," Science et Esprit 39, no. 3 (1987). And Roger D. Haight, "Historical Ecclesiology : 
An Essay on Method in the Study of the Church," Science et Esprit 39, no. 1 (1987). 
217 In this context Rahner understands “word” to mean “the word of God, as it appears in 
the preaching of the Church” and “sacrament” as “basic acts of the self-realization of the Church 
with regards to individuals at decisive situations in their lives.” Rahner, "Word and Eucharist," 
253; 277. 
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sign is the visible gesture of the Church and the word uttered conveys the 
authority of God’s word.218 
 
The Church cannot exist without the word of God and the word of God is a reality in so 
far as the Church preaches it.      
Secondly, “[t]his word of God in the Church is an inner moment of God’s salvific 
action on man.”   According to Rahner, there is an intrinsic relationship between the inner 
word of God’s grace and the event of God’s word spoken externally to the human being.  
The inner word is illuminated by the proclamation of the God’s word.  Rahner writes: 
… the proclamation of the word of God, that is, the word in so far as it is 
conveyed by the historical, external salvific act of God as an intrinsic moment of 
this act and by the community of believers, belongs necessarily to the inner 
moments of God’s action on man.219  
 
Thirdly, “[a]s an inner moment in this salvific action of God, the word shares in 
the special character of the salvific action of God in Christ (and in the Church).” Here 
Rahner affirms that the transcendental experience of the human being, as an inner 
moment of God’s grace, must find expression in human terms.  In other words, the gift of 
justifying grace that is extended to all of humanity and forms the supernatural existential 
of the human being, must have a categorical expression.  “Should this kind of expression 
be lacking salvation would be just some ‘secret depth’ within the soul.”220    
Fourthly, [t]his word of God… is the salutary word which brings with it what it 
affirms.” Here is where the full weight of Rahner’s understanding of symbol is brought to 
bear on the discussion.  The expression and what is being expressed are united in their 
difference.  The word of God really brings about the salvation that it proclaims.   
                                                 
218 George Vass, The Sacrament of the Future : An Evaluation of Karl Rahner's Concept 
of the Sacraments and the End of Time (Leominster: Gracewing, 2005), 20. 
219  Rahner, "Word and Eucharist," 259.  
220 Vass, The Sacrament of the Future : An Evaluation of Karl Rahner's Concept of the 
Sacraments and the End of Time, 17. 
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Fifthly, [t]his word… takes place in the Church in essentially varying degrees of 
concentration and intensity.”  Here Rahner makes an important observation that should 
not be overlooked nor minimized; he recognizes that not all symbols are equal.  The 
efficacy of the symbol is in some sense determined both by its proclamation and by its 
reception.  Rahner writes that word of God that is proclaimed by the Church “can realize 
its essence only in a historical process, it is not always and at every moment fully its 
whole self: it grows, it becomes what it is and must be, it can be deficient, provisional and 
preparatory phases and moments.”221 
Lastly, [t]he supreme realization of the efficacious word of God, as the coming of 
the salvific action of God in the radical commitment of the Church… in the situations 
decisive for the individual’s salvation, is the sacrament and only the sacrament.”  
Sacraments are most properly understood as symbols or events of God’s self-
communication in the world of which the Church is fundamentally related.  Rahner 
writes: 
By such "natural symbols" or intrinsically real symbols, we mean for our purpose 
here, the spatio-temporal, historical phenomenon, the visible and tangible form in 
which something that appears, notifies its presence, and by so doing, makes itself 
present, bodying forth this manifestation really distinct from itself. With natural 
symbols, the sign or symbol as a phenomenon is intrinsically linked to what it is a 
phenomenon of, and which is present and operative, even though really distinct. 
In fact we must distinguish between two aspects: the dependence of the actual 
manifestation on what is manifesting itself, and the difference between the two.222 
 
Whenever and wherever the Church actualizes its essence it does so as the real symbol of 
Christ’s redemptive grace.223 
                                                 
221 Rahner, "Word and Eucharist," 264. 
222 Rahner, "The Church and the Sacraments," 219-220. 
223 Rahner distinguishes various levels of the Church’s activity.  While all instances of the 
Church’s self-actualization are properly “sacramental” in structure, Rahner contends that the 
seven Sacraments of the Catholic Church and in particular the Eucharist definitively actualize the 
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3.3 – Symbol, Language, and Doctrine 
Rahner’s understanding of language is closely related to symbol and in particular 
the symbolic significance of the Logos.  His analysis and subsequent conclusions 
regarding language reveal Rahner’s anticipation of postmodernity and the implicit 
influence of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy on his thought.224   
Rahner envisions language not as an instrument that simply conveys thought, but 
as “embodied thought.”225  As incarnate thought, language is more original than thought; 
it gives rise to thought.226  However, not all words are equivalent.  Rahner distinguishes 
between “primordial words” and “conventional words” when he writes: 
There are words which divide and words that unite: words which can be 
artificially manufactured and arbitrarily determined and words which have always 
existed or are newly born as a miracle; words which unravel the whole in order to 
explain the part, and words which by a kind of enchantment produce in the person 
who listens to them what they are expressing; words which illuminate something 
small, picking out with their light only part of reality, and words which make us 
wise allowing the manifold to harmonize in unity.  There are words which delimit 
and isolate, but there are also words which render a single thing translucent to the 
infinity of all reality… They bring light to us, not we to them.  They have power 
over us because they are gifts from God, not creations of men, even though they 
perhaps they came to us through men.  Some words are clear because they are 
shallow and without mystery; they suffice for the mind; by means of them one 
                                                                                                                                                 
Church’s essence as the abiding presence of Christ in a particular time and place for the 
individual. 
224 See: Craig A. Baron, "The Poetry of Transcendental Thomism: Postmodernity 
Anticipated and Challenged in Karl Rahner," in The Presence of Transcendence : Thinking 
'Sacrament' in a Postmodern Age, ed. L. Boeve and John Ries (Leuven: Peeters, 2001).  It should 
be noted that while Rahner’s theology is often discussed in relationship to philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger, the transcendental philosophy of Joseph Maréchal was undoubtedly a considerable 
influence fro Rahner as well.  
225 Karl Rahner, "Priest and Poet," in The Theology of the Spiritual Life,  Theological 
Investigations (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1967), 295. 
226 Rahner’s description of language shows a remarkable affinity to Paul Ricoeur’s notion 
of the symbol as “giving rise to thought.”  Rahner writes, “…the word… is the corporal state in 
which what we now experience and think first begins to exist by fashioning itself to the word-
body.  To be more precise: the word is embodied thought, not the embodiment of the thought.  It 
is more than the thought and more original than the thought, just as the entire man is more than, 
and more original than, his body and soul considered separately.” Ibid. 
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acquires mastery over things.  Other words are perhaps obscure because they 
evoke the binding mystery of things.227  
 
 Robert Masson correctly observes that Rahner’s concept of primordial words is not so 
much about a kind of word as it is about the way a word is used.228  Hence, primordial 
words elude definition.  Rahner contends that primordial words “can only be taken apart 
by being killed.”229  In short, primordial words do not conform to strict conceptual or 
categorical definitions.  Primordial words present and speak of the opaque and dynamic 
aspects of existence and reality.  Hence, as symbols primordial words both reveal and 
conceal.   
3.3.1 – The Symbol and Doctrinal Language 
 
 The theology of symbol, according to Rahner, provides the hermeneutic 
necessary for approaching theological and dogmatic statements.  Rahner writes:  
The principle that the concept of symbol… is an essential key-concept in all 
theological treatises, without which it is impossible to have a correct 
understanding of the subject-matter of the various treatises in themselves and in 
relation to other treatises.230 
 
Theological and doctrinal statements carry both transcendental and categorical meaning.  
Put another way, theological and doctrinal statements are human words and finite 
concepts that point to the infinitely mysterious reality of God.  Hence, such statements 
                                                 
227 Ibid., 295-296. 
228 Robert Masson, "Rahner's Primordial Words and Bernstein's Metaphorical Leaps: The 
Affinity of Art with Religion and Theology," Horizons 33, no. 2 (2006): 279.  Masson also 
describes ten helpful characteristics that distinguish primordial words from conventional words.  
Primordial words: 1) have an original relation to the realities about which they speak, 2) point 
beyond themselves into the infinity of reality, 3) cannot be unequivocally defined, 4) are not 
arbitrarily constructed, 5) are not conventional signs, 6) are irreplaceable, 7) present the reality 
they signify, 8) open up aspects of reality for the hearer, 9) open up the hearer to aspects of 
reality, and 10) are sacramental in structure.  Ibid., 280.  
229  Rahner, "Priest and Poet," 297. Here Rahner echoes Gabriel Marcels’ distinction 
between a problem and a mystery.   
230 Rahner, "The Theology of Symbol," 245. 
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can never unravel God’s absolute and transcendent mystery.  All theological and 
dogmatic statements are open to further development.  The development of theological 
and doctrinal statements need not imply that such statements lack truth or are relative.  
Instead, the principle of doctrinal development affirms the abiding mystery of God. 
 According to Rahner there are five constitutive elements of the dynamism of 
doctrinal development.  Firstly, as discussed above, Revelation as God’s self-disclosure 
requires that the addressee of Revelation be capable of hearing a possible word from 
God.  Put another way, “A divine utterance which is divine by its own nature has no 
meaning unless it is directed towards a divine hearing.”231  Secondly, the word of God is 
officially delivered by the Church’s magisterium that “essentially has the function of 
preserving and distinguishing.”232  The magisterium, however, “promotes the 
development of dogma when the movement has already been launched by other factors.”  
Dogmatic and doctrinal pronouncements and developments are initiated by factors other 
than the magisterium of the Church such as history, culture, and theology.  Hence, 
development occurs as the result of dialogue between the magisterium and other elements 
that are proper to the Church and its nature.   Thirdly, God’s revelation of God’s-self is 
carried and passed along in human words and concepts.  Rahner writes: 
All this, however, cannot hide the fact that this word itself is purely a genuine 
human word and is only competent to make God’s word present to us, as long as 
the human word remains such, with all the elements and consequences of coming 
from the human mind. 233 
 
Language and concepts are necessarily marked by the limits of particular sociocultural 
spatiotemporal situations.  Hence, as language and concepts develop, so too must 
                                                 
231 Karl Rahner, "Considerations on the Development of Dogma," in More Recesnt 
Writings,  Theological Investigations (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1666), 12. 
232 Ibid., 16. 
233 Ibid., 18. 
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dogmatic and doctrinal statements.  Fourthly, statements of dogma and doctrine are 
forever in the process of being handed on by the Tradition of the Church, are  subject to 
the Tradition of the Church, and constitute the Tradition of the Church.  Dogma and 
doctrine are truths which truths, which are spoken to someone.  Hence,  
traditio [handing on] takes place at a given moment of space and time, is 
necessarily historical, and absorbs the recipient and his historical uniqueness, 
which is also properly of his knowledge, into the process of traditio itself. 234   
 
In other words, Rahner recognizes that the processes of speaking and hearing are both 
marked by the world in which one lives.  Therefore the process of traditio is also a 
dynamic and hermeneutic process where the activities of explaining, understanding, and 
appropriating are in constant development or movement.235  Lastly, “[w]here dogma is 
present to the full extent of its being, it implies that conscious faith of the Church… holds 
it as revealed by God.”236  Hence, it is possible for the Church to become aware of truth 
of which it was not previously conscious.   
 Rahner’s understandings of language and doctrinal development demonstrate the 
significance of a logic that is governed by symbol for theological discourse.  The 
development of doctrine is the fruit of the relationship between expression and what is 
expressed that is dynamic, reciprocal, and intrinsic.   
4 – Conclusion  
 Rahner’s theological method and his understanding of symbol provide valuable 
resources for a theology that is postcritical.  Rahner’s theological method challenges the 
                                                 
234 Ibid., 25. 
235 Interestingly, Rahner sees this process developing in one of two ways.  In the first 
instance, doctrinal development will progress towards multiplication and distinction.  In the 
second instance, doctrinal development will progress towards convergence upon the one mystery 
of God. 
236 Rahner, "Considerations on the Development of Dogma," 27. 
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critical attitudes of modernity and postmodernity by affirming the experience of mystery 
within the concrete circumstances of the human being.  Far from dismissing the 
ontological and metaphysical tradition of the West, Rahner’s theology of symbol 
capitalizes on the strengths of ontology and metaphysics while opening up the space for 
other phenomenological experience of the human being.  The dynamism of the symbol, 
which according to Rahner is characterized by the process of emanation and return, 
supports both constancy and change.  The relationship between the symbol and 
symbolized is one of expression and origin respectively.  However, the dynamism of the 
symbol suggests that the origin which comes to expression on and through the symbol is 
also realized for the other and for itself in and through the symbol.  Thus, all finite beings 
are in the process of becoming what they are both one’s-self and for the other.  All 
aspects of human existence are meaningful and related in diversity not in spite of it.  In 
turn, Rahner’s theological method provides resources for reframing traditional Western 
approaches to the relationship between unity and difference that are indicative of a logic 
of the one over the many.   
Rahner’s observations regarding the symbolic nature of reality provide new 
possibilities for theological discourse whereby the realities of unity and difference are 
understood in a productive relationship with one another.  In sum, Rahner’s theology and 
method seeks to explain and understand unity-in-difference and accomplishes this task 
most effectively with symbol. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
KARL RAHNER AND ECUMENICAL THEOLOGY IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM: 
A SYMBOLIC RETHINKING OF UNITY AND DIFFERENCE 
1. – Introduction 
The fundamental task of this chapter is to broaden the concept of unity by 
developing an understanding of mutual recognition for the ecumenical movement that is 
governed by a logic of symbol.237  Such a rethinking within the ecumenical movement 
must not only ask about what one sees in the other, but also re-evaluate how one sees the 
other in the first place.   
The ecumenical movement and ecumenical dialogue are in need of a “second 
naïveté”.238  The need for a second naïveté is clear when one recognizes that at its 
foundation ecumenical dialogue is a dialogue of symbols.  This chapter suggests that 
ecumenical dialogue is always at least implicitly an ecclesiological dialogue that strives 
for mutual recognition (not necessarily consensus or agreement) on all matters.  Hence, it 
is necessary to distinguish between the nature and purpose of the church, ecumenism, and 
ecumenical dialogue.   
The intention of this chapter is twofold.  Firstly, this chapter establishes the need 
for ecumenical dialogue to move beyond both the traditional Western logic of the one 
over the many and the logic of postmodernity that accords primacy to difference over 
                                                 
237 Yves Congar provides a poignant example of the need to broaden the concept of unity 
within Catholicism.  Quoting an unnamed protestant observer at the 1978 meeting of French 
Bishops in Lourdes, Congar writes, “Since Vatican II, your church has put into practice 
everything possible in the perspective of unity which she has allowed herself.  It seems that at 
present she cannot go any further.  Might that not be a sign that your conception of unity is not 
broad enough, and that in particular it cannot recognize difference?” Yves Congar, Diversity and 
Communion, North American ed. (Mystic, Conn.: Twenty-Third Publications, 1985), 2. 
238 See: chapter one pp.44-52 
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unity.  While recognizing a certain indebtedness to both modernity and postmodernity, 
this chapter elucidates the need to develop an approach to ecumenical dialogue that is 
postcritical and governed by a logic of symbol.  Secondly, this chapter develops the 
theological insights of Karl Rahner in order to advance a theology of ecumenical 
dialogue that 1) originates in the mystery of the unity of the church of Christ, 2) humbly 
recognizes the complex nature of Christ’s church and its unfolding surplus of meaning, 
and 3) in courage and faith can pursue the unfolding unity of the church of Christ in 
history while also recognizing that its aim is an eschatological reality. 
2. – The Ecumenical Movement and Ecumenical Dialogue in the Third Millennium 
The contemporary ecumenical movement and its efforts towards the realization of 
the koinonia of Christ’s church left an indelible mark on Christianity in the twentieth 
century.  During the twentieth century, the ecumenical conviction emerged that the 
churches separated and spread throughout the world in a variety of particular theological, 
historical, sociological, and geographical contexts must learn to express together the one, 
holy, catholic, and apostolic church of Christ in and through the common activities of 
martyria (witness), leitourgia (worship), and diakonia (service).  However, the 
exuberance and excitement that accompanied the initial discoveries of commonality and 
sharing between separated Christian churches in the early and middle of the twentieth 
century have given way to the sobering realization that there are still a great many 
differences that continue to divide the one church of Christ.  
Today the ecumenical landscape in Western Christianity is fraught with questions 
and concerns regarding the roles of difference and diversity for the unity sought by the 
ecumenical movement.  Avery Dulles writes: 
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It should not be surprising… that in the contemporary Church, rocked by 
paradigm shifts, we should find phenomena such as polarization, mutual 
incomprehension, inability to communicate, frustration, and discouragement. 
Since the situation is simply a fact of our times, we must learn to live with it. It 
will greatly help, however, if people can learn to practice tolerance and to accept 
pluralism. We must recognize that our own favorite paradigms, however 
excellent, do not solve all questions. Much harm is done by imperialistically 
seeking to impose some one model as the definitive one.239 
 
As the Christian churches that are engaged in ecumenical activity traverse a new era 
marked by pluralism and globalization and begin to recognize that Christianity’s living 
space is the whole world,240 the interpretation and appropriation of Christian identity and 
the realities of unity and difference are in need of hermeneutical resources that are 
capable of constructively engaging the present-day ecumenical context. 
 This section argues that the tensions experienced by the contemporary ecumenical 
movement in the West issue from divergent understandings and explanations of the roles 
of unity and difference within the koinonia of Christ’s church.  While it is generally 
accepted that unity and difference are intrinsic characteristics of Christ’s church, 
individual churches tend to emphasize either unity or difference in a variety of ways.  The 
tendencies to emphasize either unity or difference shapes how particular churches 
interpret: 1) Christian identity in relation to orthodoxy and orthopraxis and 2) the identity 
of the church in relation to its universal and particular dimensions.  Drawing upon Paul 
Ricouer’s work, The Course of Recognition, this section articulates a postcritical 
framework for ecumenical dialogue that is capable of moving beyond the hermeneutical 
impasses of the present-day ecumenical movement in the West. 
2.1 – The Nature and Purpose of Ecumenism: Recollecting the Church  
                                                 
239 Avery Dulles, Models of the Church, Exapnded ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 23. 
240 See: chapter one pp. 11 
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Ecumenism, in its contemporary form, emerges out of the present-day division of 
the church in relation to the conviction that such disunity offends Christ’s prayer that 
those who believe in him “may all be one.”241   John Paul II explains: 
To believe in Christ means to desire unity; to desire unity means to desire the 
Church; to desire the Church means to desire the communion of grace which 
corresponds to the Father’s plan from all eternity.  Such is the meaning of Christ’s 
prayer: “Ut unum sint.”242 
 
The nature and purpose of ecumenism are properly understood within the purview 
of the nature and purpose of the church itself.  The Canberra Statement (1991), The Unity 
of the Church as Koinonia: Gift and Calling, succinctly articulates the nature and purpose 
of ecumenism: 
The unity of the Church to which we are called is koinonia given and expressed in 
the common confession of the apostolic faith; common sacramental life entered 
by one baptism and celebrated together in one Eucharistic fellowship; a common 
life in which the members and ministries are mutually recognized and reconciled; 
and a common mission witnessing to the gospel of God’s grace to all people and 
serving the whole of creation.  The goal of the search for full communion is 
realized when all the churches are able to recognize in one another the one, holy, 
catholic apostolic church in its fullness.243 
 
As extensions of the nature and purpose of the church, the primary concerns of 
ecumenism are directed towards interpreting and appropriating the relationship between 
                                                 
241 John 17:21 NAB; The 1910 World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh is often 
considered to be the formal beginning of the contemporary ecumenical movement.  However, it 
would be inaccurate to hold that ecumenical activities were dormant until 1910.  Rahner writes, 
“Every living reality has a history, and often too a pre-history, and for the most part it is not 
possible to draw any unambiguous boundaries between history and pre-history, especially since 
in the case we are considering the mentality of the individual theologians, even in earlier ages, 
was not the same, but rather exhibits profound differences, so that perhaps in any distinction we 
might draw between controversial theology and ecumenical theology it might be said that from 
the Reformation to the present day there have been ecumenical theologians and controversial 
theologians.” Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of Ecumenical Discussion," in Confrontations I,  
Theological Investigations (New York: Seabury, 1974), 25-26. 
242 John Paul II, "Ut Unum Sint," Origins 25, no. 4 (1995): ¶9. 
243 World Council of Churches, "The Unity of the Church as Koinonia: Gift and Calling," 
in The Ecumenical Movement : An Anthology of Key Texts and Voices, ed. Michael Cope Brian E. 
Kinnamon (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1997), 124. 
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unity and diversity.  Ecumenism, however, is a distinctive reality in so far as it is 
concerned with the abnormal situation of a divided church.244   
The Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement articulates the conviction that 
ecumenism is intimately bound to one’s understanding of the church, but warns against 
misappropriating the significance of both unity and diversity: 
…the ecumenical movement has been a search for unity in the truth as it is found 
in Jesus (Eph. 4:21) and into which the Holy Spirit leads (John 16:13).  It has not 
been a matter, on the one hand, of creating a super-orthodoxy uniformly 
formulated or, on the other, of doctrinal compromise or indifferentism.  Rather, 
churches have together searched the scriptures, the venerable Tradition of the 
church, and the belief and practice of the contemporary communities with the aim 
of reaching a “common expression of the apostolic faith today”…245 
 
As the above testifies, the ecumenical search for unity is a shared process, though 
separated Christian churches carry out that process.  The truth sought by the ecumenical 
movement is neither an instance of a super-orthodoxy that envisions unity by way of a 
logic of the one over the many, nor is truth arrived at through an uncritical acceptance of 
difference and diversity.  Instead, “ecumenical Christians” writes Kinnamon, “should be 
so committed to living the whole truth of the Christian faith that they readily confess that 
this truth is greater than any of their separated witnesses.”246 
Ecumenism looks to discover the unity of the church in the truth of Jesus Christ 
through the Holy Spirit.  It is also a movement concerning unity-in-difference that 
unfolds through a dialogic process and seeks to uncover the truth that is found within the 
                                                 
244 The phrase “unity and acceptable diversity” is used commonly within ecumenical 
language.  It is essential that “acceptable diversity” is not understood and explained from a purely 
ontological/metaphysical perspective.  When it is interpreted in this manner, “acceptable 
diversity” turns out to be difference that can be managed; otherness that can be dissolved or 
reconciled to the same. 
245 Nicolas Lossky, Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement, 2nd ed. (Geneva, 
Switzerland: WCC Publications, 2002), xvi. 
246 Michael Kinnamon, The Vision of the Ecumenical Movement and How It Has Been 
Impoverished by Its Friends (St. Louis, Missouri: Chalice Press, 2003), 63-64. 
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shared diversity of the church.  The Decree on Ecumenism of Vatican II testifies to this 
conviction when it states, “[w]hatever is truly Christian is never contrary to what 
genuinely belongs to the faith; indeed, it can always bring a deeper realization of the 
mystery of Christ and the church.”247   
The intention of following sections is to articulate the nature and purpose of the 
ecumenical movement and ecumenical dialogue.  The interpretation of ecumenism that 
emerges in this section is one that is open to possible ways of expressing unity that are 
largely ignored or undeveloped within the contemporary ecumenical movement.    
2.1.1 – The Nature of the Ecumenism 
 The ecumenical movement is deeply wed to how various churches interpret and 
appropriate the nature of the church.  In particular, ecumenism is concerned with the 
unity of the church or koinonia.  Hence, it is not surprising that one of the basic 
challenges confronting ecumenism is competition between various ecclesiological 
convictions regarding the communion of the church.  Kurt Koch writes: 
Since each church has and realizes its denominationally specific concept of the 
unity of its own church, and is therefore virtually automatically intent on 
transferring this denominational concept to the goal of the ecumenical movement 
too, there are as many differing representations of the goal of ecumenism as there 
are different churches.248 
 
Koch’s analysis astutely acknowledges that the difficulties ecumenism faces issue from a 
kind of ecclesiological provincialism.  The Joint Working Group between the Roman 
Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches writes: 
                                                 
247 Second Vatican Council, "Decree on Ecumenism," in Decees of the Ecumanical 
Councils, ed. Norman P. Tanner (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), 912. 
248 Kurt Koch, "Ecumenical Developments and New Challenges: Where Do We Stand 
Forty Years after Unitatis Redintegratio?," in Searching for Christian Unity, ed. J. Paul, W. 
Kasper, and J. Zizioulas (New York: New City, 2007), 96. 
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The koinonia or communion as the basic understanding of the church demands 
attempting to develop common ecumenical perspectives on ecclesiology. Unity is 
not uniformity but a communion of rich diversity. Therefore, it is necessary to 
explore with others the limits of legitimate diversity. In this regard special 
cognizance must also be taken of the religious and socio-cultural context in which 
the process of ecumenical formation takes place.249   
 
The fundamental challenge that confronts the ecumenical movement is not the diversity 
of ecclesiologies put forth by particular churches, it is the inability or the refusal of 
particular churches to see beyond their own horizon of understanding.  In either case, a 
logic of the one over the many, often expressed in some form of metaphysical ontology, 
leads to an exclusivist position towards other churches.   Such positions hold to the 
conviction that a reliable interpretation adheres to the principle of non-contradiction and 
are, in the end, antithetical to the nature of ecumenism in so far as they seek to reconcile 
diversity by subsuming otherness to sameness.  In short, unity does not mean 
uniformity.250     
In sum, by its nature, ecumenism is a dialogic and interpretive movement 
concerned with fostering the unity of the church.  It takes as its starting point the 
conviction that all Christians are already united by the same justifying grace of God 
despite the very real divisions that exist between churches.   
2.1.2 - The Purpose of Ecumenism 
The goal or purpose of ecumenism is the realization of the koinonia of Christ’s 
church in and through the shared activities of leitourgia, martyria, and diakonia.  
Recognizing that an openly divided church violates the church’s identity as one, holy, 
                                                 
249 The Ecumenical Movement Joint Working Group between the Roman Catholic 
Church and the WCC and 1993, "Ecumenical Formation," in The Ecumenical Movement : An 
Anthology of Key Texts and Voices, ed. Michael Cope Brian E. Kinnamon (Geneva: WCC 
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catholic, and apostolic and denigrates the church’s expressive activities of leitourgia, 
martyria, and diakonia, ecumenism calls separated churches to conversion and promotes 
healing reconciliation between them.  Jeffrey Gros acknowledges: 
The Church has no meaning, no purpose, separate from its place in relationship to 
God's love for us. In ecumenical conversion we are called to love one another 
with something of the love that has been shown to us in creation, redemption, and 
the sustaining and sanctification of the Spirit. We are called to be imaginative and 
resourceful in our loving. The process of ecumenical life is a context in which we 
need to learn how to recognize, value, and appropriate elements from other 
Christian groups that are gifts of the Spirit intended for all.251 
 
Philip Potter contends that the ecumenical movement is “the means by which the 
churches form the house, the oikos of God, are seeking so to live and witness before all 
peoples that the whole oikoumene may become the oikos of God through the crucified 
and risen Christ in the power of the life-giving Spirit.”252  Ecumenism seeks the koinonia 
of the church by fostering mutual recognition in and through dialogue.  Rahner and Fries 
write: 
The purpose of ecumenical conversation is not that two churches should confront 
each other with their separate traditions and attempt by bargaining and 
compromise to reduce the two to one. It is rather that together they should be able 
to achieve a more authentic reformation than either of them could achieve in 
isolation.253 
 
Thus, the ecumenical movement looks to establish the unity of the church via mutual 
recognition that obtains in and through dialogue. Mutual recognition, however, is not the 
goal and purpose of ecumenism.  While the koinonia of the church requires mutual 
recognition, mutual recognition does not automatically lead to unity.   A divided church 
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is a divided symbol and, as such, it suffers from a diminished efficacy; a divided church 
poorly “recollects” Jesus Christ.  The most fundamental purpose of ecumenism is to 
“recollect” a divided church so that it may “recollect” Jesus Christ.  Hence, in order for 
the ecumenical movement to achieve its goal particular churches must recognize and 
experience one another and themselves as real but incomplete symbols of Jesus Christ.  
Hence, no particular church can confess to be the complete symbol of Jesus Christ in so 
far as such a claim is an eschatological one.  
2.2 – Ecumenical Dialogue: Mutual Recognition and a Dialogue of Symbols  
 
Ecumenical dialogue, from a postcritical perspective, seeks to foster and promote 
the goal of mutual recognition, not rigid recognition through conformity.  Walter Kasper 
explains that: 
[r]ecognition means neither the resignation of one’s standpoint nor the pluralism 
of unconnected and perhaps contradictory standpoints.  Recognition does not 
mean to reduce to the lowest common denominator but rather to heighten one’s 
own standpoint.  But this heightening does not lead to separatism; rather it 
recognizes a legitimate pluralism in expressing “that which is held in 
common.”254 
 
Kasper’s description of recognition encapsulates the dominant way of establishing and 
maintaining koinonia between particular churches and between particular churches and  
the universal church in early Christianity.255 
Ecumenical dialogue, as an ecclesial activity, develops in relation to the diversity 
of particular churches.  The participants of ecumenical dialogue engage one another from 
their particular historical/social and theological positions.  According to Rahner, 
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separated churches enter into dialogue “each from its starting-point as previously 
determined by its past history.”256  The church carries out its activities and expressions in 
a really human fashion.  In this sense, the identity of the church only emerges as a reality 
in the world when it embraces its dialogic structure that resembles the hypostatic union of 
Jesus Christ.257  The church “recollects” Jesus Christ in a manner that is similar to the 
way that the divinity of Jesus Christ is revealed through his humanity.  In short, a similar 
“scandal of particularity” that marks the incarnation also marks the church. 
Ecumenical dialogue seeks to develop mutual recognition between separated 
churches through what might be termed a “fusion of symbols.”   However, recognition is 
always a provisional actuality.  Recognition is provisional because symbols are not static 
realities and require ongoing understanding, explaining, and appropriating.  Hence, 
symbols, because they are dynamic realities, run the risk of misrecognition.  Walter 
Kasper writes: 
So we bear the truth "in earthen vessels". All our concepts are limited, culturally 
and historically conditioned. Thus the encounter and the dialogue with other 
cultures can help to discover new aspects of the truth, which is Jesus Christ. 
Dialogue helps us to know all the depths and heights of Jesus Christ. Only when 
we bring in all the riches of all cultures can we know the fullness of truth in its 
fullness. Mission therefore is not a one-way process; mission - as it understands 
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itself today - realizes itself in a dialogical way and is connected with 
inculturation.258 
 
Thus, through the exchange of symbols, which requires a hermeneutic other than one 
governed by a logic of the one over the many, ecumenical dialogue “does not produce 
truth; dialogue discovers the truth, which is given to us once and for all in Jesus 
Christ.”259 
2.2.1 – The Nature and Purpose of Ecumenical Dialogue 
Dialogue is an essential aspect of being human and becoming human.  The 
dynamic movement between the transcendental and the categorical demonstrates the 
necessity of dialogue for human beings and their becoming.260  Ecumenical dialogue, 
however, is a distinctive form of dialogue in so far as it flows from the dialogic nature of 
the church as the people of God and the present-day disunity of the church. 
Ecumenical dialogue is always a dialogue regarding a particular community’s 
interpretation and appropriation of their collective experience of God’s salvation.  Angelo 
Maffeis is correct in acknowledging that, “before being an ecclesial fact, dialogue is a 
universal human phenomenon.”261  However, as a dialogue between churches, 
ecumenical dialogue is also and must be a dialogue that explicitly acknowledges the 
mystery of God in the symbolic expressions of the other church. 
 Angelo Maffeis clarifies several constitutive elements that provide a helpful 
understanding of the structure of human dialogue.  Firstly, dialogue requires at least two 
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interlocutors.262  As such, dialogue requires difference.  Secondly, the interlocutors must 
have a message.263  To put it another way, the dialogue partners each have their own 
unique symbols.  Thirdly, the goal of sharing one’s message is to arouse consensus.264  
When one’s dialogue partner recognizes the truth of the shared messages or symbols, 
hopefully such consensus occurs.  Put another way, the goal of dialogue is a consensus as 
mutual recognition and not by the eradication of difference.  Fourthly, according to 
Maffeis, “[c]onsensus makes possible a communion among the interlocutors, which 
through dialogue, they reach the awareness to share determined knowledge, determined 
convictions, and values.”265  Dialogue allows for a conscious and intentional living with 
one another as opposed to simply living alongside one another.  Dialogue pushes beyond 
the comfortable boundaries of a tolerance that “presupposes that people are safest when 
no one can interfere with their pursuit of their own understandings of the good.”266  
Lastly, the presupposition and result of dialogue is the capacity for common activity.267  
The foundation of dialogue is unity-in-difference.  Dialogue is possible because the 
partners bring a mixture of commonality and difference.    
Through dialogue, Christians seek agreement and consensus that, from a 
postcritical perspective, is not simply an exchange of information, but instead culminates 
in mutual recognition between churches.  Ecumenical dialogue is as much about listening 
to the truth of the other as it is about speaking.  Karl Rahner writes: 
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The collective finding of truth can really and ultimately consist only in the fact 
that a person makes an effort in such a dialogue to recognise as his own the 
community which he presupposes and this in the way in which it is given in 
others; conversely, it means that the person lets the other recognise this 
community as his own just as it is given in himself and is brought before his own 
and the other’s consciousness in the dialogue.  Dialogue, therefore, presupposes 
and seeks unity, and lives in a genuine tension between both realities.268 
 
It is through mutual recognition that separated churches come to share in and express the 
truth of Christ. 
2.3 – The Ecumenical Movement and the Question of Unity and Difference 
Interpreting and appropriating unity and difference within a pluralistic and 
globalized context presents significant challenges for the ecumenical movement in the 
West where metaphysical and ontological presuppositions are deeply embedded within 
the fabric of culture and thought.  The questions and challenges facing the ecumenical 
movement and ecumenical dialogue in the West issue from the conflicting paradigms of 
pluralism and globalization on the one hand and traditional Western ontology and 
metaphysics on the other. 269  Michael Kinnamon recognizes this basic tension 
confronting the ecumenical movement when he writes: 
At the heart of the ecumenical movement is a problem that has troubled political 
philosophers from Plato to the authors of the United States Constitution: the 
relationship between the one and the many, between the unity of the community 
and the diversity of its particular parts. The two concepts - unity and diversity - 
are symbiotic. "Unity'' is meaningful only if it includes in one whole things that 
are unlike, and "diversity'' is only diverse in relation to the other distinctive parts 
of a whole. So the question is one of emphasis or starting point. Do we say “out of 
the many, one” (e pluribus unum) or “within the one, many”? Do we properly 
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speak of unified diversity or diverse unity?270 
 
Kinnamon’s observations illustrate the basic tensions that confront the ecumenical 
movement today.  The above remarks, however, also express the pervasive attitude in the 
West to frame the challenges confronting the ecumenical movement as “problems”.  The 
penchant in Western Christianity to envision unity as a problem presents serious 
obstacles for both the ecumenical movement in general and ecumenical dialogue in 
particular.  Within ecumenical literature, the relationship between unity and difference is 
frequently understood along the lines of primary reflection that seeks a definitive 
resolution.271   
 The ecumenical movement and ecumenical dialogue are in need of hermeneutical 
resources that allow for an interpretation and appropriation of the realities of unity and 
difference in a manner that extends beyond the boundaries of primary reflection and the 
problematic.  Put another way, there is need within both the ecumenical movement and 
ecumenical dialogue to think beyond the limits of a logic that is governed by the one over 
the many and a logic that is governed by the many over the one.  Instead, ecumenical 
dialogue and the ecumenical dialogue are in need of a hermeneutic that supports thinking 
of unity and difference as mutually enriching principles; not mutually exclusive 
principles.  The following suggests that Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of recognition 
provides the necessary framework for a postcritical reevaluation of ecumenical dialogue 
and the ecumenical movement.  
2.3.1 The Course of Recognition 
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A central concern of the ecumenical movement and the ultimate goal of 
ecumenical dialogue is fostering and developing mutual recognition between churches 
separated from one another.  However, despite its frequent and common usage, the term 
“recognition” is difficult to circumscribe in the ecumenical register as it references a 
variety of meanings and activities.272  According to William Rusch, the use of 
“recognition” in ecumenical literature: 
…can refer to either individual components in the life of the Church – sacraments, 
persons, confessions – or it can refer to churches as a whole.  It can be gradual or 
dynamic.  It is primarily a spiritual process, although it is not without legal 
aspects.  It involves questions of legitimacy… Recognition functions in the 
context of unity in diversity, seeking an ecumenical path between the tendency to 
remove all difference and opposing the inclination to settle for mere coexistence 
or cooperation.  It affirms a certain “otherness”, resisting the urges to take over, to 
adopt, or to take possession.  It is an ongoing process… 273 
 
The above illustrates that “recognition” is a term that on the one hand is self-evident and 
on the other hand is fraught with a multiplicity of meanings.  Despite its commonplace 
appearance within ecumenical literature and discussions, “recognition” is a complex and 
polyvalent term that requires attention. 
Recognition is interpreted most appropriately as a process.  As such, Ricoeur 
contends that recognition begins with identification, moves towards recognizing one’s-
self, and culminates with mutual recognition.  Ricoeur writes:  
The passage from recognition-identification, where the thinking subject claims to 
master meaning, to mutual recognition, where the subject places him- or herself 
under the tutelage of a relationship of reciprocity, in passing through self-
recognition in the variety of capacities that modulate one’s ability to act, one’s 
“agency”.274 
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The movement towards “mutual recognition” and the consequences inherent in such a 
movement for ecumenical dialogue are key themes for the present-day ecumenical 
movement.  
In his final major work, The Course of Recognition, Paul Ricoeur sets out to 
provide a philosophical interpretation of the aporetic nature of recognition.  Ricoeur 
writes: 
It is a fact that no theory of recognition worthy of the name exists in the way that 
one or more theories of knowledge exist.  This surprising lacuna stands in contrast 
to the kind of coherence that allows for the word recognition to appear in a 
dictionary as a single lexical unit, despite the multiple senses that this lexical unit 
embraces… 275 
 
Acknowledging the various lexical meanings of the term “recognition”, Ricoeur concedes 
that there is a “rule governed polysemy of the word recognition in its ordinary usage.”276  
Ricoeur maintains that despite the various common uses of the word “recognition” there 
is an ordered series of meanings.  Ricoeur writes: 
… the passage from one meaning to another takes place by imperceptible skips.  
The principle of these tiny gaps lies in what is not said, the unsaid, of the prior 
definition, beneath which lies concealed the very generating of this ordered series 
of the meanings. Under the aegis of what I have called a rule-governed 
polysemy…. the definitions run together in such a workable way that the 
derivation seems to flow like a continuous stream of meanings.277 
 
The stream of meanings, to which Ricoeur refers, reveals the course of recognition as “a 
trajectory running through its [the verb to recognize] use in the active voice to its use in 
the passive voice.”278  In short, the path of recognition moves from the activity of 
recognizing towards the reality of “being recognized”.  The trajectory of recognition 
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develops in three interrelated yet distinct moments: 1) recognition as identification, 2) 
self-recognition, and 3) mutual recognition.  As the following demonstrates, the trajectory 
or course of recognition suggested by Ricoeur has important implications for a 
postcritical assessment and application of ecumenical dialogue. 
2.3.2 – Recognition as Identification  
The course of recognition, according to Ricoeur, begins with the cognitive 
process of identification “in the sense of establishing a relationship of identity between 
one thing and another.”279  The problematical character of recognition as identification 
for modern criticism originates with the categories of the “same” and “other” in the 
precritical thought of Plato.  With Plato, precritical Western thought envisions the 
relationship between one thing and another via the theory of participation.280  Ricoeur 
observes that for the precritical attitude the theory of participation circumscribes: 
… the ideas of the one and the many, and the same and the other, which 
themselves give rise to a series of operations of conjunction and disjunction 
underlying the slightest operation of predication, inasmuch as to predicate one 
term on another is to make one idea participate in another… For example, the 
polarity of the same and the other turns out to overlap the dialectic of being to the 
extent that the same must be defined both “relative to itself” and “relative to 
something other than itself.”281 
 
Inheriting the precritical dialectic tension between the “same” and the “other”, the 
modern critical mindset’s point of departure is the conviction that identification is 
possible via the “royal seat of judgment.”282  
Beginning with Descartes, Ricoeur maintains that “[i]n order to identify it is 
necessary to distinguish, and it is in distinguishing that we identify.”283  For Kant, 
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however, to identify means to synthesize or bring together.284  Despite their obvious 
differences, there is an underlying commonality between Descartes and Kant.  Ricoeur 
writes, “[f]or Descartes and for Kant, to recognize… is to identify, to grasp a unified 
meaning through thought.”285  Whether one understands identification as the activity of 
synthesis of the transcendental subject or as the activity of distinguishing of the cogito, in 
either case it is the activity of a subject who is the master of meaning.  For both Descartes 
and Kant, recognizing and knowing are inextricably connected.  Arto Laitinen 
acknowledges that in the thinking subject and the transcendental subject there is a 
preoccupation with certitude such that “identification is threatened not only by mistaking 
some individual thing for some other individual thing, but also by a failure to construe 
something as an individual thing at all.”286  Put simply, difference that cannot be 
cognitively mastered threatens the process of identification via distinguishing and 
synthesis. 
  Descartes and Kant envision the relationship between knowing and recognizing 
in such an exclusive manner that it becomes necessary to disregard or at least bracket 
belief and any subsequent knowledge acquired through belief.  Ricoeur maintains that for 
the modern critical attitude phenomenological analysis reveals the disconnect between 
knowledge and recognition.  Ricoeur explains that: 
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…neither Descartes nor Kant really makes specific the “something” identified 
either by procedures of distinction or by procedures for placing things into 
relation.  For Descartes, the only thing that counts is the representative value 
which confers a kind of being on the idea, the objective being of an idea.  But this 
holds as much for scientific entities, for objects of perception, for persons, and 
finally, at the highest degree for God.  For Kant, only mathematical and physical 
entities satisfy the criteria of objectivity delimited by the transcendental point of 
view, the distinct status of persons in relation to things being set aside for 
practical philosophy.  For a philosophy of being-in-the-world, on the contrary, it 
is the modes of being of things in the world that is important.287 
 
Hence, identification is not only accomplished by recognizing what something is, but also 
through an attentiveness to the way something is. 
The mystery of the “other” in the play of appearance, disappearance, and 
reappearance reveals limits of recognition as identification.288  The phenomena of change 
comprises identification in such a way that “the work of recognition must struggle with 
the threat of the ‘unrecognizable’.”289  It is with the subject that suffers and deals with 
change where “[a] kind of companionship with misunderstanding, which goes with the 
ambiguities of an incomplete, open-ended life world, has to replace the fear of error.”290    
In turning to the modes of being of things in the world, a wounded cogito 
emerges.  There is a reversal of intentionality whereby the subject as the master of 
meaning is at the very least decentered.  As such, the autonomous subject of the modern 
critical attitude, having been confronted by the mystery of the other, emerges as a 
humbled subject indebted to the other.  
In sum, Ricoeur’s analysis of recognition as identification elucidates three 
successive moments within the process of recognition as identification.  Identification 
begins with the thinking subject who distinguishes, synthesizes, and, finally in the face of 
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the uncertainty of the mystery of the other, realizes that identification is threatened by the 
possibility of misunderstanding.  Phenomenologically speaking, turning to the things 
themselves opens up a space for the mysterious other within the course of recognition.  It 
is in turning to the things themselves that the mystery of the other is at last permitted to 
manifest itself in the space between knowing and recognizing.  Recognition as 
identification reaches its limit when the mystery of the other presents the rational subject 
with the possibility of misrecognition and wounds or decenters the cogito’s subjectivity 
precisely as the sole arbiter of reality.  
2.3.2.1 – Ecumenical Dialogue and Identification 
In the twentieth century, the ecumenical movement and its dialogue in the West 
demonstrate a virtually ubiquitous commitment to recognition as identification.  The 
great achievements wrought by ecumenical dialogue, especially in the last fifty or so 
years, are more or less achievements in the realm of recognition as identification and in 
particular identification via distinguishing and synthesis.  The preoccupation of the 
ecumenical movement and ecumenical dialogue with orthodoxy evidences the Western 
inclination to envision recognition as identification.  The German Ecumenical Study 
Committee’s description of doctrinal consensus and its relationship to church unity 
illustrates such an approach to the ecumenical movement and ecumenical dialogue.  The 
committee writes: 
The starting point for doctrinal conversations is the respective standpoint of each 
confession.  They discuss these standpoints in dialogue with the aim of reaching 
doctrinal consensus.  When this consensus is achieved, it is received in the still 
separated churches.  When the reception process is completed, communion 
between the churches is restored and then the unity of the church has been 
achieved.291 
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Approaches like those of the German Ecumenical Study Committee envision the 
relationship between unity and diversity characteristic of the church’s koinonia as a 
problem in need of resolution via doctrinal consensus; in short orthodoxy.  This manner 
of thinking is undoubtedly responsible for a plethora of important discoveries, but it also 
presents significant limitations for both ecumenical dialogue and by extension the entire 
ecumenical movement. However, synthesizing and distinguishing eventually run their 
course and come up against their limits when confronted with the mystery of the other, as 
Ricoeur’s analysis of the play of appearance, disappearance, and reappearance 
demonstrates.  Change that results from reform, conversion, or novelty invariably risks 
misidentification.   
At various points in history, Christians ceased recognizing one another. As a 
result, when Christians separated from one another ecclesially they also, in a manner of 
speaking, “disappeared” from one another.  On the one hand, the circumstances of 
ecclesial separation supported the development of churches within a diversity of spacio-
temporal, socio-cultural, and theological settings, but on the other hand the development 
of separated churches took place within an isolated trajectory.  By contrast, the twentieth 
century marks a time in which separated Christians took up the challenge of recognizing 
one another.  The work of recognition that is characteristic of ecumenical dialogue 
provides a context in which Christians reappear to one another.  A great deal of 
difference developed among churches in the time between separation (disappearance) and 
the birth of the ecumenical movement (reappearance) that present significant challenges 
for mutual recognition between the churches of today. 
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Emilio Castro rightly observes that, “during the last forty or fifty years such 
tremendous progress has been made in discovering one another, that we are a little 
impatient today.”292  Impatience is an apt description of the frustration that permeates the 
ecumenical landscape and it is such impatience that characterizes the so-called 
“ecumenical winter”.  The “ecumenical winter”, however, is better understood as 
indicating the need for a transition from a critical to a postcritical paradigm.  Using the 
language of Paul Ricoeur, the “ecumenical winter” is akin to the “desert of criticism.”  
Critical engagement and doctrinal consensus, however, are not the proper goals of 
dialogue between separated churches.  Nor should one see the struggles that arise from 
critical engagement and the search doctrinal consensus as frustrating the movement 
towards ecumenical dialogue’s goal of mutual recognition.  Instead, the stagnation and 
frustration associated with the ecumenical movement and dialogue is rooted in the 
necessity of an appropriate hermeneutic.  Conrad Raiser explains: 
Initially it was appropriate for dialogue to be used principally as a tool to identify 
as clearly as possible the differences and common ground between traditions of 
churches.  The goal of this patient conversation was to take stock, soberly and 
honestly, in the hope that the area of common ground would gradually increase.  
Such dialogue was only possible under the assumption that there was as it were a 
spiritual communion between separated churches which was antecedent to all 
their efforts to overcome divisions.293 
 
At the risk of oversimplification, Gerard Kelly contends that there are two basic 
hermeneutical approaches to recognition within the present-day ecumenical movement; 
“Catholic” and “Protestant”.  Despite the obvious generality inherent in his choice of 
labels, Kelly provides a fruitful analysis of the predominant contemporary understandings 
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of the hermeneutical resources that inform recognition within the ecumenical movement 
and ecumenical dialogue. 
 According to Kelly, the ecumenical relations between the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Orthodox evidences the “Catholic” approach to recognition.294  The Catholic 
approach envisions recognition to be characteristic of the relationship between “sister” 
churches.  According to this approach, each church is apostolic in the fullest sense of the 
term.295  Patriarch Maximos and Bishop Zoghby introduced the idea of sister churches at 
Vatican II.296  According to Bishop Zoghby: 
If the oriental Church has always recognised a primacy of the Bishop of Rome, 
however imprecise that may be, it has never been part of the Latin Church.  It is a 
sister Church of the Latin Church.  It does not come from the latter; nor does it 
owe its existence, its substance or its dogmatic and disciplinary development to 
the Latin Church.297     
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The relationship between sister churches is a relationship that originates from a shared 
source.  In the case of the Latin and Oriental churches, there is a common “quality of life 
and of faith that actualises the one apostolic faith in word and in sacrament.”298  In short, 
recognition entails the acknowledgment of the shared apostolic faith.  As such, the 
measure of orthodoxy is understood in terms of origin.  Difference is permissible insofar 
as it can be identified with the apostolic faith as its origin.  Hence, recognition is a 
function of a logic that conforms to the principle of the one over the many, which 
assumes that legitimate diversity must have a common origin.     
The Protestant approach to recognition, on the other hand, emphasizes reconciled 
diversity.299 The Lutheran-Roman Catholic Study Group articulates the above approach: 
Concern for an abiding truth within a diversity of traditions leads to the question 
of what is that foundation and centre of the gospel in relation to which the 
manifold witness of the church in various historical situations can be conceived as 
testimony and development. This foundation and this centre cannot be reduced to 
a theological formula, but rather is constituted by the eschatological saving act of 
God in Jesus' cross and resurrection.300 
 
As the above demonstrates, the “Protestant” understanding of recognition tends to elevate 
difference and diversity.  Michael Kinnamon distills three characteristics commonly 
employed within ecumenical literature for elevating diversity.  Kinnamon writes: 
(1) God alone is sovereign.  All human concepts, institutions, and activities stand 
under judgment of of the One who finally transcends all our projects and 
explanations.  (2) Human beings are finite and sinful.  Our perceptions, even of 
revealed truth, are always partial and in need of correction.  (3) Christian faith is 
eschatological, which means that our historical existence must be seen in light of 
God’s ultimate purpose and promise.301  
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Simply put, the “Protestant” understanding of recognition employs a logic that is 
informed by the principle of the many over the one.  As such, the criteria for doctrinal 
consensus is thin when compared to the “Catholic” understanding of recognition.   
What is particularly striking is that both approaches, despite employing different 
logics, ultimately take recourse to recognition primarily as identification insofar as 
approaches to recognition rely on the ability judge.  Thus, recognition is achieved by 
either disregarding the implications of difference or excluding difference that does not 
conform to the standard of measurement.  It is evident that both of the above approaches 
to recognition rely on synthesis and distinction to varying degrees.  Kelly observes that 
Catholic and Protestant approaches to recognition demonstrate divergent understandings 
of communion and diversity.  Kelly explains: 
For the Catholic approach, diversity is understood in terms of catholicity. This 
means that if diversity is not to destroy unity some fundamental points of 
communion must be present.  For the Protestant approach, communion is 
understood in terms of a reconciliation of the variety of denominational heritages. 
This means that any future union must respect confessional allegiances and 
identities.302    
 
The Catholic and Protestant approaches to recognition are deeply embedded in the 
ecclesiological convictions of particular churches.  In other words, the various ways that 
Church has been identified throughout Christian history sheds light onto the 
contemporary situation of the ecumenical movement and the diversity of approaches to 
ecumenical dialogue. 
If ecumenical dialogue is to achieve its goal of mutual recognition, it must move 
beyond the confines of recognition as identification.  However, moving beyond 
identification does not entail leaving it behind.  Properly understood, ecumenical 
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dialogue is a dialogue of symbols, hence, the literal meaning that is achieved through 
identification is integral for the emergence of a symbolic meaning; symbolic meaning is 
always tied to, but exceeds, the literal meaning of the symbol.   
2.3.3 – Recognizing One’s-Self 
 The second “moment” on the course of recognition is the recognition of one’s-
self.  Ricoeur maintains that recognizing one’s-self entails a movement from an 
understanding of one’s-self in terms of ego sum (I am) to an understanding one’s-self in 
terms of ego possum (I can).303  The recognition of the self by the self is not primarily a 
theoretical knowledge; it is a practical knowledge in which one realizes recognition in 
“the ability to say, the ability to do, the ability to recount, and imputation.”304  Ricoeur 
explains:  
In intersecting in the certitude and assurance of the “I can,” the two semantic 
fields of attestation and self-recognition bring to bear their respective harmonics, 
in this way lending richness and density to what I propose to call recognition-
attestation.  From which this mixture comes the certitude of assertions introduced 
by the modal phrase I can.305 
 
As such, it is in and through the capacity to act and to take responsibility that the identity 
of one’s-self emerges.  However, the ability to say, the ability to do, the ability to 
recount, and imputation are only possible in relationship to an other.  The process of 
recognizing one’s-self obtains via the process of becoming; self-recognition means 
recounting one’s-self in and through the practical engagement with the other by enacting 
one’s identity in freedom and responsibility.   
 The reflexive consciousness of one’s-self is understood via the distinction and 
relationship between idem identity and ipse identity.  Charles Reagan explains: 
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The former [idem] is identity through time by a sameness of appearance, 
characteristics, or style through which we recognize someone as the same person 
on different occasions, even though time has changed some of those features. The 
latter [ipse] is a constancy of character through time, in spite of all of the changes 
of appearances.306 
 
Ricoeur argues that the recognition of one’s-self attains by some form of the expression 
“I believe that I can.”307  The recognition of one’s-self, for Ricoeur, turns out to be bound 
to a narrative identity in which ipse identity is of vital importance.308  Ricoeur explains: 
The difference between idem and ipse is nothing more than the difference 
between a substantial or formal identity and a narrative identity. Self-sameness, 
“self-constancy,” can escape the dilemma of the Same and the Other to the extent 
that its identity rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of 
dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text. The self 
characterized by self-sameness may then be said to be refigured by the reflective 
application of such narrative configurations. Unlike the abstract identity of the 
Same, this narrative identity, constitutive of self-constancy, can include change, 
mutability, within the cohesion of one lifetime.309  
 
The narrative identity of a particular community is the self-interpretation of a community 
amidst the reality of change and difference.  As such, it is through narrative that a 
community understands, explains, and appropriates itself through its own history.   
 Narration, according to Ricoeur, is the manner in which a community comes to 
recognize itself as capable and responsible.  On the juridical plane, Ricoeur observes that 
the “author is responsible for the known or foreseeable effects of his actions.”310   On the 
moral plane, however, “it is the other person, others, for whom one is held 
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responsible.”311  There is an intimate relationship between the idem and ipse identities 
within the narrative structure of identity in so far as recognizing one’s-self is realized 
through memory and promises.  Ricoeur explains:  
In memory and promises, the problematic of self-recognition reaches two high 
points simultaneously. The one is turned toward the past, the other toward the 
future. But they need to be considered together within the living present of self-
recognition, thanks to several features they have in common.312 
 
The idem identity is linked to memory and the ipse is linked to one’s promise.  The 
attestation, “I believe that I can”, is possible only because one has good reason to believe 
that one is capable of acting in the future in a particular way.  In short, to say “I believe 
that I can” requires that “I can remember” and that “I can promise.”  Thus, the certitude 
of the recognizing one’s-self is one that is characteristic of an avowal.  As such “[t]he 
kind of certitude” writes Ricoeur, “that characterizes avowal cannot be reduced to doxa 
on the theoretical level. It is a certitude sui generis, arising from the practical dimension 
of knowledge.”313  Forgetting with respect to memory and betrayal with respect to 
promises, however, threatens the recognition of one’s-self.   
Symbols occupy a central place within the narrative identity of both individuals 
and communities.  It is through narrative identity that the interpretation of symbols is 
possible.  However, because of the symbol’s relationship to mystery and its surplus of 
meaning, the symbol resists definitive interpretation by challenging the established 
narrative. Hence, symbols emerge within a narrative and develop the narrative identity as 
an identity that both interprets symbols and is interpreted by them.  Douglas McGaughey 
writes: 
                                                 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid., 109. 
313 Ibid., 147. 
 124 
Such a theory of symbol, rooted in but not confined by a narrative horizon… sees 
symbols as basic to the liberation of the human community. Symbols can function 
because they both build upon and transform their narrative horizon.  Symbols call 
the human into temporality and history to claim ever new meaning and to 
announce the unexpected ‘more’ of experience and understanding.314 
 
A “living” narrative is one that both provides its own symbols and is opened up by the 
powerful interpretative force of such symbols.   The symbol, which always evades being 
reduced to a definitive understanding and explanation, is appropriated in light of dialectic 
tension that exists between its primary or literal meaning and the symbolic meaning of 
the mysterious other.  Hence, “[t]here is a tension of ‘is’ / ‘is not’ in the symbol that 
continually forces a new interpretation of the meaning of the symbol in the context of the 
symbol’s narrative and the reader’s life-world.”315    
 As is the case with recognition as identification, recognizing one’s-self does not 
guarantee mutual recognition.  Recognizing one’s-self, however, does anticipate mutual 
recognition in so far as the capable agent recognizes one’s-self as capable with respect to 
another.  “[S]elf-recognition,” writes Ricoeur, “refers to others without the position of a 
ground, like that of the power to act, nor does the ‘before others’ imply reciprocity and 
mutuality.”316  It is through the process of self-recognition that a second naïveté is forged 
in the turn towards narrative identity and symbol.  Put another way, self-recognition 
acknowledges one’s-self and the other as subjects and anticipates the possibility of inter-
subjectivity, but self-recognition does not fully address the complex issue of inter-
subjectivity. 
Ricoeur’s analysis of self-recognition offers important insights and direction for 
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ecumenical dialogue and its movement towards mutual recognition.  The process of self-
recognition signals the movement from a logic of the one over the many to a logic that is 
governed by a logic of symbol.  In short, self-recognition is dependent on and develops 
the resources of a second naïveté in which interpretation, informed by the process of 
identification, affords the possibility of hearing again.     
2.3.3.1 - Ecumenical Dialogue and Recognizing One’s-Self 
 As the above acknowledges, the difficulties facing ecumenical dialogue are 
indicative of the need to move beyond recognition as identification.  Willem Visser ‘t 
Hooft admits this when he states: 
It seems to me that the present ecumenical situation can only be described in the 
paradoxical statement that the ecumenical movement has entered into a period of 
reaping an astonishingly rich harvest, but that precisely at this moment the 
movement is more seriously called in question than ever before. And once again 
the basic issue is that of the relation between the Church and the world.317 
 
Having reaped the rich harvest wrought by the process of getting to “know” one another, 
both the ecumenical movement and ecumenical dialogue must now contend with the 
reality of renewal within churches.  Presently, churches involved in the ecumenical 
movement are caught between the juridical and moral planes.  In other words, the 
present-day ecumenical context is characteristic of a tension between the responsibility of 
churches acting on their own behalf on the one hand and on the other hand the 
responsibility that churches have in regards to other churches.  Hence, the questions 
facing ecumenical dialogue and the future of the ecumenical movement are directed 
toward orthopraxis.  At the level of identification, questions of orthodoxy occupy a 
central place, but, at the level of recognizing one’s-self, concerns emerge regarding 
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orthopraxis in relation to orthodoxy.  Hence, the preoccupation of the ecumenical 
movement and ecumenical dialogue should no longer be dominated by questions and 
concerns of identify, but instead should be directed towards questions of how churches 
can actively live out their identity as Christian with one another, not simply alongside one 
another.  Such a shift calls for the capacity of churches to receive the fruits of the 
ecumenical movement responsibly; both with respect to one’s own church and the church 
of the other.   
Dialogue without reception stagnates.  Without a moment of symbolic 
appropriation, the understanding and explanation that occurs within dialogue remains at 
the level of a sharing of objective information.  This type of exchange can easily fall into 
proselytizing or spinning one’s wheels in doctrinal clarifications. Developing an 
understanding of reception as symbolic appropriation is integral to the success of 
ecumenical dialogue and its goal of mutual recognition.   It is through the exchange of 
symbols that dialogue overcomes the threat of stagnation and irrelevance and can develop 
into unity.  Paul Murray explains: 
… for this process of overcoming stasis to begin, it requires some to take 
responsibility, to take the initiative, and this regardless of whether others are 
ready to reciprocate. As the therapeutic adage goes, ‘We cannot change others. 
We can only change ourselves and, thereby, the way we relate to others.’ But 
doing this will itself alter things and open up new possibilities. Similarly, the ethic 
at work in Receptive Ecumenism is one wherein each tradition takes 
responsibility for its own potential learning from others and is, in turn, willing to 
facilitate the learning of others as requested but without either requiring how this 
should be done, or even making others’ learning a precondition to attending to 
one’s own.318 
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At the level of self-recognition, dialogue develops along the lines of a hermeneutic that 
interprets and appropriates Christian identity in a manner that extends beyond the 
boundaries of the propositional and definitional identity of a particular church.  At this 
level recognition of Christian identity unfolds via a hermeneutic of symbol that develops 
within the narrative of a particular church but also in relation to the narrative identity of 
ecumenical other.  As such, there is a “fusion of narratives” where separated churches can 
responsibly share in the life of the other.  Therefore, the proper questions and concerns 
should be directed towards the shared activities of Christian life: worship, witness, and 
service.      
It is at the level of self-recognition that, in humble honesty, churches recognize 
that they are capable and responsible agents, capable of speaking and listening and 
responsible for doing so before another church.  As such, recognizing one’s-self is also a 
recognition that one’s narrative horizon is open and receptive to the mystery of the other. 
2.3.4 – Mutual Recognition 
 The final moment on the course of recognition is what Ricoeur terms “mutual 
recognition.”  Having passed through the moments of recognizing “something” or 
“someone” and recognizing “one’s-self”, Ricoeur develops mutual recognition as an 
“identity in mutuality,” a recognition of “one another.”319 
 Ricoeur’s analysis of mutual recognition begins with an observation and warning: 
“mutuality runs the risk of reliance on forgetting the insurmountable difference that 
accounts for the fact that the one is not the other.”320  In short, mutual recognition 
develops along the lines of unity not absorption.  Accordingly, mutual recognition, for 
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Ricoeur, is a sort of inter-subjectivity without subjects subsuming one another.  “The 
investigation of mutual recognition” writes Ricoeur, “can be summed up as a struggle 
against the misrecognition of others at the same time it is a struggle for recognition of 
oneself by others.”321  The “struggle” however is not a struggle for power or authority; it 
is not a struggle to subsume the many into one.  Instead, Ricoeur contends that the mutual 
recognition is exemplified in the exchange of gifts.   
Ricoeur acknowledges that gift exchange—the three-fold process of giving, 
receiving, and giving in return—threatens mutuality with the obligation for reciprocity.  
Ricoeur writes: 
The recourse made to a concept of mutual recognition amounts… to a plea in 
favor of the mutuality of relations between those who exchange gifts, in contrast 
with the concept of reciprocity that the theory places above social agents and their 
transactions.322   
 
For its part, reciprocity “covers a vast territory that includes vengeance, the gift, and the 
market.”323   The focal point of reciprocity tends to emphasize the gift and return gift 
under the obligation of economic or value exchange where the initial gift places the other 
under the obligation of return gift.  Ricoeur, however, maintains that the decisive 
category of gift exchange with respect to mutual recognition is reception.324  “Instead of 
the obligation to give in return,” writes Ricoeur, “it would be better, under the sign of 
agape, to speak of a response to a call coming from the generosity of the first gift.”325  
Thus, it is by graciously receiving the initial gift that the obligation of the return is 
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reoriented and reflective of the generosity that led to the first gift.326  Ricoeur explains: 
A good receiving depends on gratitude, which is the soul of the division between 
good and bad reciprocity.  Gratitude fills out the relation between gift and return 
gift, in decomposing before recomposing it.  It puts the pair give/receive on the 
one side, and that of receive/return on the other.  The gap that it opens between 
these pairs… is inexact in two ways, both as regards the value and as regards and 
temporal delay.  For the regime of gratitude, the values of exchanged presents are 
incommensurable in terms of market costs, this is the mark of what is “without 
price” in such exchange of gifts.  As for the fitting time to return the gift, we can 
say that it too is without exact measure.  This is the mark of agape, which is 
indifferent about something in return, on the exchange of gifts.  This gap between 
giving/receiving and receiving/returning is thus both opened up and bridged by 
gratitude.327 
 
 According to Ricoeur, the character of the gift “stands in a complex relation with 
the symbolic character of recognition that… is unaware of itself, insofar as it clothes 
itself and conveys itself in the exchange.”328  That is, the gift presents what is other than 
itself.  In short, mutual recognition obtains via the free and gracious exchange of 
symbols.  
The course of recognition, as Ricoeur lays it out, is a movement from the 
exchange of signs to the exchange of symbols through the intermediate moment of a 
second naïveté in which a hermeneutic of symbol is developed.  Confrontation with the 
reality of the unmanageable mystery of the other, which cannot be adequately interpreted 
and appropriated at the level of signs, demonstrates the need for a second naïveté that is 
governed by a logic of symbol and emerges through a narrative identity where one comes 
to recognize one’s-self and the other as subjects that are capable and responsible.  As 
such, the possibility of mutuality through the free and reciprocal exchange of symbols 
develops.   
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2.3.4.1 - Ecumenical Dialogue and Mutual Recognition   
 Ricoeur’s understanding of mutual recognition and the “long way” to mutual 
recognition through its various detours provides important insights and resources for 
understanding the fundamental goal of ecumenical dialogue as a free and mutual 
exchange of symbols.  It is precisely in this way that churches come to recognize one 
another as a gift that is beyond measure.  It is necessary to reemphasize the point made 
earlier that neither mutual recognition nor the claim to mutually recognize one another 
ensures the unity of the church, nor does mutual recognition spontaneously arrive at 
unity.  However, the unity of church in fact does require mutual recognition as a sort of 
prerequisite.  
  Understanding the goal of ecumenical dialogue as an exchange of symbols 
redirects ecumenical dialogue away from dialogue that focuses on the idem identity of the 
church towards the ipse identity of the churches.  This shift in emphasis rests upon the 
conviction that every particular church is a unique expression of the church of Christ, but 
that no particular church expresses the church of Christ in its totality.  This is because the 
literal meaning of a symbol never exhausts its symbolic meaning despite the symbolic 
meaning’s dependence on the literal meaning; symbols are in a continuous state of flux.  
Thus, ecumenical dialogue is a dialogue between churches that seeks to more fully 
understand, explain, and appropriate the endless unfolding of the mystery of the Christ’s 
church through the mutual exchange of the symbols of one another, which really are 
expressive of the church of Christ.  The exchange that occurs at the level of mutual 
recognition is not an exchange of manageable commodities; instead, it is the exchange of 
symbols that develop out of one another’s narrative identity.  A complete narrative 
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identity, at least in regards to the churches, implies an eschatological finality that is 
simply not the case for any particular church. 
3. – Karl Rahner and a Symbolic Approach to Ecumenical Dialogue 
The preceding section argues that both the ecumenical movement and ecumenical 
dialogue need to rethink and reevaluate the realities of unity and difference and their 
relationship to one another.  The rethinking and reevaluation of unity and difference 
necessitates hermeneutical resources that allow for the possibility of recognizing the 
other in a manner that surpasses the paradigm of identification.  The future success of the 
ecumenical movement and ecumenical dialogue is dependent on the establishment of a 
second naïveté whereby the realities of unity and difference are interpreted and 
appropriated symbolically as mutually enriching realities.     
This section argues that Karl Rahner’s theology of ecumenism and his theology of 
symbol are invaluable assets for promoting the ecumenical goals of mutual recognition 
between churches and the realization of the unity of Christ’s church.  The logic of unity-
in-difference that characterizes both Rahner’s theology in general and his theology of 
symbol in particular provides a point of departure for reevaluating the aporetic 
relationship between unity and difference within an ecumenical context.  Rahner writes: 
A symbol is... not to be primarily considered as a secondary relationship between 
two different beings, which are given the function of indicating one another by a 
third, or by an observer who notes a certain agreement between them.  The 
symbolic is not merely an intrinsic propriety of beings in so far as a being, to 
attain fulfillment, constitutes the differentiation which is retained in the unity, and 
which is in agreement with the original originating unity and so its expression.  A 
being is also ‘symbolic’ in itself because the harmonious expression, which it 
retains while constituting it as the ‘other’, is the way in which it communicates 
itself to itself in knowledge and love.  A being comes to itself by means of 
‘expression’ in so far as it comes to itself at all.  The expression, that is, 
‘symbol’… is the way of knowledge of self, possession of self, in general.329 
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Rahner’s theology of symbol and its accompanying logic provide the means for an 
ecumenical interpretation of Christian identity and ecclesial identity by rethinking the 
relationships between 1) the transcendental and the historical, 2) orthopraxis and 
orthodoxy, and 3) the universal and the particular. 
   Firstly, this section analyzes the contemporary significance of Rahner’s theology 
in relationship to several criticisms that demonstrate the significance of reading Rahner’s 
theology in light of his concept of symbol.  Secondly, this section develops a basic sketch 
of Rahner’s ecumenical theology and the inherent connection between Rahner’s 
ecumenical theology and his theology of symbol.  Finally, this section argues that 
Rahner’s ecumenical theology and theology of symbol are germane to the concerns of 
unity and difference that surface within present-day ecumenical dialogues and the 
ecumenical movement. 
3.1 – Rahner’s Contemporary Ecumenical Significance 
Articulating the contemporary significance of Karl Rahner’s theology is a 
daunting task for several reasons.  Firstly, Rahner’s theological career spans more than 
five decades.  Rahner began his career as a theologian during a time when Roman 
Catholicism was absorbed by Neo-Scholastic thought.  He witnessed the horror of World 
War II and its aftermath.  He was a driving theological force at Vatican II, where he 
sought to foster the attitudes of the ressourcement movement and Aggiornamento.  In his 
later years, Rahner was critical of the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church and its 
future.  Secondly, while Karl Rahner is often labeled a systematic theologian, his 
theological corpus is predominately comprised of essays dealing with particular 
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questions. Although his individual writings demonstrate a systematic quality, it is 
difficult to recognize the same systematic consistency within the entirety of his work.  
When asked about the nature of his theological work, Rahner commented that: 
Strictly speaking I have not produced scholarly works in theology; more exactly, I 
have produced only very few works in theology… I only attempt to clarify those 
individual questions that modern readers are interested in understanding better.  I 
would say that I have always done theology with a view to kerygma, preaching, 
pastoral care… In short, I am not a scholar and don’t intend to be one… I want to 
be a Christian who takes Christianity seriously.  I want to be a person who 
unabashedly lives in modern times and from the perspective of modernity 
addresses this or that, a third problem, a twentieth problem, about which one then 
reflects.  If you want to call that a theology, well fine!330 
 
Lastly, as he himself acknowledges, Karl Rahner is undoubtedly a modern theologian.  
Steven Ogden observes, “Rahner has been immersed in modernity.  Modernism plays a 
role in providing him with a theological agenda, critical tools and key concepts.”331  
However, characterizations of Rahner as a modern theologian ought not overlook 
Rahner’s criticism of modernity and, at times, his tendency to reach beyond the limits of 
modern thought.   
An honest appraisal of the contemporary ecumenical significance of Rahner’s 
theology must acknowledge from the outset that the concerns addressed by Rahner during 
his lifetime are varied and not always identical to the concerns of present-day 
Christianity.  Hence, notwithstanding the affinity between Rahner’s context and today’s 
context, one should not assume that Rahner’s theology is ubiquitous with present-day 
categories of thought nor the explicit concerns of contemporary ecumenical theology.  
Robert Masson writes: 
A new generation of scholars is raising fundamental questions about the balance, 
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coherence, and foundations of Rahner’s theology.  They are bringing new 
questions and theological contexts to his thought and bringing Rahner’s thought 
to bear on questions that had not been at the center of his attention – if on his 
horizon at all.332 
 
As Masson acknowledges, two basic questions ought to mediate an apt interpretation of 
Rahner’s contemporary significance. Firstly, how do present-day concerns inform and 
challenge Rahner’s theology?  Secondly, how does Rahner’s theology inform and 
challenge present-day concerns? 
 The following sections build upon the discussion of Rahner’s theology that began 
in chapter two and work towards demonstrating the contemporary ecumenical 
significance of Rahner’s theology.  This section argues that Rahner’s theology and its 
accompanying logic provide a hermeneutic lens for reevaluating his theology as a 
resource for both the ecumenical movement and ecumenical dialogue.  The present-day 
ecumenical relevance of Rahner’s theology is dependent on its capacity to address three 
primary concerns of the ecumenical movement: 1) the role of history for interpreting and 
appropriating the unity of Christ’s church with respect to a diversity of historical 
circumstances, 2) interpreting and appropriating the unity of Christ’s church amidst the 
reality of political difference, and 3) the need to recognize a common Christian identity 
amidst a diversity of expressions.   
The task of demonstrating Rahner’s present-day ecumenical import is 
accomplished by addressing three criticisms leveled against Rahner’s theology that are 
also characteristic of the above contemporary ecumenical concerns.  Firstly, this section 
addresses the significance of history in Rahner’s theology by engaging Fergus Kerr’s 
criticism that Rahner’s transcendental method minimizes the importance of history for 
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the human being.  Secondly, this section explores the question of the human being’s 
political identity by addressing J.B. Metz’s well known critique that Rahner’s 
transcendental theology minimizes the necessity and priority of the political dimensions 
of the human being.  Lastly, this section engages Hans Von Balthasar’s criticism that 
Rahner’s theology minimizes the uniqueness of Christianity and Christian identity. 
3.1.1 – Historical Identity 
Fergus Kerr’s critique of Rahner’s theology represents a common misreading of 
the turn to the subject within Rahner’s theology.  Kerr suggests that Rahner’s turn to the 
subject reduces the human being to the confines of the cogito.  Kerr’s interpretation 
confuses Rahner’s methodological starting point with the foundation of his theology. 
Karen Kilby summarizes such interpretations when she writes, “A common vision of the 
relation of philosophy to theology in Rahner’s opus… has been something like this: 
Rahner first in Spirit in the World, worked out and defended his philosophical position, 
and then throughout his career built his theology upon this basis.”333  However, theology, 
for Rahner, properly begins and ends not with the cognitive subject, but with an 
encounter with mystery, an encounter that, for human beings, always and only takes place 
in the world. 
Fergus Kerr, in Theology after Wittgenstein, critiques the turn to the subject in 
modern theological discourse.  In his treatment of Karl Rahner, Kerr writes:  
Central to his [Rahner’s] whole theology, that is to say, is the possibility for the 
individual to occupy a standpoint beyond his immersion in the bodily, the 
historical and institutional.  Rahner’s consistently individualistic presentation of 
the self emphasizes cognition, self-reflexiveness and an unrestricted capacity to 
know.  It rapidly leaves time and place behind.334 
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Kerr maintains that the human being always appears first as a cognitive subject in 
Rahner’s theology.335  Kerr is correct insofar as Rahner prefers to initiate discussions 
regarding the human being from the philosophical vantage point of the cognitive subject.  
However, Kerr’s critique emphasizes Rahner’s practical methodological entry point but 
fails to account for Rahner’s insistence that the human being is in the first instance and 
always the “locus of God’s self-communication.”336  While Rahner’s methodological 
entry point for theological discourse is the cognitive subject, what actually animates 
Rahner’s theology is the dialectic relationship between transcendence and history, which 
constitutes both the human being and the experience of the human being.  Leo 
O’Donovan argues that, properly understood, a two-fold method characterizes Rahner’s 
theology.  O’Donovan writes, “[r]epeatedly in the course of [Rahner’s] writing he has 
emphasized that in order to treat a theological question adequately one must approach it 
from both a transcendental and an historical perspective.”337  Rahner acknowledges that 
the human being is not an isolated cognitive monad separated from history and the world.  
Instead, Rahner admits that the human being is radically dependent.  Rahner writes: 
Man never establishes his own freedom in some absolute sense… He never 
realizes completely his possibilities in the world and in history.  Nor can he 
distance himself from them and withdraw into the pure essence of a pseudo-
subjectivity or pseudo-interiority in such a way that he could honestly say that he 
had become independent of the world and the history that was given him… What 
he experiences in himself is always a synthesis: of possibilities presented to his 
freedom and his disposition of self, of what is himself and what is the other, of 
acting and suffering, of knowing and doing, and these elements are synthesized in 
a unity which cannot be completely and objectively analyzed.  Therefore insofar 
as reflection can never control or master or grasp the totality of the ground from 
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out of which and towards which the subject is actualizing himself, man is the 
unknown not only in this or that area of his concrete reality, but he is the subject 
whose origin and end remain hidden from himself.  He comes to the real truth 
about himself precisely by the fact that he patiently endures and accepts this 
knowledge that his own reality is not in his own hands.338 
 
Rahner envisions the human being as an “open system.”  The human being is 
always in relation and in reference to the uncontrollable mystery of the other.  The 
experience of history, culture, other human beings, and God permeate, inform, and 
constitute human existence.  It is precisely because of the human being’s engagement 
with the mystery of an other that human thought arises, most often as a question.  Human 
knowledge, concepts, and ideas always bear the mark of one’s finitude, but they also 
carry a trace of the hidden and mysterious God.    
Kerr is correct insofar as he recognizes that Rahner carves out a privileged place 
for the cognitive subject in his theology.  Kerr’s critique of Rahner, however, falls short 
as it does not take account of Rahner’s tendency to decenter the subject he so carefully 
constructs.  Rahner writes: 
As long as we measure the loftiness of knowledge by its perspicuity, and think 
that we know what clarity and insight are, though we do not really know them as 
they truly are; as long as we imagine that analytical, co-ordinating, deductive and 
masterful reasoning is more and not less than experience of the divine 
incomprehensibility; as long as we think that comprehension is greater than being 
overwhelmed by light inaccessible, which shows itself as inaccessible in the very 
moment of giving itself: we have understood nothing of the mystery and true 
nature of grace and glory.339 
 
While Rahner, devotes significant intellectual energy to dealing with modern questions 
and addressing such questions using modern methods, tools, and concepts, Rahner also 
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the consistently affirms the limits of modern methods, tools, and concepts.  F.S. 
Fioreneza summarizes: 
For Rahner this experience [of God’s otherness] is much more a questioning than 
a knowing.  It brings to the fore the mystery of human life and the mystery of 
being so that the unlimitedness of the horizon of experience becomes as much a 
non-knowing as a knowing and becomes a quest for meaning.  The answer to this 
quest is found in history and in the revelation of God.340 
 
Rahner recognizes the relationship between transcendence and history as a dialectic 
relationship that is characterized by unity-in-difference.  For Rahner, human knowledge 
and human existence are worked out and realized within the world.  The human being is 
always a thinking and acting subject for whom thought and action are possible only 
within the world. 
 An analysis from the perspective of symbol more fully elucidates the relationship 
between transcendence and history.  As spirit in the world, the human being exists as a 
symbolic relationship between body and spirit whereby the human being realizes himself 
or herself as a question.  The human being symbolically experiences the transcendental 
and the historical aspects of human existence.  In short, while distinct from another, there 
is an intrinsic relationship between the historical and the transcendental for the human 
being whereby historical experience mediates the transcendental.  Rahner writes: 
…the transcendental subject even in the boundlessness of his own 
transcendentality, ultimately apprehends himself and must apprehend himself as a 
question.  For he always experiences himself in this transcendentality of his as 
open, as of himself an empty question, as that which refers beyond and outside of 
himself of himself that which he himself precisely is not.  Now he experiences the 
act of self-realization of his own transcedentality as communicated to him through 
the a posteriori experience of the object which of itself manifests itself or refuses 
to manifest itself to him.  As an object in this sense the subject is not the master of 
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it.  Nor does the transcendental enquiry in the sense we are using the term here 
signify any devaluation of history or the experience of that which is factual and 
irreducible to the transcendental.341 
 
3.1.2 – Political Identity  
 The second criticism this section addresses is that of J.B. Metz.  Metz’s critique of 
Rahner is similar to that of Kerr’s insofar as it is concerned with the limits of Rahner’s 
transcendental method.  Metz contends that Rahner’s transcendental method overshadows 
the political dimensions of human existence in general and Christian existence in 
particular.  In the forward of Spirit in the World, Metz asks: 
…does not such a transcendental-existential approach (which defines man a priori 
as that being characterized by absolute transcendence towards God) concentrate 
the necessarily historically realized salvation of man too much on the question of 
whether the individual freely accepts or rejects this constitution of his being? Is 
there not danger that the question of salvation will be made too private and that 
salvation history will be conceived too worldlessly, breaking too quickly the point 
of the universal historical battle for man? Anthropocentrically oriented theology 
places faith quite correctly in a fundamental and irreducible relationship with the 
free subjectivity of man. However, is the relationship of this faith to the world and 
history sufficiently preserved (aufgehoben)?342 
 
Leo O’Donovan summarizes Metz’s criticism as follows, “[Rahner’s] approach is said to 
yield an appreciation not so much of contingent history as of generalized history.  As a 
result… the method is insensitive to social problems and ineffectual in the realms of 
policy and social change.”343  Metz, like Kerr, is concerned that Rahner’s transcendental 
method risks the historical identity of the human being. However, for Metz the issue of 
historical identity ultimately raises concerns regarding the role of orthopraxis in shaping 
Christian identity.  Hence, Metz’s criticism is a political one and raises questions as to 
whether or not Rahner’s theology adequately addresses the relationship between 
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orthodoxy and orthopraxis.  In short, Metz shares Charles Péguy’s famous dictum that, 
“[e]verything begins in mysticism and ends in politics.” 
According to the New Dictionary of Theology: 
Both… orthopraxis and… orthodoxy are ways of facing the issue of Christian 
identity as constituted by distinctive meanings and values.  Properly understood, 
orthopraxis deals with the constitution of Christian meanings and values by 
concentrating on the communicative and effective functions of meaning.  In 
contrast, orthodoxy takes the constitution of Christian meanings and values 
seriously by focusing upon the cognitive function of meaning, i.e., on the truth 
and intelligibility of Christian beliefs.344  
 
Given the above descriptions of orthodoxy and orthopraxis, it is evident that Rahner tends 
to favor the role of orthodoxy, at least in terms of the space that he devotes to it.  
However, it would be incorrect to dismiss the importance of orthopraxis for Rahner and 
how he envisions their relationship to one another and Christian identity.  Rahner 
explains: 
It is only in terms of this personal, social environment that man can be brought to 
a realization of himself as subject, and it is only in terms of this that those 
transcendental experiences of freedom, responsibility, absolute truth, love and 
personal trust are borne in upon man in which alone it can be made intelligible to 
him what is meant by God. For this God is not any kind of particular object side 
by side with many others… which impinge upon him, but rather is present to him 
as the ground, the horizon, and the ultimate goal of man's own personal 
movement outwards towards his social environment in all its complexity.345 
 
Rahner affirms a certain priority of orthopraxis over that of orthodoxy as the subjectivity 
of the human being is realized inter-subjectively.  According to Rahner, “transcendence is 
not primarily the condition of possibility of knowing things, but is the condition of 
possibility for a subject being present to himself and just as basically and originally 
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present to another subject.”346 
 Orthodoxy and orthopraxis are mutually enriching principles for Rahner.  
Understood from a symbolic perspective, orthodoxy and orthopraxis are both expressions 
of Christian identity that are rooted in and develop in relationship to transcendental and 
historical conditions of human existence.  There is a tension that exists between the two 
and a constant danger of subsuming one into the other.  However, orthodoxy and 
orthopraxis, properly understood, function as symbols of one another.  The orthopraxis of 
a community ought to express the community’s orthodoxy and the orthodoxy of a 
community ought to find expression in its orthopraxis.  Rahner’s commitment to 
orthodoxy and orthopraxis is evident in his commitment to the relationship between 
knowledge and love.  If for Rahner knowledge is the “being-present-to-self of being”, it 
is the being-present-to-the-other that characterizes love.347  Rahner maintains that, “for a 
subject who is present to himself to affirm freely vis-à-vis another subject means 
ultimately to love.”348  Hence, subjectivity in terms of knowledge is brought to 
expression and realized in loving the other and it is through loving the other that human 
beings come to knowledge.  Throughout his theological career, Rahner devotes 
increasing attention to the dialect of knowing and loving.  Gerald McCool writes: 
Man is grounded in the act of love of a free, personal subject.  Consequently, he 
will understand himself and his ground only if he enters into God by responding 
to Him through the attitude of free, loving submission.  The dynamism of 
question thus manifests that being is ultimately both personal and 
interpersonal…Being will be truly understood only through a free, loving 
response which is, at the same time, the subject’s authentic choice of himself… 
the subject is not only free; he is historical and communitarian… he is a member 
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of a species, who, through his freedom enters into its communal history.349 
 
On the one hand, the community constitutes human beings; however, on the other hand, 
human beings are also capable of constituting their community.  Simply put, Rahner 
acknowledges that human beings must express themselves in order to achieve their nature 
and that a human being can only express and realize himself or herself in a community 
and within history.  Orthopraxis and orthodoxy are distinct but not separate.  Thus, one 
can never abstract from history or from community, the identity of human beings in 
general, and Christian identity in particular.  
3.1.3 – Christian Identity  
 The final criticism this section addresses is that of Hans Von Balthasar.  Balthasar 
maintains that Rahner’s use of transcendental method in both the “supernatural 
existential” and “anonymous Christianity” reduce the Christian message and Christian 
witness to a “bland Christianity not worth its salt.”350  According to Balthasar: 
[t]he attempt to reduce religion to ethics, love of God and personal love for Christ 
to love of neighbor, contradicts radically the Church’s entire canon of sanctity 
that one would have to contrast with the tradition and dub it say, 
‘Neocatholicism’.351 
 
Balthasar’s claim that Rahner’s transcendental theology robs Christianity of its 
uniqueness fails to acknowledge that Rahner’s articulation of the relationship between 
love of neighbor and love of God does not suggest an identity between the two, but 
instead, argues that love of God and love of neighbor constitute a relationship of unity-in-
difference.  According to Rahner, love of neighbor and love of God are inextricably 
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united, yet they are distinct activities.  Rahner argues, “the one does not exist and cannot 
be understood or exercised without the other, and that two names have really been given 
to the same reality if we are to summon up its one mystery, which cannot be 
abrogated.”352  Hence, on the one hand the essential unity that exists between love of God 
and love of neighbor does not negate the distinction between the two.  On the other hand, 
however, the unity between love of God and love of neighbor is such that it is not 
possible to abstract one from the other.  Love of God and love of neighbor, while distinct, 
are always in found in relation to one another in such a way that the act of loving one’s 
neighbor is also a response to God’s offer of God’s self in grace.  Rahner writes: 
the primary basic act of man who is always already ‘in the world’ is always an act 
of the love of his neighbour and in this the original love of God is realised in so 
far as in this basic act are also accepted the conditions of its possibility, one of 
which is the reference of man to God when supernaturally elevated by grace.353 
 
 According to Balthasar, Rahner secures the universality of God’s grace at the 
expense of belief in Jesus Christ as the particular expression of God’s redemptive love.  
In particular, Balthasar accuses Rahner of jettisoning martyrdom and the giving of one’s 
life for the sake of faith in Jesus Christ as a defining mark of Christian identity.  Balthasar 
argues: 
Karl Rahner frees us from a nightmare with his theory of the anonymous 
Christian who is dispensed, at any rate, from the criterion of martyrdom and 
nevertheless thereby has a full claim to the name Christian if he, consciously or 
unconsciously, gives God the honor.354 
 
The tension between the universality and particularity of Christian identity lies at the 
center of the debate between Rahner and Balthasar.  For Rahner, the act of love is always 
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a response to God’s universal salvific will, which Rahner articulates in his concept of the 
supernatural existential.355  Rahner’s conviction that love of neighbor and love God exist 
as unity-in-difference can be articulated as follows: there is no genuine act of love that is 
un-Christian.  This is the case because the act of love is always a response to God’s 
universal salvific will and as such cannot be abstracted from the reality of God’s grace 
that the church of Christ proclaims.  Hence, a positive response to God’s grace is always, 
whether thematic or unthematic, inherently Christian.  Rahner is ill at ease with confusing 
Christianity as a definitive expression of God’s redemptive love with an exclusivist 
perspective.  Rahner maintains that Christianity is the definitive contemporaneous 
symbol of God’s universal salvific will, but this need not imply that the Christian 
community is the exclusive expression of God’s salvific will.  To put it another way, 
while the Christian community definitely expresses martyrdom, the “language” of the 
Christian community is not the only expression of Christian martyrdom.  Hence, it is 
possible for God’s salvific will to be manifest in a manner that really expresses God’s 
universal salvific will outside of the boundaries of the Christian community.   
 Christian identity for Rahner is inherently symbolic and arises out of the complex 
relationships between transcendence and history, orthodoxy and orthopraxis, and 
knowledge and love.  The bi-directional nature of the symbol that is reflective of the 
process of emanation and return, risks an interpretation of Rahner’s theology that is one-
sided and unbalanced.  However, for Rahner, Christian identity is always an interpreted 
identity whereby history, intersubjectivity, and language are not only means to express 
Christian identity, but also ways of informing Christian identity.  Christian identity, for 
Rahner, is not static.  It is an identity that realizes itself in and through the world as a 
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response to the universal salvific will of God fulfilled in the person of Jesus of Christ and 
definitively in Christian life and belief.    
Karl Rahner’s ecumenical theology is an outgrowth of the theological 
anthropology that undergirds his understanding of Christian identity.  As the above 
demonstrates, despite his modern context, Rahner’s theology and his notion of Christian 
identity do not neatly fit into typical categories.  Kevin Hogan writes: 
[Rahner’s] theological anthropology, grounded in a particular understanding of 
self-presence as embedded in the world, describes the human person as one in 
whom intersubjectivity, history, and language play central roles… Rahner’s turn 
to the subject avoids the excesses of the postmodern dissolution of the subject as 
well as those of post-Cartesian modernity, and thereby offers an alternative to 
both.356 
 
Rahner’s theological method and an attentiveness to his theology of symbol have the 
potential to provide important resources for both ecumenical dialogue and the ecumenical 
movement.   
According to Rahner: 
… ecumenical theology cannot be confined to this interchange of information 
however much this may constitute the initial stage in it, and however important it 
may be for it not to be aimed at gaining individual converts for one’s own Church. 
Theology has to do with truth. It is not intended merely to inform but rather to 
communicate truth – truth which makes valid claims upon the other party and 
therefore can and should be communicated by the informant only in such a way 
that he identifies himself with this claim to truth.357 
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Rahner astutely acknowledges that one cannot confine the goal of the ecumenical 
movement and ecumenical dialogue to the level of recognition as identification.  Instead, 
there is a need to identify one’s-self more deeply with the truth that all Christians profess.  
In and through ecumenical dialogue, the ecumenical movement must reorient itself 
towards developing the interpretative resources required to recognize the truth that all 
Christians share.  In short, there is a need to recognize one’s-self in the other. 
3.2 – Karl Rahner’s Ecumenical Theology 
Since the time of the Reformation, difference and variety have developed and 
accumulated between separated churches in the West.  While the basic concern for the 
unity of the church is not new, the divisions within the church today yields a unique 
situation with distinct challenges.  Unlike the present context, disagreements between 
Christians in the West, even during the time of the Reformation, were essentially 
“family” disputes that took place within a shared context.  Rahner writes: 
This common self-understanding, this homogeneity at the verbal and conceptual 
levels on which each side was operating, derived, of course, from a fairly 
widespread cultural unity and shared experience, both of them rather narrow and, 
as a whole, easy to keep in mind. It was like a conflict between brothers and 
sisters of the same family.358  
 
The context of the church today, however, is remarkably different.  One can no longer 
assume that churches share a cultural unity, common understanding of the church, or 
common experience.  In short, until recently Christianity, especially in the West, enjoyed 
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a certain homogeneity that is simply no longer the case.359  
 According to Rahner, the homogeneity of the Hellenistic/European paradigm is 
transitioning towards a globalized and pluralistic paradigm.  “The emergence of the 
Church as a world-church” Rahner writes, “is in fact… brought about by a newly 
emerging unity of humankind and by the ensuing development of global social activity 
and planning for this unified humankind.”360  The emerging unity of humankind to which 
Rahner refers is a unity that flourishes in relation to difference.  Put simply, the church is 
beginning to recognize that the unity of the church is not achieved by conformity to 
identical expression; instead, the unity of the church is better understood and explained as 
a unity-in-difference. 
Rahner suggests that the possibility of ecumenism emerges in the present 
globalized and pluralistic paradigm, but notes that the raison d’être of ecumenism owes 
itself to another origin.  Rahner explains: 
…it must be unreservedly conceded that for ecumenical dialogue and ecumenical 
theology in the form in which it appears today a liberal humanism, with its 
defence of freedom of opinion and faith within a pluralistic society, has been, and 
still is, the occasion and the context without which the pursuit of ecumenical 
theology as it de facto exists today is inconceivable. This historical necessity for 
this liberalism… does not need to be denied, and must not be glossed over… This 
liberalism, however, is hardly the true ground, the ultimate fons et origo, of the 
ability which the separated parties have of conducting a dialogue today. So we 
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must not confuse the essential basis for a given phenomenon with the historical 
situation in which such an essential basis becomes effective.361 
 
Rahner admits that the present sociocultural and philosophical milieu provides the 
awareness and the resources for ecumenism to emerge, but that the source and foundation 
of ecumenism is the belief that all Christians already possess God’s justifying grace.  
Rahner writes: 
The ultimate basis of ecumenical theology is that unity, apprehended in hope, 
which consists in a belief in justifying grace, a belief which, even though in its 
theological formulation and its explication in credal form it is still in process of 
being arrived at, is nevertheless already in existence as one and the same belief in 
both of the parties involved in ecumenical theology.362 
 
The above elucidates several of Rahner’s fundamental convictions regarding ecumenism.  
Firstly, all churches are in the process of becoming.  As such, no particular church can 
claim to have a monopoly on the church of Christ.363  Secondly, churches are realized 
both ad intra and ad extra symbolically and, as such, each particular church brings about 
the justifying grace of God within the diversity of concrete circumstances of the world.   
Thirdly, there is a preexistent unity among churches despite the present state of visible 
disunity.  Lastly, the unity that the church strives to realize has a vertical and horizontal 
dimension.  The church endeavors to unite all of humanity with God.  Thus, the church is 
a communion of human beings in communion with God. 
 Jeannine Hill Flectcher provides a valuable summary of Rahner’s understanding 
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of unity and difference and the significance of their interrelated roles within ecumenism.  
She writes:  
… in the ecumenical process, Rahner saw difference as a valuable quality 
reflecting the diverse receptions of God's presence in Christ. Here "the treasure of 
all the churches together is not only quantitatively but qualitatively greater than 
the actual treasure that can be found in a single church." The particularities 
engendered by different sociological configurations of Christianity are to be 
preserved as valuable in their distinctiveness. This principle of ecumenism is a 
theological principle born of a sociological reality.364 
 
For Rahner, ecumenism does not realize its goal by establishing a third church, nor by 
conforming to a particular church, nor by an uncritical acceptance of difference.  Instead, 
ecumenism achieves its goal through the mutual recognition of churches as living in a 
unity characterized by diversity and difference.  
3.2.1 – Karl Rahner’s Theology of Unity  
 The theme of unity-in-difference permeates Karl Rahner’s writings.  It is evident 
that Rahner’s conception of unity is interrelated with his theological understanding of 
symbol.  Unity is essential for understanding how Rahner envisions the church, 
ecumenism, and ecumenical dialogue.  Rahner explicitly develops a theology of unity in 
his essay Unity of the Church – Unity of Mankind.365   
With Thomas Aquinas, Rahner affirms that, “plurality as such is not a ground of 
unity.”366  Rahner, along with scholastic tradition, contends that unity precedes 
plurality.367  He writes:   
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Theological Investigations (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 154-172. 
366 Ibid., 154. 
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Pluralism," 187.  Rahner maintains the Thomistic claim of God's simplicity to ensure God's unity 
of Being, but this does not rule out the idea that from the human perspective this infinite 
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…what is absolutely disparate, that which has nothing in common in any respect, 
in any way, is impossible and inconceivable.  And, conversely, everything that is, 
that is possible and conceivable, rests on an ultimate solidarity which both 
embraces the differences of existents from one another and the differences 
between existentiality and knowability, between subject and object, and means in 
the last resort what we understand by God: the unity that exists in itself, preceding 
all plurality and sustaining all diversity368   
 
Theologically speaking, God is the unity that precedes and sustains all plurality and 
difference.369  With this in mind, Rahner advances a theology of unity that considers three 
aspects: 1) unity as existing, 2) unity as task, and 3) unifying unity. 
Firstly, Rahner contends that everything that exists possesses an internal unity as 
well as a unity with every other thing that exists.370  On the one hand, everything in 
existence is itself a unity-in-diversity.  On the other hand, an individual existent is only 
an individual in relation to the difference of the other.  Consequently, at least in terms of 
unity as existing, the identity of an individual existent is given to it.  Simply put, an 
individual existent does not create the unity that is a quality of its own existence.  It is a 
unity that it receives by virtue of existing. 
Secondly, the unity of oneself and the unity of oneself with another is “already” a 
reality, but “not yet” at its goal; it is already in so far as it exists and not yet in so far as it 
has a transcendental goal.  The reality of unity, thus, entails a process of becoming.  
Rahner writes: 
If and in so far as each individual existent with its initial unity belongs to the 
world of becoming and unity is a transcendental determination of every existent as 
such… then to every existent there belongs also a unity imposed on it as a task, a 
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unity still to be realized as telos (goal) of its becoming.371 
 
Unity is not only given as existing; it is also to be acquired as a task.  Unity is realized as 
a task through human freedom and in human history.  The unity that is realized in 
freedom and in history, however, is always provisional and tentative because it is unity in 
the process of becoming; unity as task is not unity at its transcendental goal.   
A proper analysis of unity as a task lies within the realm of phenomenology.  This 
is something that Western ontology and metaphysics tends to overlook.  Thus, according 
to Rahner, a proper analysis of unity is a dialectical one that requires both 
phenomenological and ontological/ metaphysical analysis.   
 As a task, unity develops in relationship to the decisions of human beings as free 
and responsible subjects.  Unity’s concrete expression unfolds and develops within 
humanity’s history and is determined by it to some extent.  Thus, at least in theory, as a 
developing reality, unity’s concrete expression can legitimately vary from one context to 
another.  Rahner writes:   
There are processes within a historically existing reality which at least can be 
recognized as legitimate by the nature of this existing reality even though they 
spring from a free decision and even though these processes and decisions cannot 
be proved to be the only possible ones, and hence cannot be proved to be the only 
obligatory means for the nature of the historically evolving reality.372 
 
Unity as a reality unfolds within the world of becoming through the concrete choices and 
activity of human beings.  Thus, when unity legitimately becomes a concrete and visible 
expression, it does so in accord with its nature, but this need not imply that all 
expressions of unity are identical.  In short, it is possible to manifest unity through a 
variety of expressions and choices that are all in accord with the nature of unity.  Thus, it 
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is possible for unity as a task to unfold and develop along a variety of paths with respect 
to different and legitimate processes and decisions.   
Lastly, Rahner attends to what he terms unifying unity.  Both unity as task and 
unity as existing are sustained by God’s unifying activity.  “[T]he already present unity 
of the individual existent and the unity to be acquired of the existent coming to be” writes 
Rahner, “presuppose an ultimate unifying unity.”373  Hence, God is both the origin and 
the goal of unity.  Rahner writes: 
The unity by which we can really live is not the abstract or creaturely unity of the 
idea, or the unifying basis of our own nature, but rather the ‘superessential’ unity 
which by grace becomes more interior to us than the unity of our being, and 
which, nevertheless, is not our own… In this unity which is full of content, 
therefore, the conflict which takes place within our own being between diffusion 
and compression, extroversion and introversion… is reconciled without thereby 
disappearing altogether.374 
 
Once again, Rahner affirms the dialectal relationship between phenomenology and 
traditional ontology/metaphysics.   
At first glance, Rahner’s proposal on unity appears to be characteristically onto-
theological.  However, one must recall that Rahner understands God to be the ever-
present and eternal mystery, infinitely knowable.  Thus, God is not posited to avoid an 
infinite regress, nor is God employed to grasp at the ungraspable.  In short, Rahner does 
not present God as the ground and telos in order to establish a solution to the “problem” 
of unity.  For Rahner, the Trinity is the source and the goal of all that exists as the 
mystery that unfolds in human history like the ever-receding horizon.  Rahner writes:   
The unity to be achieved of an increasing interiorization and the increasingly far-
ranging quest to include a wider environment are correlative.  But this implies that 
the increasingly close approach to the unity to be achieved carries with it a 
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continual growth of internal and external elements of that unity.  In this way unity 
as task remains within the world of becoming and of history as such always as a 
goal approached merely asymptotically, never finally attained, since advancing 
unity is always producing new material that has still to be integrated into unity.375 
  
As the ground and transcendent goal of unity, God is never fully grasped, comprehended, 
or conceptualized, but the human being does really experience and encounter God even if 
it is an unthematic involvement. 
It is apparent that Rahner’s logic of symbol underlies his theology of unity.  Unity 
that already exists as a reality is distinct from the unity that is in the process of becoming 
realized in time and space as a task via the free activity of human beings aided by the 
unifying grace of God.  The task, which visibly manifests the unity that already exists, 
really does effect what it signifies.  Simply put, unity as a task is not identical to unity as 
existing or unifying unity, but unity as a task really brings about or effects the unity that it 
signifies; unity is realized or becomes a categorical and concrete reality as task.    
Rahner is careful to acknowledge that the task and goal of unity is not the 
homogenization of diverse subjects, but instead the task and goal of unity is the 
reconciliation of “innumerable subjects, each different from others and simultaneously 
possessing the whole in each individual and each in a unique way.”376  Thus, again 
Rahner affirms that unity is always a unity-in-difference not a unity-in-conformity.   
As free personal subjects, human beings only asymptotically realize unity in 
history by loving the other.  Rahner defines love in this context as “…wholly the 
consummation of unity in accepting the absolute otherness of everyone else (in accepting 
this other as one’s very own) and thus the reconciliation between universal unity and 
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enduring plurality, which itself is accepted as good, as its own, by the loving subject.”377  
Theologically speaking, one achieves unity by loving one’s neighbor.378   
Rahner argues that recognizing the unity between love of neighbor and love of 
God is essential for the mission of the church in a secularized world that tends to 
deconstruct and demythologize everything.   
At all events, in the concrete and present situation is such that… only where, and 
to the extent, a man has a genuine, loving and heartfelt relationship with his 
fellow men, does he find God and can he convince other men that this reality 
which we call God exists.  All merely theoretical talk on the subject, all worship 
even, everything explicitly religious would no longer appear credible to people 
today unless it were based on, comprised in and attested by genuine love, and that 
means love between human beings.379  
  
The call to love one’s neighbor, for Rahner, is rooted in the Christian conviction that God 
calls all of humanity along with its plurality and difference into existence (existing unity) 
and that God also calls all of humanity towards a common salvific destiny (unifying 
unity).  However, in between origin and end, human beings realize in history God’s 
loving self-communication whenever they in freedom and responsibility manifest God’s 
command to love the other. 
To place the above observations within a Trinitarian framework, the original unity 
of God’s creation, which is destined for the common fulfillment of redemption in and 
through the person of Jesus Christ, is realized in the sanctifying activity of the Holy 
Spirit.  Simply put, creation, propelled by the Spirit, is in movement towards redemption.  
As the following demonstrates, the church has a particular role and responsibility for 
unity and its expression within the economy of salvation and humanity.  In sum, the 
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unifying love of God recollects unity as task and unity as reality when it is expressed in 
the activity of loving one’s neighbor.  Thus, as the following demonstrates, the unity the 
church seeks, ecumenism, and its accompanying dialogue is a unity that must lovingly 
afford a place for the other and difference.   
3.2.2 – Rahner and the Symbolic Nature of Ecumenism 
Rahner understands the importance of both unity and diversity within ecumenism 
and he acknowledges that interpreting the relationship between unity and diversity in the 
separated churches is a continuing task that, rooted in the ever-unfolding mystery of God, 
does not conform neatly to a particular church’s system of thought.  Rahner explains: 
…it would be preposterous and un-Christian for the Christian churches simply to 
carry on, conservatively, in their traditional status quo. They can keep their lawful 
inheritance for the future only if they are willing to change. They must be attuned 
to their times. This does not mean that everything is allowed, that alien fashions 
are arbitrarily accepted. It means an ever renewed and radical return to the 
innermost heart of the faith, to which both Christians and the churches must bear 
witness. Christians must become more Christian; then automatically they will 
come closer to each other. What is required is not a liberalizing diluting of 
Christianity into a worldwide humanism.380 
 
The unity of the church sought by ecumenism is a reality that hinges on the symbolic 
competence of churches and individual Christians in relation to Jesus Christ.  In other 
words, as the particular churches mature and become more effective symbols of Jesus 
Christ, so too will the particular churches draw closer together in unity. 
Rahner offers two theses that highlight the importance of a logic governed by 
symbol for ecumenism.  Firstly, while acknowledging the diversity of particular churches 
without minimizing the significance of their diversity of expression, Rahner contends that 
the nature of ecumenism is ultimately rooted in the belief that all Christians “live in the 
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grace of God, are truly justified by the Holy Pneuma of God, and are sharers in the divine 
nature.”381  Rahner explains that the nature of ecumenism: 
…is the unity, apprehended in hope, of a belief in justifying grace which already 
exits and is identical in both sides, yet which, so far as theology is concerned 
together with the creedal formula which gives it conceptual expression, is still in 
process of being achieved.382 
 
By its nature, the ecumenical movement is an interpretative movement built upon the 
conviction that all Christians share in and are already united in the same justifying grace 
of God.  It is an interpretive movement that treats expressions of belief that are in the 
process of becoming.  
Rahner’s second thesis contends that, “that which most of all constitutes 
ecumenical theology is the theology of the future, which has to be worked out by all the 
Churches each from its own point of departure as already laid down by its past 
history.”383  The ecumenical movement, as an interpretative movement, is bound to 
prejudices of the particular churches.  However, the past prejudices of the separated 
churches are necessary in order for a fusion of horizons to occur.  Hence, the ecumenical 
movement is also a dialogic movement.    
As such, ecumenical dialogue is grounded in and must be aware of theological 
anthropology.  Rahner writes: 
…all statements made by a theological anthropology can be read as – and are only 
correct if they are read as – warnings not to stop in an anthropological statement 
at any point short of the one where these statements in an apophatic anthropology 
are dropped into the incomprehensibility of God.  Theological anthropology is 
only truly anthropological when it really sees itself as theology and loses itself in 
that. But theology is theology only when it becomes the acknowledgment of 
God’s incomprehensibility, before which we can only fall dumb in adoration; 
before which and towards which we exist, whether we wish to or not; being able 
                                                 
381 Rahner, "Some Problems in Contemporary Ecumenism," 249. 
382 Ibid., 248. 
383 Ibid., 252. 
 157 
only to choose whether to accept this exposure to the mystery per se, entering into 
it in believing liberty, or whether to repress it skeptically. 384 
 
From an anthropological standpoint, the human being’s capacity for dialogue safeguards 
the human being from the trap of Cartesian interiority.  The ability to dialogue validates 
the human being’s capacity for self-realization in and through the other; human beings 
become via dialogue with an other.  “Dialogue” writes Kasper, “is an indispensable step 
along the path towards human self-realization. Personal identity is a dialogical identity 
and not an identity closed in upon itself.”385  Rahner claims that on both the personal and 
social levels the necessity of dialogue intensifies with the present-day situation of 
pluralism.  Rahner writes: 
For better or for worse, everyone has become everyone else’s neighbour.  If, 
therefore, one does not want to hold the absurd opinion that the existence of man 
can be regulated and preserved in the same living space independently of his 
views and opinions – in other words, that culture is not at all important for life in 
the biological and civilisational, social plane of human existence – then in that 
case dialogue between world-views becomes possible and indeed necessary for 
life.  No world-view in this unity of the spiritual-personal and bodily-social 
existence of man can possibly renounce objectifying itself bodily and socially into 
at spatio-temporal, social space of human existence which is common to 
everyone; it cannot possibly withdraw itself and more into an interiority’ which 
has nothing to do with anyone else.386 
 
Rahner understands that that the process of globalization is a reality that both unites and 
diversifies.  Accordingly, Rahner offers two principles that reflect both the possibility and 
fruitfulness of dialogue within a pluralistic context.  Firstly, Rahner holds that every 
particular worldview is subject to history.387  As such, it is possible to acknowledge the 
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incompleteness of the expression of  a universal truth without thereby denying truth as 
such.  Rahner maintains that, “[i]t belongs to the nature of a universal world-view to 
appeal to its own future and to accept its own eschatological character which calls its own 
present before the tribunal of self-criticism and places it under the judgment of the 
future.”  Secondly, Rahner argues that dialogue is possible and fruitful within the context 
of a radical openness to otherness.  Daniel Pekarske summarizes Rahner’s point when he 
writes that  
Dialogue is possible where one seeks the total inclusion of the existential 
experience of the other, without which we cannot understand or judge the other’s 
universal claim. These are the grounds for ongoing dialogue which today 
demands more than toleration. It demands risking oneself. It demands 
commitment, humility, and in the final analysis, love.388 
 
Rahner’s understanding of dialogue elucidates both its symbolic orientation and the 
importance of recognizing the other as both a real partner and as a mystery.  Rahner’s 
understanding of dialogue also demonstrates his predilection and inclination for thinking 
postcritically.  Dialogue is always an interchange of symbols that arise out of a situation 
and context other than one’s own.  Dialogue begins by allowing the mystery of the other 
to offer itself.  The symbols that present the mystery of the other are not initially one’s 
own symbols; however, dialogue seeks to develop a mutual recognition whereby one not 
only allows the other to be other, but recognizes the other as other.389 
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3.2.3 – The Unity of the Churches  
In 1983, Karl Rahner and Heinrich Fries put forth a bold and provocative proposal 
for the unity of the churches.  Together, Fries and Rahner set out a hopeful and optimistic 
path for unity between separated churches.  They argue that the unity of the separated 
churches is not only an actual possibility, but that it is one of the highest priorities for the 
churches.  The Fries-Rahner proposal for unity, however, has essentially fallen to the 
wayside within ecumenical literature.  While most references to the proposal amount to 
passing acknowledgements or footnotes, its actual value remains largely unassessed.   
The Fries and Rahner proposal provides eight theses for the unity of particular 
churches currently separated from another.390  Each of the eight theses is directed towards 
establishing the conditions for unity among churches.  As a basic principle, Fries and 
Rahner write: 
When establishing such conditions, each church would have the duty and 
responsibility-derived from the commandment of Jesus-to expand its own 
conditions no more than is clearly commanded by its own religious conviction of 
what is important to salvation. This should be done with real courage, and some 
perhaps weighty doubts should be left aside.391 
 
Fries and Rahner maintain that the stagnation and immobility of the ecumenical 
movement issues from a “tactical caution” on the part of the churches whereby “[t]hey do 
not really come out courageously with declarations as to what the conditions are under 
which they are really prepared to unite with other churches.”392  The intention of this 
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section is to develop the main contours of the Fries-Rahner proposal for the unity of the 
churches.  A fuller evaluation of the practical implications of the proposal will be 
addressed in chapter five. 
The first of the theses that Fries and Rahner put forth contends that, in terms of 
identification, churches are bound to recognize the Sacred Scriptures and the early creeds 
of the church as the basic truths that are common to all Christians.  Fries and Rahner 
write, “[t]he fundamental truths of Christianity, as they are expressed in Holy Scripture, 
in the Apostles' Creed, and in that of Nicaea and Constantinople are binding on all 
partner churches of the one Church to be.”393  Hence, the early creeds of the church and 
the Sacred Scriptures have a normative function within the churches.  However, despite 
their normative character, Scripture and the early creeds of the church are expressions of 
God’s mystery subject to various interpretations.  Fries writes: 
Although the fundamental truths of Christian faith have been formulated in the 
Confession of Nicaea and Constantinople, this does not exclude but instead 
includes their further interpretation and development, through all those 
motivations and challenges that determine the history of faith and of theology, 
and also of dogmas.394 
 
Thus, Rahner and Fries affirm that the unity of the churches requires that churches 
mutually acknowledge that their particular interpretations are interpretations of a 
common faith expressed in the Sacred Scriptures and early creeds that arise within an 
open-ended life world.  In short, the diverse historical circumstances of each church are 
to be respected by all other churches insofar as the diversity of interpretations that arise in 
relationship to the unique history of particular church share in the common connection to 
the early church as it is expressed in Sacred Scripture, in the Apostle’s creed, and in the 
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creeds of Nicaea and Constantinople. 
The second thesis of the Fries-Rahner proposal for the unity of the church takes 
up the difficulty of navigating the demand for truth within a pluralistic context and 
implicitly acknowledges the need for a second naïveté.  Rahner maintains that not all 
truths have the same existential significance for individuals and communities, for 
example, the truth of gravity and the truth of plate tectonics.  Gravity tends to have an 
existential significance greater than plate tectonics even to the extent that practically 
speaking plate tectonics is irrelevant. This, however, may not be the case for individuals 
and communities living near the San Andreas Fault; the truth of plate tectonics for these 
communities and individuals understandably has an existential proximity and 
significance that others would not enjoy.  This sort of differentiation applies to the truths 
of Christianity as well.  Rahner writes: 
Nothing may be rejected decisively and confessionally in one partner church 
which is binding dogma in another partner church. Furthermore, beyond Thesis I 
no explicit and positive confession in one partner church is imposed as dogma 
obligatory for another partner church. This is left to a broader consensus in the 
future. This applies especially to authentic but undefined doctrinal decrees of the 
Roman church, particularly with regard to ethical questions. According to this 
principle only that would be done which is already practice in every church 
today.395 
 
Thesis II confronts the issue of consistency and change as well as particularity and 
universality within Christianity.  It also acknowledges the necessity of addressing one 
another’s narrative identities.  In short, the stability and normative quality of the early 
creeds and Scripture cannot simply negate the differences that have developed in the faith 
awareness of particular churches. 396  With respect to such differences, Rahner calls for 
an epistemological tolerance that reserves judgment with respect to conflicting dogmatic 
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and ethical statements.  The need for an epistemological tolerance is particularly apropos 
for the contemporary relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman 
Catholic Church.  As chapter five expounds, much of the tension and many of the 
disagreements that continue to develop between both communions, especially with regard 
to divergent ethical teachings on birth control, sexuality, divorce to name only a few, 
issue in part from divergent cognitive dispositions.  Conflicting ethical positions need not 
be interpreted in all instances as an affront against unity.  In fact, Rahner claims that too 
often the ethical and dogmatic criteria for ecumenical unity that is out forth by churches 
is more rigid than the practical ethical and dogmatic requirements to belong to a 
particular church.  Hence, Rahner maintains that the ecumenical movement would benefit 
from churches extending the same epistemological tolerance to one another that extend to 
their members.397  Rahner writes: 
From the viewpoint of dogma, a unity of the churches is already possible today 
with this kind of epistemological tolerance.  A consequence of this tolerance is 
that one does not cram radically contradictory but definite and explicit teachings 
together, and yet one makes room for the not-yet-agreed-upon but nevertheless 
acknowledged as agreed-upon. This sentence may seem daring, utopian, and 
perhaps even dogmatically controversial.  But if one rejects the notion that a 
unification of the churches is simply impossible in today's intellectual-political 
circumstances-a notion surely prohibited by the fundamental convictions of 
Christianity and the Church-then one will have to admit that in today's intellectual 
climate no unity in faith is possible other than the one just proposed.398 
 
It is at the level of self-recognition that, in humble honesty, churches recognize that they 
are capable and responsible agents, capable of speaking and listening and responsible for 
doing so before another church.  As such, recognizing one’s-self is also a recognition that 
one’s narrative horizon is open and receptive to the mystery of the other. 
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Rahner understands the goal of ecumenical dialogue as an exchange of symbols 
and redirects ecumenical dialogue away from discussions that emphasize the idem 
identity of churches towards the ipse identity of the churches.  This shift in emphasis rests 
upon the conviction that every particular church is a unique expression of the church of 
Christ, but that no particular church expresses the church of Christ in its totality.  In other 
words, Rahner challenges the churches of the ecumenical movement to suspend 
ontological judgments in order to approach and recognize the Christian other.  Put within 
the framework of a logic that is governed by symbol, as symbols the literal meaning 
expressed by particular churches never exhausts the symbolic meaning of a church 
despite the symbolic meaning’s dependence on the literal meaning; as symbols churches 
are in a continuous state of flux.  Thus, ecumenical dialogue is a dialogue between 
churches that seeks to more fully understand, explain, and appropriate the endless 
unfolding of the mystery of the Christ’s Church through the mutual exchange of one 
another as symbol, which really are expressions that carry the reality of the church of 
Christ.  Rahner and Fries explain: 
In their [churches of the Reformation] Christian life style, their liturgy, their 
theology, and in their relationship to secular realities, these churches have also 
clearly produced Christian and ecclesiastical realities which have a concrete form 
and liveliness not found so easily in the Roman Catholic Church. Thus it must be 
admitted honestly and openly that, compared to these realities, the Roman 
Catholic church in fact exhibits deficiencies. At least, it pays tribute to the 
inescapably valid principle that nobody, in his particular (individual and 
collective) reality, can realize, all together and at once, everything that Christian 
grace and revelation has potentially given to both world and history.399 
 
Hence, the exchange that occurs at the ecumenical dialogue’s goal of mutual recognition 
is not an exchange of manageable commodities, it is instead the exchange of symbols that 
develop out of one another’s narrative identity into a shared narrative identity.  A 
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complete narrative identity, at least in regards to the churches, implies an eschatological 
finality that is simply not the case for any particular church. 
Thesis III maintains that , “[i]n this one Church of Jesus Christ, composed of the 
uniting churches, there are regional partner churches which can, to a large extent, 
maintain their existing structures.”400  Rahner and Fries acknowledge that the unification 
of the churches does not require uniformity of structure.  Accordingly, it is possible for a 
diversity of practices and structures to exist within the one church of Christ.  Rahner 
writes: 
The ecclesiological principle of a legitimate pluralism of discipline and life in the 
individual partner churches can and should be applied not only to the Eastern 
Churches… but also to the churches of the reformation.401 
 
Thesis III gains traction and reasonability in light of a logic that is governed by symbol 
rather than metaphysical ontology.  Approached from the perspective of metaphysical 
ontology, unity of the churches in terms of discipline and structure remains on the level 
of primary reflection and as such requires a definitive resolution through compromise or 
assimilation.  However, Rahner and Fries use an approach that respects the structures and 
disciplines of particular churches as ways in which churches express the one church of 
Christ in and through a diversity of contexts and traditions.  Thesis III also expresses a 
relationality greater than mere tolerance.  As partner churches, churches that occupy the 
same “territory” present not only a quantitative unity, but a qualitative unity. 
 Rahner and Fries address the role of the bishop Rome in two ways.  Firstly, 
Rahner and Fries address the role of the bishop of Rome as an instrument of unity for the 
churches.  Fries and Rahner write, “[a]ll partner Churches acknowledge the meaning and 
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right of the Petrine service of the Roman pope to be the concrete guarantor of the unity of 
the Church in truth and love.”402  Secondly, Fries and Rahner take up the authoritative 
responsibilities of the bishop of Rome.  Fries and Rahner put forth the sub-thesis that  
The pope, for his part explicitly commits himself to acknowledge and to respect 
the thus agreed-upon independence of the partner churches.  He declares (by 
human right, iure humano) that he will make use of his highest teaching authority 
(ex cathedra), granted to him in conformity with Catholic principles by the First 
Vatican Council, only in a manner that conforms judicially or in substance to a 
general council of the whole Church, just as his previous ex cathedra decisions 
have been issued in agreement and close contact with the whole Catholic 
episcopate.403 
 
Hence, Fries and Rahner address the ecumenical place of the bishop of Rome in terms of 
the responsibilities of the churches and from the responsibilities of the bishop of Rome. 
   Chapter five will address some of the practical concerns that merit further 
reflection here, such as election, jurisdiction, and teaching authority including the 
significance of the proposal that the pope will make use of his highest teaching authority 
de iure humano and not de iure divino.  The goal of this brief analysis is to situate the 
symbolic role of the bishop of Rome as an aspect of a unified church.  Rahner and Fries 
contend that the polemical hermeneutic previously applied to Petrine service need not be 
the case any longer and that the contemporary ecumenical context calls for a revaluation 
of Petrine service.  Harold Ditmanson writes, “Church polity is intended to serve the 
process of mediating the grace of God.”404  Hence, there is a need for the polity within 
the church, but according to Ditmanson, “the variety and changeability of church orders 
points to the continual need to express in updated form the relation between what is 
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normative and what is situational in the life of the church.”405  Ditmanson astutely 
acknowledges the ecumenical tension that surrounds the bishop of Rome and the need to 
understand the role of Petrine service in relationship to both orthodoxy and orthopraxis.  
A logic governed by symbol permits such a relationship.  Envisioned from the standpoint 
of churches, a symbolic interpretation of Petrine service sees the bishop of Rome as a 
visible expression of the churches’ unity.  However, this necessitates that the bishop of 
Rome, recognizing himself as a visible sign of unity, does not offend the visible 
expression of unity and respects the differences of particular churches, especially with 
respect to ex cathedra pronouncements.   
 Thesis V addresses the necessity of bishops as an expression of the unity of 
particular churches and as an expression of unity between churches.  Fries and Rahner 
write: 
All partner churches, in accordance with the ancient tradition, have bishops at the 
head of their larger subdivisions.  The election of a bishop in these partner 
churches need not be done according to the normally valid manner in the Roman 
Catholic Church.406 
 
Rahner and Fries affirm the significance of bishops for all churches.  Rahner explored the 
status and function of the bishop in an earlier work where he writes, “[t]he Church alone, 
in fact, in contrast to all other societies, has this unique characteristic that she can appear 
as a microcosm of herself in any one place.”407  In terms familiar to Rahner’s 
transcendental theology, the “transcendental” and “particular” churches are expressions 
that make the same reality present; Jesus Christ. 
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 In a particular way, bishops are symbols of the apostolicity of the church. Fries 
writes that “the apostolic succession in the office of the bishop is a sign of the 
apostolicity of the church, not apostolicity itself.”408   
Thesis VI states that, “The partner churches live in mutual fraternal exchange of 
all aspects of their life, so that the previous history and experience of the churches 
separated earlier can become effective in the life of the other partner churches.”409  Thesis 
VI explicitly deals with mutuality.  Accordingly, an ecumenically united church is not a 
church offended by difference, nor is it a church that seeks to unite through conformity.  
Instead, a united church is a church that responds to the need for a second naïveté 
whereby the individual churches more fully realize and express their life in and through 
the exchange of difference.  Fries writes: 
This thesis corresponds to the perceived goal of the one Church-to-be, which is to 
be understood not as a Church of uniformity, but rather as a unity in variety, as a 
conciliar fellowship, as Church of reconciled diversity.  The precondition for such 
a goal is the mutual recognition which itself presupposes mutuality and 
diversity.410 
 
In short, the exchange of symbols governs mutuality in a manner whereby churches 
develop in relationship to one another and not in spite of one another.  The challenges 
that inevitably arise in the face of diversity and difference are not so much affronts 
against Christian identity as they are the milieu for a more fully expressed and realized 
Christian identity. 
Thesis VII of the Fries-Rahner proposal for the unity of the church takes up the 
issue of recognition of offices between churches.  Fries and Rahner propose that: 
Without prejudice to the judgment of another church concerning the theological 
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legitimacy of the existing ministerial office in the separated churches, all partner 
churches commit themselves henceforth to conduct ordinations with prayer and 
the laying-on of hands, so that acknowledging them will present no difficulty for 
the Roman Catholic partner church either.411 
 
The recognition of ministerial office is a two-fold issue.  Firstly, it is a matter of 
recognizing the ministries of still separated churches.  Secondly, it is a matter of 
recognizing the jurisdiction of the ministers of other churches.  Fries and Rahner suggest 
that with respect to the Roman Catholic understandings of the validity of orders and the 
subsequent validity of the Eucharist that it would be necessary to establish common 
practices, i.e. the laying on of hands and prayer, in order to recognize mutually both the 
ministers and the Eucharist.    
 Of all the theses presented by Rahner and Fries, Thesis VII is decidedly in favor 
of a Catholic position.  In other words, both Rahner and Fries understand the necessity of 
the laying on of hands and prayer as essential for dealing with the impasse between 
Catholic sacramental theology and Protestant sacramental theology, especially in regards 
to the requirements of sacramental validity.  However, Rahner gestures towards a more 
nuanced position when he writes: 
Ordinations are ultimately valid not because it is absolutely certain that, even in 
exceptional cases, they have corresponded to the concept of an almost physical 
norm of effectiveness of the sacraments…They are valid because they are deemed 
valid within the one Church, and because they must be acknowledged as valid in a 
variety of situations.412  
 
The above affirms the symbolic quality and effectiveness of ordination and the 
sacraments as arising from the mutual recognition of a community.  In a certain sense, it 
is the mutual recognition of the church community that validates the ordination in and 
through the prayer and the laying on of hands. 
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The final thesis proposed by Rahner and Fries contends that, “[t]here is pulpit and 
altar fellowship between the individual partner churches.”413  Here mutuality, at least as 
far as ecumenical dialogue is concerned, reaches it goal.  Fries explains: 
For the unity of the faith and of the Church is not monolithic, static, or 
conceivable as definitely completed.  It is open-ended and, as enduring and living 
unity, is marked by the incomplete, the “in transit, “and by eschatological 
reservation.  One can also describe this ecclesiological state of affairs by defining 
the reality of the Church as gift and task; unity appearing in the Eucharist can be 
understood as unity antecedently given through Jesus Christ, which becomes the 
constant and endless task for the community of those bound to Christ; it can be 
understood as striving for unity (see Eph. 4:13) and endeavors toward unification 
and reconciliation.414 
 
Rahner and Fries maintain that, properly understood, mutual recognition does not entail 
inter-communion, but rather prepares the way for altar fellowship as “mutual Eucharistic 
hospitality.”415  One does not build mutual Eucharistic hospitality upon a foundation of 
sameness; instead, it is formed out of a recognition of mutuality that develops out of 
gratitude.  
Mutual recognition between churches implies risk.  As an exchange of symbols, 
mutual recognition gives rise to thinking that is often foreign to the status quo of a 
particular church.  Recalling that symbols not only call for interpretation, but also have 
the power to interpret, churches find themselves both vulnerable and answerable to one 
another.  The boldness of Fries and Rahner’s proposal lies within its insistence upon the 
courage to take risks (at least from the perspective of a metaphysical ontology) in a way 
that opens up otherwise closed possibilities and paths towards mutual recognition and 
unity.  Mutuality and unity do not entail the absence of struggle, disagreement, or tension.  
Rahner explains: 
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But it is precisely when we do find the courage to accept these conflicts and 
tensions within the Church, this real multiplicity of gifts and charisms, of tasks 
and functions, that we draw the sting from the struggle between opposing 
tendencies which always and inevitably do occur even within the Church, that we 
transform that struggle into the strivings of love, and that we set the Spirit free, 
who would otherwise be stifled.416 
 
4. - Conclusion  
A logic that is governed by symbol invites a reimagining of the church, 
ecumenism, and ecumenical dialogue beyond the traditional Western logic’s principles of 
metaphysical ontology.  Simply put, a logic governed by symbol uncovers and is 
nourished by the relationship between unity and difference.  As such, an understanding of 
the mystery of the other emerges in such a way that it can be interpreted and appropriated 
without managing it.  The long path of recognition, with all of its detours, explicates both 
the overwhelming task of ecumenical dialogue and the possibility of achieving its goal of 
mutuality between still separated churches. 
Drawing upon the theological resources of Karl Rahner’s theology, the preceding 
analysis developed a symbolic approach to ecumenism and ecumenical dialogue.  This 
symbolic approach offers a contemporary response to the challenge set forth by Vatican 
II in Unitatis Redintegratio (The Decree on Ecumenism): 
There can be no ecumenism worthy of the name without interior conversion. For 
it is from newness of attitudes of mind, from self-denial and unstinted love, that 
desires of unity take their rise and develop in a mature way. We should therefore 
pray to the Holy Spirit for the grace to be genuinely self-denying, humble, gentle 
in the service of others and to have an attitude of generosity toward them.417 
 
The considerations of ecumenism and ecumenical dialogue in this chapter are admittedly 
the product of theological and philosophical reflection largely devoid of practical 
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application.  However, this is a necessary step in order to apply such a theology to the 
concrete reality of the ecumenical relationship between the Anglican Communion and the 
Roman Catholic Church. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
ANGLICAN-ROMAN CATHOLIC DIALOGUE: SOCIAL, HISTORICAL, AND 
THEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. – Introduction  
 The relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic 
Church has a complexity that is unique within the context of ecumenism.  Moments of 
intense convergence and divergence mark the long and varied relationship between the 
two communions.  The ebb and flow of the ecumenical relationship enjoyed by the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church is fraught with triumph and 
tragedy, mutual admiration and disdain, goodwill and bloodshed, politics and faith, open-
mindedness and stubborn refusal, radical hope and sober realism.  It is a relationship that 
is as complex as the personalities and communities it involves.   
The modest goal of this chapter is to develop a narrative that cultivates an 
understanding of the significant historical and theological contours of the relationship 
between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.  The following is 
not, nor does it intend to be, an exhaustive account of the historical and theological 
developments between these two communions.418  Instead, this chapter considers six 
“moments” within the relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman 
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Catholic Church that are reflective of a larger narrative.  These moments include the 1) 
The English Reformation and the Via Media, 2) the promulgation of Leo XIII’s apostolic 
bull Apostolicae Curae, 3) the Malines Conversations from 1921 to 1927, 4) Vatican II 
and the Malta Report, 5) the Anglican Roman Catholic International Commission 
(ARCIC), and finally 6) the promulgation of the apostolic constitution Anglicanorum 
Coetibus by Benedict XVI on November 4, 2009.   
2. – The English Reformation and the Via Media 
 The period beginning with the reign of Henry VIII and ending with Elizabeth I 
(1509-1603) represents a significant moment within the relationship between the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.  Despite the obvious external 
divisions that arose in Western Christianity during the 16th century, it was also a 
formative moment for the internal development of the Western churches.  The rapid 
developments of the 16th century Reformation provided the context for both the Roman 
Catholic “Counter-Reformation” and the English Reformation.  For its part, however, the 
English reformation does not neatly fit into the categories of “Reformation” or “Counter-
Reformation.”  This section elucidates the origins of the breach between Rome and 
Canterbury and the genesis of the Anglican quest for “comprehensiveness.” 
2.1 – Henry VIII and the Act of Supremacy 
The marital relationships of Henry VIII sowed the seeds of the English 
reformation.  Of Henry’s six wives, his first wife, Catherine of Aragon (of Roman 
Catholic allegiance) and his subsequent wife Anne Boleyn (of Protestant allegiance) 
occupy a central place within the historical development of the Anglican Reformation.  
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 Arthur, Henry VIII’s brother, and Catherine of Aragon were married in 1501.  
However, Arthur died in 1502 and Henry, all of 12 years old, was engaged to Catherine 
in 1503.  It was necessary, however, that a dispensation from affinity be granted by Pope 
Julius II before the marriage between Henry and Catherine could be recognized as a 
canonically valid.419  Pope Julius II granted a bull of dispensation from affinity in 1504, 
allowing Henry and Catherine to marry in 1509 shortly after Henry’s ascent to the throne 
as king of England.  During more than eighteen years of marriage, Catherine gave birth to 
six children, all whom were stillborn with the exception of their daughter, Mary.   
In 1527, Henry sought to have his marriage with Catherine annulled.  Henry’s 
desire for an annulment is complicated.  Essentially, it rested upon his aspiration for a 
legitimate male heir and his wish to marry Anne Boleyn.  Canonically speaking, the 
justification for annulment that Henry and his entourage of theological experts and 
political advisors put forth was, at best, convoluted.  Henry argued that the original 
dispensation from “affinity” was outside of the competence of a pope’s juridical 
authority.  Henry petitioned the current pope, Clement VII, to overturn the 1504 
dispensation that had been granted by Julius II in order to provide the canonical 
justification to annul his marriage with Catherine.  However, as D.G. Newcombe 
recognizes, “[p]opes were never eager to admit that they had made mistakes, nor were 
they happy to overturn decisions of their predecessors.”420  The reluctance of the pope to 
overturn the papal bull of Julius II, coupled with a tenuous political situation between 
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Clement VII and Charles V, the king of Spain and Catherine’s nephew, further 
complicated the possibility of obtaining an annulment. 
Henry’s boldness in his dealings with the pope grew in proportion to his 
impatience for obtaining an annulment.  Henry attempted to force the hand of the pope 
through legislation and reforms enacted by the English Parliament, gradually increasing 
Henry’s juridical authority over the Church of England while lessening the pope’s.  In 
September of 1533, Clement VII excommunicated Henry after his refusal to reconsider 
the Act in Restraint of Appeals that solidified the juridical authority of the monarchy with 
respect to the Church of England.  This effectively rendered papal authority irrelevant 
within the English realm.   Henry’s brashness culminated with the 1534 Act of 
Supremacy, which states that the king: 
shall be taken, accepted, and reputed the only Supreme Head in earth of the 
Church of England, called Anglicana Ecclesia, and shall have and enjoy, annexed  
and united to the imperial crown of this realm as well the style title thereof, as all 
honours, dignities, pre-eminences, jurisdictions, authorities, immunities, profits, 
and commodities, to the said dignity of Supreme Head of the same Church 
belonging and appertaining.421   
 
It is evident that Henry’s disputes with Rome and the pope were juridical in nature.  
However, it is equally evident that Henry did not intend to create a breach within the 
church of Christ.  While Henry was eager to establish some semblance of juridical 
independence from Rome, he did not envision nor intend for the Church of England to 
further the efforts of the continental Protestant Reformation.422  However, the juridical 
disputes between Rome and England under the reign of Henry provided the context for 
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both the development of the unique identity of the Church of England and for a continued 
hardening of its relationship with Rome. 
2.2 – Anglican Identity: The Via Media 
 The term via media, or the middle way, is a term that has become characteristic of 
Anglican identity.  Bernard and Margret Pawley observe that the term via media can be 
misleading.  They write, “[t]he Anglican interpretation of catholicity has been a positive 
deliberate attempt towards comprehensiveness; to include and to make available as much 
Christian truth and order as was edifying.”423 
 In the wake of Henry VIII’s death in 1547, his son Edward VI, the heir apparent 
to English crown, was crowned king at the age of nine.  It was the council of regency, in 
light of Edward’s age, that effectively governed England during the Edward VI’s reign.  
The extensive juridical authority of the State over the Church that Henry established 
paved the way for the Reformation-minded initiatives of Edward Seymour, the Duke of 
Somerset and Edward’s uncle, and Thomas Cranmer, the Archbishop of Canterbury.  
John Moorman characterizes the religious context at the time of Edward’s accession to 
the throne: 
Religious opinion in the country was at the time divided.  Few had any hopes of a 
return to Rome, but there was much controversy over such matters as Justification 
by Faith, the meaning of the Mass…, images and relics, the infallibility of the 
Bible, and so forth.  Somerset held advanced opinions, in many of which he was 
ably supported by Cranmer whose mind was increasingly influenced by foreign 
protestant theology.  These two regarded the king’s minority as a good 
opportunity for introducing considerable religious changes, using the extensive 
powers which Henry VIII had usurped for the crown.424 
 
The Edwardian rule introduced liturgical and ecclesial reforms heavily influenced by 
Protestant ideals.  Under Edward’s reign, the English Church saw the development of the 
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Book of Common Prayer, the Ordinal of 1549, reception of communion under both 
forms, married clergy, and the election of bishops, to name only a few reforms.425   
 Upon Edward’s death in 1553 and in the absence of a male heir, the inheritance of 
the throne moved to Henry and Catherine’s daughter, Mary.  Upon her assent to the 
throne, Mary moved quickly to undo the Protestant-minded reforms of the previous six 
years and was eager to restore communion with Rome.  Mary’s reign as Queen of 
England and her attempts at restoration, however, were both violent and unsuccessful, 
earning her the dubious designation “bloody Mary.” 
 After the death of Mary I, her half-sister Elizabeth, the daughter of Henry VIII 
and Anne Boleyn, ascended to the crown in 1558.  In order to quell the religious upheaval 
and confusion that had plagued the Church of England, Elizabeth I put forth what is 
commonly termed the “Elizabethan Settlement.”  The settlement was comprised of two 
enactments, the Act of Supremacy of 1559, which restored the juridical reforms of Henry 
VIII, and the Act of Uniformity of 1559, which restored most of the Edwardian reforms.  
Together the enactments sought to develop a middle ground, or via media, between the 
“Catholic” and “Protestant” mindsets.  It is with Elizabeth that the distinctiveness of the 
Anglican Church emerges.  Bernard and Margaret Powley explain:   
Her [The Church of England] distinctive position gradually began to take shape.  
The shape in which it emerged and which it has for the most part endured was 
more the result of practical experience than of basic doctrinal speculation.  The 
Church of England, as has been said often, is not a confessional Church: she 
believes herself to be the result of what happened to the English portion of the 
catholic Church which broke off to restore and relive her basic faith and order in 
light of new experiences.426 
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 It is easier to understand the breach between the Anglican Church and Roman 
Catholic Church when the preceding historical considerations are placed against the 
backdrop of the Council of Trent (1545-1563).  The Church of England and the Roman 
Catholic Church developed distinctive approaches for navigating unity when confronted 
with difference.  The Roman Catholic Church responded to the perceived threat of the 
Reformation by solidifying its confessional and doctrinal positions in order to distinguish 
its identity from that of the reformers.  At the risk of oversimplification, the Catholic 
Church at Trent favored an approach that began with theory and ended in praxis.  The 
Anglican Church, however, dealt with unity and difference by way of the opposite 
approach.  The Church of England began with praxis in order to develop and clarify its 
identity.  Hence, it is not surprising, in light of the manner in which each church comes to 
understand its particular identity during these formative years, that the hopes of 
reconciliation and the breach between Rome and Canterbury are essentially solidified by 
the close of the sixteenth century. 
3. – Leo XIII and Apostolicae Curae: The Validity of Anglican Orders 
Pope Leo XIII’s bull, Apostolicae Curae, is a significant moment in the dialogic 
relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England.  The period 
between 1570 and the promulgation of the papal bull Regnans in Excelesis, which 
formally excommunicated Elizabeth I and those who obeyed her, and the promulgation of 
Apostolicae Curae in 1896 was marked by gradually increasing tolerance amidst deep-
seated suspicion.  This period in the relationship between the two communions is by no 
means without significance; however, realistically speaking there was little, if any, hope 
of unification between the churches of Rome and England.  
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There are three events leading up to Apostolicae Curae that are worth mentioning.  
The first is the establishment of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in England in the midst of 
the French revolution.  The second is the “Oxford Movement,” which sought to correct 
some of the excesses that had become commonplace within the English Church. 
According to Bernard and Margaret Pawley, the movement was “responsible for 
substantial deepening in the understanding of the sacramental life.”  The third notable 
event was the promulgation of papal infallibility in 1870 by Pius IX and the Vatican I 
Council.  The Anglican Church interpreted infallibility as a new doctrine of the Catholic 
Church, reinforcing the view that the Roman Church and the papacy overstepped its 
jurisdiction.  The unintended consequence of infallibility was the formation of the “Old 
Catholics,” a group which the Roman Catholic Church recognizes even today as having 
valid orders and whose bishops participate in the ordination of Anglican bishops. 
Underlying the development of Apotolicae Curae, despite its unfavorable position 
regarding Anglican orders, are hopeful and friendly dialogues between Lord Halifax of 
England and Abbé Portal of Frances.  Their friendship and ensuing dialogue convinced 
both men that the possibility of unifying Rome and Canterbury was a much more realistic 
possibility than was commonly held in both churches.  Convinced that a frank and open 
dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Church of England was both 
necessary and possible, Abbé Portal and Lord Halifax agreed that questions regarding 
Holy Orders would be a suitable starting point for such a dialogue.  The result of this 
decision was a work crafted by Halifax and Portal, published in French under the 
pseudonym Fernand Dalbus and titled Les Ordinations Anglicanes.  Leo XIII, as Portal 
recalls, received the work favorably. 
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The inquiry into Anglican orders, which for Halifax and Portal was an inquiry to 
initiate dialogue, impelled Leo XIII to set up a commission to examine the validity of 
Anglican orders.427  The commission, however, was overshadowed by the English Roman 
Catholic Church’s desire for the unification of the Anglican and Roman Catholic 
Churches by conquest and absorption.  The resultant document, Apostolicae Curae, 
declared Anglican orders to be “utterly invalid and altogether void.”428  The papal bull 
claims that beginning with the Ordinal of Edward VI, Anglican ordinations are defective 
according to intention and form.  In regards to form, Apostolicae Curae states: 
… In the rite of the accomplishment and administration of any sacrament we 
rightly distinguish between the ceremonial part and essential part, which are 
usually called the matter and the form. And all are aware that the sacraments of 
the new law, being sensible signs and signs efficacious of invisible grace, ought 
both to signify the grace which they effect and to effect the grace they signify…. 
Now the words which up to the last generation were universally held by 
Anglicans to be the proper form of ordination to the priesthood. viz. Receive the 
Holy Ghost, are surely far from the precise signification of the order of the 
priesthood, or its grace and power, which is especially the power of consecrating 
and offering the true body and blood of the Lord in that sacrifice which is no mere 
commemoration of the sacrifice accomplished on the cross. This form was indeed 
afterwards augmented by the words for the Office and work of a priest, but this 
rather proves that Anglicans saw that the first form was defective and 
inadequate.429 
 
The Anglican rite of ordination, it was maintained, did not intend “the conferral of the 
power to offer sacrifice.”430  In March of 1879, the archbishops of the English Church 
refuted the allegations of the Catholic Church that the ordination ritual of Edward VI 
lacked both intention and form.   
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What began as a moment of convergence fueled by the desire for reunion and 
reconciliation degenerated into a moment of external divergence.  Apostolicae Curae is a 
prime example of Rome and Canterbury trying to achieve too much too soon.  Bernard 
and Margaret Pawley explain: 
Looked back on from our days the mistakes of this episode can be seen to lead 
inevitably to disillusionment.  The time was not ripe.  There was no question that 
the Roman Curia could or would come to a conclusion acceptable to Anglicans.  
Even if it had, it is also certain, alas, that the large majority of Anglicans would 
not have felt moved to do anything about the opportunities so afforded, nor would 
any legislation consequent upon it have had the slightest chance of success.431   
 
Both Halifax and Portal, driven by their convictions, were, with respect to the benefit of 
history, ahead of their time.  The bold and ambitious project of Lord Halifax and Abbé 
Portal, however, did not end with Apostolicae Curae.  Instead, it drove the cause for 
union between Rome and Canterbury “underground,” only to resurface with what has 
become known as the Malines Conversations.    
4. – The Malines Conversations: Dialogue Before Dialogue 
 The possibility of officially sanctioned dialogue between Rome and Canterbury 
was practically a non-issue after the promulgation of Apostolicae Curae.  The naïve 
optimism of Lord Halifax and Abbé Portal, which resulted in Leo XIII’s declaration that 
Anglican orders were absolutely null and void, had the consequence of reinforcing 
polemical positions on both sides of the Tiber. From a Roman perspective, the Anglican 
Church was both heretical and schismatic; the only possible resolution was a submission 
and return to the Church of Rome, amounting to an “unconditional surrender” on the part 
of the Anglican Church.  The Anglican Church, on the other hand, held similar 
convictions that the Roman Catholic Church betrayed its apostolic origins, ostracizing 
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churches in both the East and West.  Anglican sensibilities fostered the conviction the 
Roman Church was both heretical and schismatic in so far as it had “invented” doctrines; 
the most recent being the immaculate conception and papal infallibility.   
 The dawn of the twentieth century witnessed the beginnings of the ecumenical 
movement and its formal inauguration at the World Missionary Conference of 1910 in 
Edinburgh.  Rome and Canterbury’s diametrically opposed public and official responses 
to the growing ecumenical movement only further reinforced the perception that unity 
was not a possibility. However, the growing hope of a united Christendom was a reality 
not easily ignored by the Roman Catholic Church despite its official positions.  The 
Roman Catholic Church was publically dismissive and hostile to all ecumenical efforts 
aside from Church unity through return to Rome.  The Anglican Church, on the other 
hand, was a natural source of leadership for the fledgling ecumenical movement, both on 
account of its continuing development into a worldwide communion and its affinity for 
comprehensiveness.  While publically and officially dismissive, the leadership within the 
Roman Catholic Church, including the pope, was, at times, privately amenable to 
ecumenical activities.  Such is the case of Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Malines.   
Moved by the ecumenical character of the 1920 Lambeth Conference letter To All 
Christian People, Cardinal Mercier, at the behest of Lord Halifax and Abbé Portal, began 
a series of private conversations between Roman Catholics and Anglicans.432  The 
discussions that took place in Malines between 1921 and 1926 “[d]octrinally… achieved 
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little, except that the open exchange of views after so long was no doubt salutary.”433  
The Malines conversations, despite all obstacles, gained the “quiet” formal acceptance of 
both the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Rome.   
The first round of discussions took place from December 6 to December 8, 1921.  
The small group consisted of three informal representatives from each church.   R.J. 
Lahey comments: 
The first conversation was entirely unofficial.  The archbishop of Canterbury had 
committed himself only to the extent of offering Halifax the letter of introduction 
and the dean of Wells a word of advice.  Rome was even less implicated.  In 
sponsoring the meetings Mercier was supported solely by his own position and 
prestige within the church and by the knowledge that he Pope raised no objection 
since hearing of his general intentions a year earlier.434 
 
The first round of conversations accomplished very little by way of an agenda, but it 
solidified the participants’ convictions of the salutary nature of their endeavors. The 
group would not gather again until March of 1923.   
Between the first and second meeting neither the Archbishop of Canterbury nor 
the Bishop of Rome were particularly interested in transparency regarding the Malines 
conversations.  During the same period, Cardinal Mercier and Lord Halifax were 
consumed with Rome’s demand for secrecy in light of its public criticisms of the dangers 
of ecumenism.  They were likewise consumed with the Archbishop of Canterbury’s 
reluctance to give his official consent in the absence of official support from Rome, 
despite his public affirmation and leadership within the ecumenical movement.   
The second round of conversations took place in March of 1923.  By this time, 
both the Pope and the Archbishop of Canterbury formally acknowledged the Malines 
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conversations with the expectation that conversations remain secret.  With a formal 
acknowledgment from both sides of the Tiber, it was now possible to move the 
conversations forward in an official, though limited capacity.  Lahey comments, “[t]hey 
would have a mandate to discuss and to suggest – but not to negotiate, and in no way 
bind their respective communions.”435  The conversation of March 1923 focused on 
practical issues of union between Rome and Canterbury, such as the Roman hierarchy in 
England and Anglican worship.  The emergence of the Anglican Communion (a term that 
first appeared in 1851) as a worldwide communion also presented considerable 
challenges.  Thus, unity was no longer a matter of the restoring relations between the 
Church of England and the Church of Rome.  The Anglican instruments of communion, 
which at that time consisted of the Lambeth conference and the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, were altogether different from those of the Roman Church.  However, the 
fundamental issues that emerged during the course of the conversations revolved around 
the papacy.  For instance, what was the relationship between the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and the Bishop of Rome?  One suggestion was that the Archbishop of 
Canterbury receive the pallium from the pope, thereby signifying the jurisdiction of, as 
well as obedience to, the pope.  The Archbishop of Canterbury received this suggestion 
less than enthusiastically.436  In a correspondence to the Dean of Wells, an Anglican 
participant in the Malines conversations, Archbishop Davidson writes: 
It is I think possible that our Roman Catholic friends, unfamiliar perhaps with the 
strength of opinion on these subjects which is prevalent in large sections of the 
English Church and people, may suppose us to be ready for a more 
accommodating acceptance of Roman Catholic contentions and claims than I for 
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one, can regard as being either possible or in accordance with our belief as to 
what is true.437 
 
The conversations shed light on two glaring issues under the desire/effort of unification: 
1) the papacy, and 2) doctrinal differences that often enough converged with the papacy.  
These concerns directed the third round of conversations, which took place in November 
of 1923.  The November conversation focused almost exclusively on the papacy. 
 The last, and arguably most interesting, round of conversations took place in May 
of 1925.  During this meeting, Cardinal Mercier presented a memorandum titled The 
Church of England United Not Absorbed.438  The Roman Canonist, Lambert Beauduin, 
drew up the proposal for a possible path towards unification.  Beauduin developed his 
proposal in a fashion similar to that of the Eastern Catholic churches that came into 
communion with Rome.  Sonya Quitslund explains: 
Since the pallium had been given by Gregory the Great to Augustine, the first 
Archbishop of Canterbury, in 597, as a sign of his effective jurisdiction over all 
the bishops, present and future of England, Beauduin developed the idea that 
perhaps there was in this instance something similar to the power of the Eastern 
Patriarchs.  Pursuing this point, he arrived at the conclusion that the Anglican 
Church should be united to Rome but not absorbed by Rome, in much the same 
way as some Eastern Catholics had preserved a definite liturgical and disciplinary 
autonomy while yet being united to Rome.439 
 
Despite its hopeful tone, both the Anglican and Roman communities met Beauduin’s 
admittedly overly simplistic proposal with sharp criticism.  Neither the Anglicans nor 
Roman Catholics were realistically and practically open to the idea of unity between the 
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two communions.  The death of Cardinal Mercier on January 23, 1926 effectively ended 
the work of Malines conversations.  
 Despite no concrete steps being taken towards unification, the Malines 
conversations were far from a failure.  These conversations represent a moment in the 
relationship between the Anglican Communion and Roman Catholic Church during 
which the apparently “unthinkable” became a reality.  The issues that surfaced during the 
course of these conversations (Roman centralization, Anglican Orders, unity and 
diversity, etc.) provided the groundwork and paved the way for future dialogues between 
Rome and Canterbury.  As Edward Echlin observes the “seeds were planted at Malines 
which would germinate for forty years until, at Vatican II, the Church of Rome professed 
openness to unity in diversity.”440 
5. Vatican II and the Malta Report 
 Vatican II introduced a significant shift in the Roman Catholic Church’s 
disposition towards ecumenism.  It would be a mistake to interpret the pontificates of 
Pius XI and Pius XII leading up to the council as all together devoid of progress.  
However, the ecclesiological and theological mindsets characteristic of both pontificates 
left little room for ecumenical progress.  During the period between the final conversation 
at Malines in 1925 and Vatican II (1962-1965) the official theological positions of the 
Roman Catholic Church were deeply entrenched in the thought and attitudes of Neo-
Scholasticism.  The Roman Catholic Church maintained it alone could be identified with 
the church of Christ.  From this understanding the Roman Catholic Church was the 
perfect society.  As such the Roman Catholic Church lacked nothing and all others 
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societies, whether secular or religious, were wanting.   Pius XI and Pius XII held firm to 
such convictions and expressed these principles in several of their respective 
encyclicals.441   
In particular, Pius XI’s encyclical on religious unity, Mortalium Animos, forbade 
Roman Catholic participation in ecumenical activities.  Pius XI wrote:  
for the union of Christians can only be promoted by promoting the return to the 
one true Church of Christ of those who are separated from it, for in the past they 
have unhappily left it. To the one true Church of Christ, we say, which is visible 
to all, and which is to remain, according to the will of its Author, exactly the same 
as He instituted it.442 
 
Pius XII, however, acknowledging that the church of Christ is not simply a juridical 
reality, recognized the spiritual nature of the church as the mystical body of Christ.  In the 
encyclical Mystici Corporis Christi, Pius XII contends that membership in the church of 
Christ was secured through baptism, profession of the one faith, and communion with the 
Bishop of Rome.443   
5.1 – The Ecumenical Project of Vatican II  
 Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli was elected Pope on October 28, 1958 and took the 
name John XXIII.  Less than three months after his election, on January 25, 1959, John 
XXIII announced his intention to convene an ecumenical council.  The announcement, 
which elicited “stunned silence” from the Cardinals, underscores John XXIII’s 
ecumenical ambitions.  John XXIII writes of his hopes for the council: 
the enlightenment, edification, and joy of the entire Christian people and a 
renewed cordial invitation to the faithful of the separated Churches to participate 
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with us in this feast of grace and brotherhood, for which so many souls long in all 
parts of the world.444 
 
As John O’Malley observes, John XXIII’s announcement was remarkable for two 
reasons.  In the first instance, John XXIII’s tone was positive, not reactionary.  Secondly, 
“John’s stated aims quite directly extended a hand in friendship to other Christian 
churches.”445 
 The ecumenical project of Vatican II and its implications for its relationship to the 
Anglican Communion are most clearly explicated in the Dogmatic Constitution on the 
Church, Lumen Gentium, and the Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio, both of 
which Paul VI promulgated on November 21, 1964.  Lumen Gentium characterizes an 
attitudinal shift in the Roman Catholic Church’s relationship to the church of Christ.  
Unitatis Redintegratio, for its part, clarifies the shift in emphasis of Lumen Gentium and 
acknowledges degrees of communion, with a “special place” for the Anglican 
Communion.   
     Joseph Komonchak observes that beyond a definition of “what” the church is, 
Lumen Gentium addresses the question, “where is the church?”446  According to 
Komonchak, Lumen Gentium addresses this question three ways.  Firstly, the council 
fathers move away from a language of membership towards a language that centers on 
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communion.  According to Lumen Gentium, full incorporation into the society church 
consists of: 
those who, possessing the Spirit of Christ, accept its entire structure and all the 
means of salvation established within it and who in its visible structure are united 
with Christ, who rules it through the Supreme Pontiff and the bishops, by the 
bonds of profession of faith, the sacraments, ecclesiastical government, and 
communion.  A person who does persevere in charity, however, is not saved even 
though incorporated into the Church.447 
Full incorporation, according to the council fathers, is only a reality for Catholics.  
However, the council also acknowledges that a lack of fullness does not entail utter 
absence.  The council maintains that other churches enjoy a real, but imperfect 
communion.  Despite the present context of separation, churches are still bound to one 
another in various ways. 
 Secondly, Komonchak maintains that the council fathers are uncomfortable with 
an exclusive identification of the church of Christ with the Roman Catholic Church.  The 
use of the term “subsists” is indicative of this discomfort.  According to the council: 
This is the unique church of Christ which in the Creed we profess to be one, holy, 
catholic and apostolic which our Saviour, after his resurrection, entrusted to 
Peter’s pastoral care (Jn 21: 17), commissioning him and the other apostles to 
extend and rule it (see Mt 28: 18, etc.), and which he raised up for all ages as the 
pillar and mainstay of the truth (see 1 Tim 3: 15). This church, constituted and 
organized as a society in the present world, subsists in the Catholic Church, which 
is governed by the successor of Peter and by the bishops in communion with him.  
Nevertheless, many elements of sanctification and of truth are found outside its 
visible confines. Since these are gifts belonging to the church of Christ, they are 
forces impelling towards catholic unity. 448    
 
The council recognizes that the church of Christ extends beyond the visible boundaries of 
the Roman Catholic Church.  In short, the church is found wherever the truth of salvation 
is a manifest.  The council fathers understand that the Roman Catholic Church expresses 
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the fullness of salvation; however, institutionally it is not the only expression of 
salvation.   
 Finally, Komonchak acknowledges that the council affirms the presence of the 
church of Christ in the worshipping community gathered around the Eucharistic table.449  
The Eucharistic assembly is the expression of the one church in its particular locality.  
Thus, the council acknowledges that the universal or catholic church is manifested locally 
through word and sacrament.  In short, the catholicity of the church is embodied and 
expressed in local communities.  As such, local communities are not simply 
administrative subsections of the church.  They really are church. 
 Unitatis Redintegratio clarifies the shift in ecclesiological and ecumenical 
emphases of Lumen Gentium.   Despite all that separates Christians from one another, the 
Decree on Ecumenism states in clear and certain terms that: 
… It remains true that all who have been justified by faith in Baptism are 
incorporated into Christ; they therefore have the right to be called Christians, and 
with good reason are accepted as brothers and sisters in the Lord by the children 
of Catholic Church. 450 
 
Hence, all Christians share in the communion that is salvation.  The council maintains 
that “some, even very many, of the most significant elements and endowments which 
together go to build up and give life to the church itself, can exist outside the visible 
boundaries of the Catholic Church.”451  While the council upholds that churches 
separated from Rome suffer from a variety of imperfections, it nevertheless 
acknowledges “the Spirit of Christ has not refrained from using them [separated 
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churches] as a means of salvation which derive their efficacy from the very fullness of 
grace and truth entrusted to the Catholic Church.”452 
 It would be an inaccurate to interpret the remarkable ecumenical and 
ecclesiological shifts that occurred at Vatican II as a macro-rupture with the Roman 
Catholic understanding of its own identity.  Instead, with Vatican II the Roman Catholic 
Church remarkably began to understand its identity in relation to other churches.  This 
“in relation to” is not a tension that the council itself resolves, nor did it intend to do so.  
While the council acknowledges that the communion of the church is a communion 
characteristic of unity-in-difference, it does not go so far as to establish the limits of unity 
and difference.  Pope Paul VI explains, “[t]he council aims at complete and universal 
ecumenicity.  That is at least what it desires, what it prays and prepares for.  Today it 
does so in hope that tomorrow it may see the reality.”453  
 The relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic 
Church appears only once in the sixteen documents produced by the council.  The 
reference itself is vague and deserves consideration.  After acknowledging the “Great 
Schism” and the division between Eastern and Western churches, the Decree on 
Ecumenism states: 
                                                 
452 Ibid.  The distinction between churches and ecclesial communities found in the 
documents of Vatican II are not as precise as those subsequently found in Dominus 
Iesus.  Dominus Iesus affirms that a a church is constituted by apostolic succession via the valid 
ordination of a bishop and subsequently by the valid celebration of the Eucharist by a validly 
ordained priest or bishop. A. Amato et al., Declaration Dominus Iesus: Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith (Washington D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2012), ¶ 
17.  However, the council fathers were less concerned with identifying the criteria for the 
distinction between churches and ecclesial communities as more concerned with acknowledging 
the reality that not all Christian communities identify with the label “church.”  See: George H. 
Tavard, Vatican II and the Ecumenical Way (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007), 
46-47. 
453 Paul VI, "The Task," in Council speeches of Vatican II, eds. Hans Küng; Yves 
Congar; Daniel O'Hanlon (Rome: Paulist Press), 145. 
 192 
Still other divisions arose in the West more than four centuries later. These 
stemmed from the events which are commonly referred to as the Reformation. As 
a result, many communions, national or confessional, were separated from the 
Roman See. Among those in which catholic traditions and institutions in part 
continue to exist, the Anglican Communion occupies a special place. 454 
 
The council does not clarify this “special place” that the Anglican Communion occupies.  
George Tavard maintains that a longer description would have caused surprise to other 
Churches such as the Old Catholics and Lutherans.455  Despite its ambiguity, the context 
of the statement is telling.  The divisions that exist between the Anglican Communion 
and the Roman Catholic Church are unique.  In other words, properly understood the 
English reformation and the subsequent development of the Anglican Communion do not 
fit neatly into categories of Orthodox or Protestant.  Whatever may have been the exact 
reason for according the Anglican Communion a “special place” within the divided 
churches of the West, the “special place” was clarified after the council by the ensuing 
dialogues between Rome and Canterbury. 
5.2 – The Malta Report  
 On December 8, 1965, the Second Vatican Council formally concluded.  Shortly 
thereafter, in March 1966, Paul VI received the Archbishop of Canterbury, Michael 
Ramsey, in Rome.  The result of the meeting was the first in a series of Common 
Declarations between the Bishop of Rome and the Archbishop of Canterbury.  The 
Common Declaration of March 1966 officially set in motion dialogue between the two 
communions: 
They [Paul VI and Archbishop Ramsey] affirm their desire that all those 
Christians who belong to these two communions may be animated by these same 
sentiments of respect, esteem and fraternal love, and in order to help these 
develop to the full, they intend to inaugurate between the Roman Catholic Church 
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and the Anglican Communion a serious dialogue which, founded upon the 
Gospels and on the ancient common traditions, may lead to that unity in truth, for 
which Christ prayed.456 
 
In response to the common declaration of March 1966, a joint preparatory commission 
was established in order to research and recommend areas of convergence and divergence 
between Rome and Canterbury.   
 The results of the joint preparatory commission were presented to both Paul VI 
and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Michael Ramsey, in January of 1968.  The “Malta 
Report”, as it is commonly called, was far reaching in its ambitions and practical in its 
approach.  The joint commission proposed that the communions would benefit from 
pursuing unity in stages.  The Malta Report identifies three successive stages along the 
path to “full, organic unity.”457 
The joint commission contended, “[d]ivergences… have arisen not so much from 
the substance of this inheritance [liturgy, theology, spirituality, Church order, and 
mission] as from our separate ways of receiving it.”458  Thus, from the perspective of the 
commission, the initial stage of unity between the Anglican Communion and Roman 
Catholic Church would be one of interpretation.  The commission acknowledged that the 
necessity of a new language that was not bound to the controversies of the past in order to 
“distinguish between those differences which are merely apparent, and those which are 
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real and require serious examination.”459  The experience and documents of Vatican II 
provided room for Roman Catholics to interpret with the Anglican Communion.  The 
commission saw in the documents of Vatican II the hermeneutic resources to foster, 
recognize, and develop convergence: 
first, between the traditional Anglican distinction of internal and external 
communion and the distinction drawn by the Vatican Council between full and 
partial communion; secondly, between the Anglican distinction of fundamentals 
from non-fundamentals and the distinction implied by the Vatican Council’s 
references to a ‘hierarchy of truths’ (Decree on Ecumenism 11), to the difference 
between ‘revealed truths’ and ‘the manner in which they are formulated’ Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World 62), and to diversities in 
theological tradition being often ‘complementary rather than conflicting (Decree 
on Ecumenism 17).460 
 
 The second stage proposed by the joint commission would require “an official and 
explicit affirmation of mutual recognition from the highest authorities of each 
communion.”461  This stage of unity, as the commission envisioned it, is characteristic of 
a unity-in-difference whereby mutual recognition does not entail absorption.  Unity at 
this stage is characterized by mutual recognition expressed in and through a shared faith, 
regular consultation between church authorities, and collaboration in diakoina, matryria, 
and leitourgia when it is appropriate.   
 The final stage of unity, according to the joint commission, would be 
characteristic of unity that is both full and visible.  However, unlike the first two stages, 
the commission acknowledged, “we cannot envisage in detail what may be the issues and 
demands of the final stage in our quest for the full, organic unity of our two 
communions.”462 
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6. – The Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission  
 
The Malta Report put forth the recommendation to establish a permanent joint 
commission.  The Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity of the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations and the Anglican 
Executive Officer of the Church of England were charged with the oversight of the 
ecumenical relations between the Roman Catholics and Anglicans.463  The direct result of 
this recommendation was the formation of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International 
Commission (ARCIC). 
The dialogues of ARCIC are theologically and historically complex.  The impetus 
for the ARCIC endeavor was born out of the convergence between the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Anglican Communion plainly evident in the wake of Vatican II.  ARCIC 
I (1970-1981) and ARCIC II (1983-2006), however, were conducted during a time of 
rapid development and change both within the communions themselves and within the 
world at large.  The process of interpreting and appropriating these shifting paradigms 
revealed significant divergences between the Anglican Communion and the Roman 
Catholic Church.  Such divergences have hindered the process of formally and practically 
receiving the statements of the ARCIC dialogues.  George Tavard explains: 
…despite the closely related threefold structure of ministry found in these two 
traditions, notable differences of organization are not without effect on the way in 
which the sensus fidelium is shaped and the ultimate decisions are reached.  The 
Anglican communion is in fact an association of sister churches united by a 
common liturgy and a common ethos, but each one with its independent decision-
making system.  Furthermore, these decision-making systems have largely been 
shaped by parliamentarian model of government… Compared to this, the still 
largely centralized Catholic Church finds it difficult to endorse new doctrinal 
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texts, except when such a decision is so obvious that it can be made from the top 
without any danger of being rejected at large.464  
 
Two events are particularly significant for understanding the ARCIC dialogues and their 
subsequent reception.  Firstly, one must consider the process of interpreting and 
appropriating the Second Vatican Council within the Roman Catholic Church.  Secondly, 
the Anglican Communion’s struggle to maintain unity amidst growing differences, 
especially with the ordination of women to the presbyterate and the ordination of women 
bishops, shaped the trajectory and reception of the ARCIC dialogues.   
In both communions, the reception of the ARCIC dialogues requires a larger 
process of reception dependent on the exercise of authority.  The intention of this section 
is to elucidate the historical and theological trajectory of the ARCIC dialogues and their 
subsequent reception.465  Hence, what follows is more or less confined to a descriptive 
analysis, leaving a more thorough theological exploration of the dialogues to chapter 5. 
6.1 – ARCIC I 
 Between 1970 and 1981, ARCIC I developed four statements: Eucharistic 
Doctrine (1971), Ministry and Ordination (1973), Authority in the Church I (1976), and 
Authority in the Church II (1981).  The commission produced a “Final Report” in 1981 
that consists of the above statements, elucidations on Eucharistic Doctrine, Ministry and 
Ordination, and Authority in the Church I as well as a preface and an introduction.  The 
statements of ARCIC I are characteristic of a progressive unfolding movement that is 
grounded in the Eucharist.  George Tavard explains that ARCIC proceeds “from 
Eucharist, to ministry and ordination, and then to the authority in the church, leaving 
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other, perhaps more practical questions of pastoral cooperation and sacramental sharing 
to a later time…”.466  Tavard provides two important principles for interpreting the 
statements of ARCIC I.  Firstly, the statements of ARCIC I are grounded in and reflect a 
shared understanding of the Eucharist.  Secondly, the statements of ARCIC I represent an 
unfolding progressive whole and ought to be interpreted as such.  The statements of 
ARCIC I, however, are interpreted in light of practical issues, such as the ordination of 
women.  Such an interpretation misplaces the ARCIC dialogues and statements within a 
context that they simply are not intended to address. 
 Minna Hietamäki articulates two hermeneutical foci for the ARCIC I statements.  
Hietamäki observes that within the unfolding development of ARCIC I, the themes 1) 
koinonia and 2) obedience and faithfulness to the lordship of Christ permeate the 
documents.467  The Introduction to the Final Report describes Christian koinonia as 
“[u]nion with God in Christ Jesus through the Holy Spirit” and that the koinonia between 
Christians “is entailed by our koinonia with God in Christ.”468  The Final Report attests 
to the centrality of the concept of koinonia as a hermeneutical focus.  The Final Report 
states, “[t]he theme of koinonia runs through our Statements.  In them we present the 
eucharist as the effectual sign of koinonia, episcope as serving koinonia, and primacy as a 
visible link and focus of koinonia.469   
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 In regards to obedience and faithfulness to the lordship of Christ, Authority in the 
Church I states: “[t]he Church is a community which consciously seeks to submit to Jesus 
Christ.”470  The statements of ARCIC I understand faithfulness and obedience to Christ 
within a complex network of closely-knit and interdependent relationships bound 
together through the activities of service, worship, and witness.  The Statement Ministry 
and Ordination explains: 
The Christian community exists to give glory to God through the fulfillment of 
the Father’s purpose.  All Christians are called to serve this purpose by their life 
of prayer and surrender to divine grace, and by their careful attention to the needs 
of all human beings.  They should witness to God’s compassion for all mankind 
and his concern for justice in the affairs of men.  They should offer themselves to 
God in praise and worship, and devote their energies to bringing men into the 
fellowship of Christ’s people; and so under his rule of love.471 
 
The entire church, whether ordained or lay, is called to obedience and faithfulness in 
particular and interdependent ways.  Accordingly, the ARCIC I statements envision a 
connection between the expression of the concepts of koinoinia and obedience both 
internally and externally through the activities of martyria, leitourgia, and diakonia.  
Authority in the church originates in obedience to the salvific will of God, which is 
expressed through God’s Word, Jesus Christ.  The entire church, in its life and mission, is 
called together to bring this visible expression.  Internally, there is a diversity of callings 
and gifts within the church whereby all members of the church, whether ordained or not, 
are accountable to one another.472  As the next section demonstrates, it is precisely the 
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issue of authority that is at the center of the reception of the achievements of the ARCIC 
I.  
6.1.1 – ARCIC I and Reception: Authority Issues  
 Rapid change and internal discernment mark the twelve years between the 
formation of the first ARCIC commission and its Final Report for both the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.  In particular, the emerging practice of 
ordaining women within some churches of the Anglican Communion and the post-
conciliar implementation and appropriation of Vatican II for Roman Catholics are 
significant developments during this period of history.  Both Vatican II and the ordination 
of women are “moments” that confront the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican 
Communion respectively with practical concerns.  As such, addressing these concerns 
necessitates recourse to authoritative structures.  With respect to the development of the 
ordination of women in the Anglican Communion, authority was consolidated at the local 
level in order to resolve disagreements and to protect communion from fracture.473  The 
Anglican Communion viewed decentralization as a way to both respect diversity and 
preserve unity between its member churches.  In the wake of Vatican II, however, the 
Roman Catholic Church experienced a gradual centralization.  As divergent 
interpretations and theologies proliferated after the council, Roman centralization was 
seen as a way of reigning in suspected abuses and misinterpretations of the council.474  In 
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short, the pope and the magisterium of the Catholic Church gradually affirmed and 
positioned itself as the authentic interpreter(s) of the council.  Both communions, 
confronted with maintaining unity amidst the reality of difference, found recourse for the 
exercise of authority within their respective traditions.  The traditional value of 
comprehensiveness and decentralization was relied on by the Anglican Communion, 
while the Roman Catholic Church reaffirmed its conviction that “all roads lead to Rome.”   
The authoritative structures that are affirmed and strengthened in the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion during the period of ARCIC I envision 
and implement the process of reception (or non-reception) in drastically different 
fashions in so far as reception is understood as fidelity to the what has already been 
received.475  Ormond Rush explains:  
Reception includes judgments as to the value and importance of some elements 
over others; it involves selection, that is, decisions to explicitly retrieve and 
foreground a particular dimension of the tradition and to allow another dimension 
to recede into the background.  In this way, reception involves determinations of 
continuity and discontinuity.476  
 
In turn, recourse to centralization for Roman Catholics on the one hand and the Anglican 
recourse to decentralization on the other had a significant impact on the reception of 
ARCIC I.  Matthieu Wagemaker explains: 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Council my be rightly grasped”; 2) “The four major constitutions of the Council are the 
hermeneutical key for the other decrees and declarations”; 3) “the pastoral import of the 
documents may not be separated from, or set in opposition to, their doctrinal content”; 4) “No 
opposition may be made between the spirit and the letter of Vatican II”; 5) “The council must be 
interpreted in continuity with the great tradition of the Church, including earlier councils”; 6) 
“Vatican II must be accepted as illuminating the problems of our own day.” Avery Robert 
Cardinal Dulles, "The Reception of Vatican II at the Extraordinary Synod of 1985," in Reception 
of Vatican II (Washington, DC: Catholic Univ of America Pr, 1987), 350. 
475 This is an important aspect of the present-day ecumenical relationship and is dealt 
with in greater detail in chapter five.  However, it is significant to note at this earlier stage in the 
discussion that the authoritative structures of the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican 
Communion are both ill-equipped to receive the work of ecumenical dialogues.     
476 Rush, Still Interpreting Vatican II: Some Hermeneutical Principles, 3. 
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The ARCIC I Final Report is remarkable, because it achieved a substantial 
agreement on issues that constituted the main obstacles for a reunion of the 
Anglican Churches with the Catholic Church.  ARCIC made the prospect of 
reunion something that seemed to be within the realm of the possible.  What it did 
not do was to take into account the difference between theory and practice.  The 
Catholic Church possesses the authority structure to implement what is agreed.  
Perhaps not every Catholic would agree with whatever decision is made, but the 
commitment once given would be a real one.  The Anglican Communion is 
deprived of that structure.  Member Churches must make their decisions on their 
own.477  
 
 The official response of the Anglican Communion was issued by the Lambeth 
Conference in 1988.  The Anglican reception was generally positive; however, it was 
overshadowed by the issues of the women’s ordination and concerns regarding women 
and the episcopate.  There was clear agreement among the leadership of the member 
churches that the statements Eucharistic Doctrine, and Ministry and Ordination were 
both “consonant in substance with the faith of Anglicans.”478  Authority in the Church I 
and Authority in the Church II was understood and welcomed as a “firm basis for the 
direction and agenda of the continuing  dialogue.”479  The statements, however, raised 
concerns about issues such as primacy, infallibility, and collegiality. 
 The official response given by the Roman Catholic Church was delivered by the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) in 1991.   Juxtaposed with the Anglican 
response, the official Catholic response is much less welcoming and much more critical 
of the Final Report.  The 1991 response differs little in terms of its criticism from the 
initial observations on the Final Report published by the CDF in 1982.  In addition, the 
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1991 response neglects to account for the responses to the Final Report by the national 
conferences of Bishops.  Francis Sullivan maintains that the critical response issued by 
the CDF was, to some extent, unwarranted and misleading.480  ARCIC I argued that 
“substantial agreement” existed on matters of ordination, ministry, and Eucharist.  
ARCIC I understood “substantial agreement” to mean: 
that the document represents not only the judgment of all its members but their 
unanimous agreement ‘on essential matters where it considers that doctrine admits 
no divergence' it is a substantial agreement. Members of the Commission are 
united in their conviction ‘that if there are any remaining points of disagreement 
they can be resolved on the principles here established'.481 
 
Regarding issues of authority in the church, the commission only claimed “consensus” 
and at points only “convergence.”482  The critical response issued by the CDF, however, 
“criticizes ARCIC I for not achieving results which the Commission itself did not claim 
to have achieved.”483  For instance, the CDF critiques ARCIC I for not having achieved 
complete agreement with Catholic doctrine.  However, ARCIC I did not claim complete 
agreement in any of its statements.  Sullivan maintains that according to the logic 
presented by the CDF’s response to the Final Report: 
…to say that an agreed ecumenical statement is consonant with the faith of the 
Catholic Church, means that it must be identical with that faith.  Further 
examination of the Response shows that an agreed statement will not be seen as 
identical with the Catholic faith, unless it corresponds fully with Catholic 
doctrine, and indeed with the official Catholic formulation of that doctrine.  It 
must furthermore be expressed in such a way as to exclude all ambiguity; and the 
Vatican documents seems to know no way to exclude such ambiguity except to 
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use the precise formulas by which the Catholic Church is accustomed to express 
its faith.484 
 
Sullivan’s assessment poignantly illustrates how the practice of centralization influenced 
the official mechanisms of reception within the Roman Catholic Church in two important 
ways.  Firstly, the official response to Final Report evidences little collegial consultation 
with the bishops of the Roman Catholic Church.  Hence, it is difficult to acknowledge 
that official response of the Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith (CDF) is a response 
shared by the Roman Catholic Church.  Secondly, the response is characteristic of an 
epistemological centralization.  The criticisms and concerns of the CDF demonstrate an 
attitude of agreement in terms of conformity. 
6.2 – ARCIC II 
 The second phase of ARCIC was formally announced on May 29, 1982 in a 
common declaration between Robert Runcie, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and John 
Paul II, the bishop of Rome.  Together they outlined the task of ARCIC II: 
We are agreed that it is now time to set up a new international Commission. Its 
task will be to continue the work already begun: to examine, especially in the 
light of our respective judgments on the Final Report, the outstanding doctrinal 
differences which still separate us, with a view towards their eventual resolution; 
to study all that hinders the mutual recognition of the ministries of our 
Communions; and to recommend what practical steps will be necessary when, on 
the basis of our unity in faith, we are able to proceed to the restoration of full 
communion.485  
 
As the above demonstrates, the task given to ARCIC II was two-fold.  Firstly, the 
commission was charged with the task of building upon the work of ARCIC I and the 
official responses from both the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.  
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Hietamäki acknowledges that “[d]ue to the very different readings of the ARCIC Final 
Report, the second commission not only had to express the common faith in a common 
language, but also had to deal with the question of interpreting the already existing 
agreement.”486  Secondly, ARCIC II was charged to provide “practical steps” towards 
restoring communion.  As with ARCIC I, kononia is a principle that joins together the 
statements of ARCIC II.  
ARCIC II produced a total of five agreed statements: 1) Salvation and the Church 
(1986), 2) Church as Communion (1990), 3) Life in Christ, Morals Communion and the 
Church (1993), 4) The Gift of Authority: Authority in the Church III (1998), and 5) Mary: 
Grace and Hope in Christ (2004).  ARCIC II also issued clarifications on the agreed 
statements of ARICIC I on Eucharist and ministry in 1993. 
 According to Paul Murray, the documents of ARCIC I and ARCIC II share four 
interrelated strategies.  Firstly, both the ARCIC dialogues seek to overcome 
misunderstandings and caricatures by attending to the nuances and articulations of both 
traditions in order to identify underlying commonalities in belief and practice despite 
differences in how these commonalities are expressed.  Secondly, there is a readiness to 
acknowledge that, practically speaking, both traditions fall short in bringing Christian 
belief and practice to expression.  Thirdly, both dialogues demonstrate a willingness to 
examine the beliefs and practices of one’s own church as well as the beliefs and practices 
of the other in light of new concepts and understandings.  Lastly, there is a commitment 
to acknowledge that in some cases the differences that have developed between the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church are “different yet complimentary 
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emphases and languages rather than irreconcilably contradictory and opposed 
positions.”487  The basic methods of both ARCIC I and ARCIC II are rooted in the formal 
strategies of identification in terms of distinction and synthesis.  However, the final 
documents of ARCIC II, The Gift of Authority (1998) and Mary: Grace and Hope in 
Christ (2005), gesture towards the limits of identification and acknowledges that the 
differences between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion are not 
simply manifest at the level of expression.  In short, the later documents of ARCIC II 
recognize that coming to terms with the differences between both communions is not 
simply a matter of addressing the different sociocultural and intellectual milieus; it is also 
a matter of acknowledging that there are real differences in terms of belief of practice. 
 Both documents, Gift of Authority (1998) and Mary Grace and Hope in Christ 
(2005), gesture towards an approach to dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Anglican Communion whereby the real differences in belief and practice open up 
a space for ecumenical learning and receptivity.488  Put simply, the later documents of 
ARCIC II, while primarily focused on methods of identification, also signal towards the 
necessity of recognizing one’s-self with respect to the other.  The reception of the 
documents by the authoritative structures of the Anglican Communion and the Roman 
Catholic Church have generally been positive; however, practically speaking, the agreed 
statements have had little resonance with the faithful of both communions.   
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 The limited reception of the ARCIC dialogues and the ARCIC documents within 
the life of both communions ought not imply nor suggest that they have not born fruit in 
other significant ways.  For instance, the dialogic process that produced Salvation and the 
Church (1987) ultimately paved the way for the 1999 Joint Declaration on the Doctrine 
of Justification between the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation.  
Paul Murray writes: 
Through the combination of clearing up misunderstandings and recognizing that 
not everything always requires to be expressed in the exact same way, respective 
Protestant and Catholic theologies of justification and salvation have come to 
appear not as contradictory theological frameworks but as two legitimate and 
complimentary languages or grammars, each saying what the other believes need 
to be said , albeit with respectively different emphases.489   
 
Simply put, the lessons learned through ecumenical relationship between the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church have provided both the theological and 
dialogic resources for other ecumenical relationships.  
7. – Anglicanorum Coetibus and the Anglican Covenant 
 Pope Benedict XVI issued the apostolic constitution Anglicanorum Coetibus in 
November of 2009.  The constitution established a canonical structure and norms for 
Anglicans to come into full communion with Rome either corporately or individually.  
The reception of Benedict’s constitution has been mixed.  On the one hand, Roman 
Catholic Church officials maintain that Anglicanorum Coetibus is a positive response that 
is born out of the ecumenical impulse of Vatican II and more than 40 years of ecumenical 
progress between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion.  According 
to Cardinal William Levada, the head of the CDF and a chief architect of the constitution, 
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Anglicanorum Coetibus “is itself in continuity with the longstanding engagement with 
Anglicans exemplified by the ARCIC process.”490  On the other hand, many critique the 
constitution as a contemporary attempt at uniatism.  Hans Küng writes: 
This Roman action is a dramatic change of course: steering away from the well-
proven ecumenical strategy of eye-level dialogue and honest understanding; 
steering towards an un-ecumenical luring away of Anglican priests, even 
dispensing with medieval celibacy law to enable them to come back to Rome 
under the lordship of the pope.491 
 
 A careful analysis of the document itself and its historical context reveals both the 
uncertainty characteristic of the present-day relationship between the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the deep admiration and 
commonality that exists between both communions. 
 Firstly, Anglicanorum Coetibus is not an unprecedented action for either Anglican 
communities or the Roman Catholic Church.  In 1980, John Paul II established the 
Pastoral Provision for clergy and laity of the Episcopal Church of the United States who 
sought to enter into communion with Rome.  The Pastoral Provision established a basic 
structure for establishing communion with Rome while at the same time maintaining 
much of the discipline, spirituality, and liturgical practice of the Anglican patrimony.  It 
is also not unprecedented for individual communities within the Anglican Communion to 
seek out and align with doctrinally like-minded churches despite geographic separation.  
While this practice has generally taken place between member churches of the Anglican 
Communion, it is not unreasonable, especially in light of the doctrinal convergence 
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discovered through the ARCIC dialogues, for some communities to seek to establish 
communion with the Roman Catholic Church.492  
 What is most striking about the constitution, however, is the two different logics 
at play simultaneously.  Two basic presuppositions from Anglicanorum Coetibus are 
characteristic of the contemporary ecumenical relationship between the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.  Firstly, the constitution affirms the 
validity of the Anglican tradition as a real and effective sign and instrument of God’s 
grace.  Anglicanorum Coetibus reads: 
Without excluding liturgical celebrations according to the Roman rite, the 
ordinariate has the faculty to celebrate the holy Eucharist and the other 
sacraments, the Liturgy of the Hours and other liturgical celebrations according to 
the liturgical books proper to the Anglican tradition, which have been approved 
by the Holy See, so as to maintain the liturgical, spiritual and pastoral traditions of 
the Anglican Communion within the Catholic Church as a precious gift 
nourishing the faith of the members of the ordinariate and as a treasure to be 
shared.493 
        
However, Leo XIII’s declaration that Anglican Orders are absolutely null and utterly void 
still holds as former ministers of the Anglican Communion must be absolutely 
ordained.494  Put simply, Anglicanorum Coetibus affirms the phenomenological validity 
of the Anglican Communion but denies its ontological validity.  Cardinal Levada affirms 
this when he writes: 
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Union with the Catholic Church is the goal of ecumenism, yet the very process of 
moving toward union works a change in churches and ecclesial communities that 
engage one another in dialogue, and actual instances of entering into communion 
do indeed transform the Catholic Church by way of enrichment. Let me add right 
away that when I say enrichment, I am referring not to any addition of essential 
elements of sanctification and truth to the Catholic Church — Christ has endowed 
her with all the essential elements. I am referring to the addition of modes of 
expression of these essential elements, modes which enhance everyone’s 
appreciation of the inexhaustible treasures bestowed on the church by her divine 
founder.495 
 
Put another way, Anglicanorum Coetibus suggests that ontological unity requires 
absorption, but phenomenological unity allows for some degree of diverse expression 
with a clear preference for ontological unity.  The consequences of such a logic are 
developed at length in the final chapter, however, it is worth mention that such a logic 
raises questions about the relationship between Christology and Pneumatology, as well as 
the sacramental relationship between content and expression. 
 Contemporaneous to Anglicanorum Coetibus is the development—within the 
Anglican communion—of the Anglican Covenant.  The covenant conceived as a response 
to growing rifts and unrest within the Anglican Communion.  The covenant would, in 
theory, provide a foundation for assessing and navigating the basic principles of 
autonomy and interdependence within the Anglican Communion.  The principle of 
interdependence has led to the establishment of the Anglican instruments of communion, 
while the principle of autonomy has helped to establish clear limits and boundaries on the 
power and authority of the Lambeth conference, the Anglican Consultative Council, the 
Primates’ meeting, and the Archbishop of Canterbury.496  The ultimate goal of the 
covenant, according to Andrew Goddard, was to develop a common way of “articulating 
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Anglican identity and recognizing the need to define certain limits to Anglican 
diversity.”497  The Anglican Covenant, however, has failed to gain acceptance among the 
member churches of the Anglican Communion.  The apparent failure of the acceptance of 
the Anglican Covenant stems from concerns regarding provincial autonomy.  
 The failure of the Anglican Covenant to find common acceptance within the 
member churches of the Anglican Communion demonstrates an approach to authority 
and communion that, at the risk of overgeneralizing, is opposite to that of the Roman 
Catholic Church.  Juxtaposed with one another, Anglicanorum Coetibus and the lack of 
consensus regarding the Anglican Covenant reveal two distinct mindsets.  The Anglican 
affinity for diversity makes it leery and suspicious of unity, while the Roman Catholic 
affinity for unity promotes misgivings regarding diversity and difference.  The Anglican 
fascination for diversity fuels a mindset that tends towards phenomenological analysis.  
The Roman Catholic fixation on unity fosters a mindset that tends towards ontological 
and metaphysical analysis. 
8. – Conclusion  
 The history of the relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman 
Catholic Church is obviously complex.  The present-day tension between Rome and 
Canterbury is about more than what many people might assume is merely the result of 
divergent practices and beliefs such as the ordination of woman and gay marriage.  The 
ebb and flow of this relationship, especially since Vatican II, however, reveals two issues.    
Firstly, conflicting interpretations of juridical authority divide the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Anglican Communion.  Hence, the Roman affinity for centralization and 
Anglican desire for decentralization pose significant issues for the process of reception.   
                                                 
497 Ibid., 46. 
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 Secondly, the Roman Catholic and Anglican mindsets are unique.  Anglican 
sensibilities tend towards phenomenology and difference, while Roman Catholic 
sensibilities tend towards ontology and unity.  Identifying the issues behind the issues 
does not minimize the importance nor the complexity of contemporary disagreement and 
divergence between Rome and Canterbury; instead, it is meant to place such 
disagreements and divergence within a more fundamental context.   
As the next chapter elucidates, the ecumenical relationship between the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church is in need of resources that take advantage 
of their respective ontological and phenomenological tendencies in a manner that is 
mutually enriching.  There is no doubt that “full visible communion” is a long way off; 
however, this need not impede the process of mutual recognition.  In short, Anglicans and 
Roman Catholics must first learn to recognize one another as “gift,” and Karl Rahner’s 
theology of symbol provides the means for achieving this goal. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RETHINKING ANGLICAN-ROMAN CATHOLIC ECUMENICAL DIALOGUE:  
SYMBOL, DIALOGUE, AND A SECOND NAÏVETÉ  
1. – Introduction  
 The preceding chapter illustrates some of the basic tensions confronting the 
ecumenical relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican 
Communion and evidences a hermeneutical disconnect between both communions.  
While the dialogues that have taken place between the Anglican Communion and the 
Roman Catholic Church have produced remarkable progress in terms of theological 
understanding, there is little evidence of this progress in the reception of the dialogues in 
either communion.  In other words, the incredible work of the ARCIC dialogues towards 
mutual recognition through greater theological understanding and explanation elicits little 
in terms of a shared Christian life and identity between the Anglican Communion and the 
Roman Catholic Church.  If koinonia between the Roman Catholic Church and the 
Anglican Communion is to become a reality, it is evident that the hermeneutical 
disconnect between them must be bridged in a way that allows for the possibility of 
mutual recognition.  This chapter maintains that developing a second naïveté, which is 
characteristic of a logic that is governed by symbol, is a necessary moment along the path 
towards mutual recognition and the ultimate goal of visible unity between the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.   
Particular churches realize their Christian identity within the particularity of their 
ecclesiological experiences and commitments.  Hence, particular churches and 
communions arrive at an ecumenically shared Christian identity in and through their own 
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ecclesial particularity.  As John Zizioulas attests, “[e]cumenism is not conceivable as an 
effort to unite Christians simply as believers in Christ but as members of a Church.  
Ecumenism is about the unity of the Church, not about Christian unity as such.”498  It 
follows that the process of ecumenical recognition and the goal of Christian unity must 
account for the ecclesial dimensions of Christian life; recognition of other churches and 
unity among Christians are realized through the particularity of churches not in spite of 
them.  An ecumenical Christian identity is an identity that respects unity-in-difference 
from the vantage point of one’s own ecclesial understanding.  The future of the 
ecumenical movement and in particular the ecumenical relationship between the 
Anglican Communion not only depends on a personal conversion that allows for the 
possibility of mutual recognition, but also necessitates an ecclesial conversion.  However, 
the unity sought by the ecumenical movement cannot be directed towards the 
development of a rigid conformity between churches. 
The challenges confronting the ecumenical dialogue between the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church are essentially two-fold.  Firstly, there is a 
need for a conversion in terms of the cognitive disposition of individuals and 
communities and the dialogic methods employed in the ecumenical conversations 
between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion.  The focus of 
dialogue must shift from seeking recognition via methods of identification towards 
methods that promote ecumenical learning and reception.  Secondly, the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church must take seriously the dispositional 
challenges involved in articulating and expressing one’s own narrative identity and the 
                                                 
498 John  Zizioulas, "Unitatis Redintegratio: An Orthodox Reflection," in Searching for 
Christian Unity, ed. Wlater Kasper (New York: New City Press, 2007), 41. 
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implications this involves for both ecumenical learning and the reception of the narrative 
identity of other churches.  Recent developments in the areas of “ecumenical learning” 
and “receptive ecumenism” offer valuable resources for addressing the dispositional 
challenges confronting ecumenical dialogue between the Anglican Communion and the 
Roman Catholic Church.  The relatively new methods of “ecumenical learning” and 
“receptive ecumenism” surfacing in ecumenical literature rightly acknowledge the need 
for dispositional conversion, but do not adequately speak to the cognitive and narrative 
dispositions that undergird and support how individuals and ecclesial groups interpret and 
appropriate Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church.  Put another way, the 
above methods acknowledge the need for conversion and describe how such a conversion 
can benefit the ecumenical movement, but neither of the methods suggest how the deeply 
rooted and divergent interpretive and appropriative vantage points, which are bound up in 
the cognitive and narrative dispositions of separated churches, might be converted. 
This chapter argues that Karl Rahner’s theology of symbol offers both the 
resources and direction necessary for confronting the present-day cognitive and narrative 
challenges that continue to surface in both the ecumenical dialogues and the reception of 
the dialogues between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.  The 
following seeks to reframe the contemporary ecumenical relationship between both 
communions symbolically and provides a response to the poignant question Michael 
Kinnamon raises: “[c]an the ecumenical movement, which gave such energy and 
direction to the church in the twentieth century, be reconceived in a way that provides 
 215 
renewing power for the church in this era?”499.  This chapter accomplishes this task 
through a symbolic reexamination of the ecumenical relationship between the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion and the ARCIC dialogues that began 
more than 40 years ago.  In particular, the following demonstrates the value of a symbolic 
revaluation of both Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church.  Admittedly, a 
logic governed by symbol does not resolve the seemingly unsolvable “problems” that 
have surfaced between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church in 
recent decades.  However, a logic of symbol allows for the possibility of agreement and 
recognition that looks beyond the limits of a logic of the one over the many that is 
characteristic of Western ontology and metaphysics. 
Firstly, this chapter symbolically reevaluates the notion of Christian identity and 
koinonia.  The symbolic revaluation proceeds along the lines of an examination of the 
marks of the church, i.e. one, holy, catholic, and apostolic and the fundamental activities 
of the church, i.e. leitourgia, martyria, and diakonia with respect to Rahner’s theology of 
symbol. Secondly, as the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion begin a 
new phase of dialogue with ARCIC III, this chapter establishes the importance of 
symbolically interpreting and appropriating the cognitive and narrative dispositions of the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.  As relationship of unity-in-
difference, the interpretation and appropriation of both Christian identity and the koinonia 
of Christ’s church benefit from a logic that is governed by symbol. 
 
 
 
                                                 
499 Michael Kinnamon, Can a Renewal Movement Be Renewed? : Questions for the 
Future of Ecumenism (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2014), 2-3. 
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2. – Rethinking the Church as the Symbol of God’s Mystery  
 
As a mystery, the church is a reality that is both infinite and knowable and, as 
such, ultimately eludes definition.  However, Western theology tends to articulate the 
mysterious nature of the church as either infinite or knowable and in so doing prefers to 
consider the church as an “instrument” of God.500  This instrumental view of the church is 
grounded in an extrinsic interpretation of the church, whereby, with respect to its 
relationship to God, the church is understood as the object and, with respect to its 
relationship to the world, the church is understood as the subject.  In short, God acts upon 
the church and the church acts upon the world.  The critical methods of both modernity 
and postmodernity employ, albeit from different perspectives, work from an instrumental 
understanding of the church.  Hence, the church is interpreted and appropriated either as 
an objective instrument that produces God’s grace or it functions as the subjective 
instrument of the transmission of God’s grace.501 
 As is the case with the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church, 
instrumental conceptions of the church inevitably produce a variety of ecumenical 
impasses that issue from either a sort of ecclesiological indifference that seeks to 
overlook all difference as inconsequential to the unity of the church or an ecclesiological 
absolutism that understands difference as a threat to the unity of the church.502   If the 
ecumenical relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican 
Communion is to succeed in moving past the above understandings, then there must be 
an effort to advance and embrace an understanding of the of the church that navigates the 
                                                 
500 The church as servant is the notable exception. 
501 See: Louis-Marie Chauvet, The Sacraments : The Word of God at the Mercy of the 
Body (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2001), xiii-xxv. 
502 Kinnamon, The Vision of the Ecumenical Movement and How It Has Been 
Impoverished by Its Friends, 63-64.  
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extremes of ecclesiological indifference and ecclesiological absolutism.  This section 
contends that such an understanding is possible via a symbolic reinterpretation and 
reappropriation of the church as the symbol of God’s mystery.503     
The following elucidates an understanding of the church according to a logic that 
is governed by symbol.  It must be stated clearly from the outset of the discussion at hand 
and in order to avoid any confusion that the intention of this section is not to develop an 
ecclesiology of the ecumenical movement.  Instead, the fundamental intention of this 
section is to develop a hermeneutical approach to ecclesiology that embraces unity and 
diversity as mutually enriching realities.  In short, the intention is to develop an 
interpretative approach to ecclesiology that is capable of understanding, explaining, and 
appropriating unity-in-difference.   
2.1 - Karl Rahner and the Mysteries of the Church  
As chapter two demonstrates, for Rahner, symbols are constitutive of a 
relationship of unity-in-difference, whereby, both unity and difference are essential for 
achieving the nature of particular being.504  Hence, there is a real harmony between what 
is symbolized and its concrete expression in the world or symbol.  Rahner writes: 
A symbol is... not to be primarily considered as a secondary relationship between 
two different beings, which are given the function of indicating one another by a 
third, or by an observer who notes a certain agreement between them.  The 
symbolic is not merely an intrinsic propriety of beings in so far as a being, to 
attain fulfillment, constitutes the differentiation which is retained in the unity, and 
which is in agreement with the original originating unity and so its expression.  A 
being is also ‘symbolic’ in itself because the harmonious expression, which it 
retains while constituting it as the ‘other’, is the way in which it communicates 
itself to itself in knowledge and love.  A being comes to itself by means of 
                                                 
503 It is important that one does not confuse the following symbolic approach to the 
church with a universal ecumenical ecclesiology.  The intention of this section is not to develop 
an ecclesiology of ecumenism; instead this section attempts to develop an ecclesiology for 
ecumenism.   
504 See: chapter two pp. 77-79 
 218 
‘expression’ in so far as it comes to itself at all.  The expression, that is, 
‘symbol’… is the way of knowledge of self, possession of self, in general.505 
 
The church exists within a symbolic relationship to God’s mystery in such a way that, 
properly understood, it really brings about the mystery of God in which the church 
originates and is fulfilled.  Hence, the symbolic nature of the church is dependent upon its 
faithfulness to the mystery of God.  Put simply, the mystery of God is brought to 
expression in knowledge and love in and through the church not as an instrument, but as 
a symbol. 
Karl Rahner argues that there are three basic mysteries proper to Christianity: 1) 
the mystery of the Trinity, 2) the mystery of the incarnation, and 3) the mystery of the 
supernatural elevation of human beings through in grace.506  Rahner writes:  
There are these three mysteries in Christianity, no more and no fewer, and the 
three mysteries affirm the same thing: that God has imparted himself to us 
through Jesus Christ in his Spirit as he is in himself so that the inexpressible 
nameless mystery which reigns in us and over us should be in itself the immediate 
blessedness of the spirit which knows, and transforms itself into love.507 
 
Rahner maintains that these three basic mysteries are irreducible “because it is only 
through revelation… that we can know that such a thing is actual and possible.”508  
Rahner’s claim that there are three basic mysteries of Christianity is not an endorsement 
for reducing Christianity to a least common denominator.  Instead, his purpose for 
acknowledging these three mysteries is to emphasize that the fullness of Christian living 
and belief begins with and is always being led back to the ineffable mystery of the Triune 
                                                 
505 Rahner, "The Theology of Symbol," 230. 
506 Rahner, "The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology." 
507 Ibid., 72-73. 
508 Ibid., 67. 
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God with whom humanity exists in relation.509  Rahner is concerned with upholding the 
conviction that Christianity, if it is to be faithful to its origin and fulfillment, must not 
only be concerned with what it can know about God, but must also humbly recognize that 
“the climax of our knowledge of God is knowledge of our ignorance.”510  As such, these 
are the three mysteries from which Christian activity and belief originate and return and 
the mysteries to which churches struggle to recall and remain faithful.   
2.1.1 – The Nature of the Church: Bringing God’s Mystery to Expression in the World  
Recalling Rahner’s first principle of the symbol, in order for the church to achieve 
its nature, it must express itself as such.  However, it does not express itself only for 
itself.  The church, like everything else that exists, expresses itself for the other as well.  
Simply put, as a symbol the nature of the church is expressed so as to be recognized by 
itself and by the other.  Hence, in order to achieve its nature, the church must express its 
identity as one, holy, catholic, and apostolic in and through the activities of martyria, 
diakonia, and leitourgia.  
Rahner understands that coming to terms with mystery is a necessary prerequisite 
for coming to terms with the church.  For Rahner, the church is not an easily definable 
and manageable reality.  Instead, the church is a reality that is permeated by and 
expressive of the holy mystery of God.  The church, in its most basic sense, is the 
concrete continuation of the redemptive activity of Jesus Christ in and through the Holy 
Spirit.   The structure of the church is analogous to the incarnation in so far as it 
                                                 
509 For instance, Rahner is not making the claim that the celebration of the Eucharist is 
not a mystery.  The mystery of the Eucharist can not be understood independently.  Rahner 
writes, “[i]f one considers the mystery of transubstantiation, one would have to ask whether such 
a change of being is conceivable or not apart from the case of Christ, that is, independently of a 
unio hypostatica.” 
510 Rahner, "The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology," 59. 
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concretely expresses Jesus Christ in a way that is similar, though not identical, to the way 
Jesus Christ, as the Logos of the Father, presents the Father within the concrete world.511  
Thus, the church has a symbolic nature that is consonant with, but not identical to, the 
structure of the incarnation.  Rahner writes: 
It [the incarnation] is the very centre of the reality from which we Christians live, 
of the reality which we believe. For the mystery of the divine Trinity is open to us 
only here; only here is the mystery of our participation in the divine nature 
accorded us; and the mystery of the Church is only the extension of the mystery 
of Christ.512 
 
To understand the nature of the church is to understand the incarnation.  Rahner 
summarizes this point: 
And insofar as the church is the concreteness of Christ in relation to us, and 
insofar as Jesus Christ is really the absolute, irrevocable and victorious offer of 
God as the absolute mystery who gives himself to us in love, the church is the 
tangible place where we have the assurance and the historical promise that God 
loves us.513 
 
The above situates the nature of the church between the reality of concrete expression on 
the one hand and the reality of God’s mystery on the other.  The mystery that the church 
brings to expression is not its own; the mystery of the church does not originate with the 
church. 
Rahner’s focus on incarnation ought not infringe upon the importance of 
pneumatology for the church.  According to Rahner: 
The Church is nothing else than the further projection of the historicity and of the 
visibility of Jesus through space and time, and every word of its message, every one 
of its sacramental signs, is, once more, nothing else than a part of the world in its 
                                                 
511 There should be an explanatory footnote discussing the nature of the church as 
creature of the Word and Creature of the spirit from the document the nature and mission of the 
church. 
512 Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation," 105. 
513 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 398.  
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earthiness, with which the Spirit has united itself indissolubly since the day on which 
the Logos became flesh.514 
 
Hence, the bookends of the identity and the life of the church are both the incarnation and 
Pentecost.  The church is not simply incarnational in the sense that it makes the God’s 
mystery present.  It is also charismatic in so far as it brings the mystery of God to 
expression in and through the activity of Holy Spirit.     
According to Rahner, the church, because of its symbolic nature, is in the process 
of becoming what it is already, the “People of God”.  Hence, as God’s people, the church 
is a complex and multivalent reality.  Rahner writes that “[t]he Church is not merely a 
religious institution, established to meet religious needs… [b]ut neither was it simply 
founded from above by Christ as a spiritual welfare establishment.”515  The church exists 
in the world as a concrete people who are situated within a variety of cultural and 
spatiotemporal circumstances, but it also realizes itself as the presence of Christ in these 
various contexts.    
2.1.2 – Interpreting the Mystery of the Church: Ecumenical Possibilities  
 According to Rahner, in terms of the relationship between the anthropological 
and theological dimensions of the church “divinity grows in equal, not inverse, 
proportion to humanity. The adoption of human reality for the manifestation of God is 
what really redeems and frees the human element and brings it to its highest 
actuality…”516   In other words, the church must express its divinely constituted nature in 
and through its particular situation in the world.  In order to express its divine constitution 
                                                 
514 Karl Rahner, "The Church as the Subject of the Sending of the Holy Spirit," in Further 
Theology of the Spiritual Life I,  Theological Investigations (New York: Saebury, 1971), 188-189. 
515 Rahner, "The Church and the Sacraments," 193. 
516 Rahner, "Considerations on the Development of Dogma," 18. 
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effectively, the church needs to adapt to its particular sociocultural and spatiotemporal 
circumstances. According to the Final Report of ARCIC I: 
All generations and cultures must be helped to understand that the good news of 
salvation is also for them.  It is not enough for the Church simply to repeat the 
original apostolic words.  It has also prophetically to translate them in order that 
hearers in their situation may understand and respond to them.  All such 
restatement must be consonant with the apostolic witness recorded in the 
Scriptures; for in this witness the preaching and teaching of ministers, and 
statements of local and universal councils, have their ground and constancy.517 
 
Hence, on the one hand, the church remains the same throughout history, while on the 
other hand, the particularity of the church demonstrates a dynamism that is characteristic 
of a unity-in-difference.  Rahner writes: 
If therefore the Church is to act aright, and in a manner appropriate to the 
particular situation prevailing at any given time…, then she must be aware of 
what she is in this particular quite concrete sense.  It is the constant temptation of 
the church to conceive of herself merely in terms of her own nature… and to 
conceal from herself her real concrete reality by hiding behind this portrayal of 
her nature, in other words behind that which she should be.518 
 
 Thus, there are elements of continuity and change in terms of the content and expression 
of the orthodoxy and orthopraxy church within a particular time and place.  Rahner’s 
observations reflect Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of idem identity and ipse identity, 
whereby, the idem identity of the church is reflective of the church’s constitution (one, 
holy, catholic, and apostolic) given to it by Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit and the ipse 
identity is reflective of the identity in which there is constancy amidst change (martyria, 
diakonia, and leitourgia).  In this sense, the ipse identity is akin to the symbolic identity 
or meaning of the church.  In other words, the ipse identity is the identity of the church as 
                                                 
517 Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission, "Final Report (1981)," 94. 
518 Karl Rahner, "Of the Structure of the People in the Church Today," in Confrontations 
2,  Theological Investigations (New York: Seabury, 1974), 218. 
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it is manifest with respect the reality of difference and change.   Hence, ipse identity 
designates a kind of self-constancy amidst the reality of change.  Ricoeur writes: 
Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or herself so 
that others can count on that person.  Because someone is counting on me, I am 
accountable for my actions before another.  The term “responsibility” unites both 
meanings: “counting on” and “being accountable for.”  It unites them, adding to 
them the idea of a response to the question “Where are you?” asked by another 
who needs me.  This response is the following: “Here I am!” a response that is a 
statement of self-constancy.519 
 
Both Rahner and Ricoeur understand well the ethical implications of existing in a world 
that changes.  The church has the obligation to manifest its identity (ipse identity) in a 
way that is expressive of its God-given identity (idem identity).  In other words, when 
someone within their own particularity cries out “God, where are you?” it is the church 
that is obliged to respond in humility and accountability before God and humanity, “Here 
I am!”  
An adequate interpretation of the church requires an attentiveness to both the 
theological and the anthropological dimensions of the church.  The symbolic nature of the 
church reveals the dialectic relationship between its theological and anthropological 
centers.  The opening words of Gaudium et Spes attest to the conviction that the church 
exists within a dialogic tension between its relationship to God and humanity. 
The joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the people of our time, especially of 
those who are poor and afflicted, are the joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of 
the followers of Christ.  Nothing that is genuinely human fails to find an echo in 
their hearts.  For theirs is a community of people united in Christ and guided by 
the Holy Spirit in their pilgrimage towards the Father’s kingdom, bearers of a 
message of salvation for all humanity.  That is why they cherish a feeling of deep 
solidarity with the human race and its history.520 
                                                 
519 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 165. 
520 Vatican II, "Gaudium Et Spes," 163.  John Zizioulas concurs with the ecclesiological 
vision of Gaudium et Spes when he writes, “This ecclesiocentric ecumenism should be placed in 
the context of issues preoccupying humanity in our time. The Church does not live in isolation 
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Joseph Komonchak attests to the Importance of the insight of Gaudium et Spes regarding 
the intimate connection between the church and God, but warns against tendencies to 
reduce the nature of the church to a theological reality: 
Whatever Christian faith may say about the divine origin, center, and goal of the 
Church, it never pretends that the Church does not stand on this side of the 
distinction between Creator and creature. The Church is not God; it is not Jesus 
Christ; it is not the Holy Spirit. If the Church is the People of God, the Body of 
Christ, the Temple of the Holy Spirit, it is all of these as a human reality, that is, 
because certain events occur within the mutually related consciousness of a group 
of human beings.521 
 
In a similar way, Rahner acknowledges that a proper interpretation of the church 
demands attention to both the anthropological and theological dimensions of the church 
and their relationship to one another so as to avoid reducing the church to a theological 
reality that minimizes the anthropological nature of the church or an anthropological 
reality that lacks its unique identity as the people of God. Rahner writes: 
It is one of the constitutive elements of divine revelation that it is given in human 
word and concept. In so far as this human word is spoken by the Spirit and 
listened to in Him, it is necessarily referred and intrinsically open to the infinite 
mystery of that truth which is identical with the reality of God and can only be 
communicated along with the communication of this reality in itself… All this, 
however, cannot hide the fact that this word itself is purely a genuine human word 
and is only competent to make God’s word present to us, as long as human word 
remains such, with all the elements and consequences of coming from the human 
mind.522 
 
Thus, understanding the nature of the church is thus a double hermeneutical task.  On the 
one hand, it requires attentiveness to the church as a theological reality and on the other 
                                                                                                                                                 
from the world, and its unity must have an existential significance for humanity indeed for 
creation as a whole, especially in our time.” Zizioulas,  54. 
521 Joseph A. Komonchak, "Ecclesiology and Social Theory: A Methodological Essay," 
The Thomist 45 (1981): 274-275. 
522 Rahner, "Considerations on the Development of Dogma," 18. 
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hand, it requires attentiveness to the church as an anthropological reality.  Roger Haight 
summarizes: 
The strictly historical dynamics of the church at any given time, that is, its social 
condition and process, is one factor for interpreting the intrinsic meaning of 
theological statements.  And the strictly theological confessions of the church at 
any given time are part of and data for understanding the church’s specific 
historical development.  This epistemological formulation corresponds to the 
unity postulated in the ontology of the church constituted by a double 
relationship, to God and to the world...523 
  
Ultimately, the church eludes definition because of its theological and anthropological 
complexity.  While it is theoretically possible to distinguish between the theological and 
anthropological realities of the church’s nature, in actuality such a distinction is never the 
case.  Hence, trying to define the church is difficult, not because the church is 
unrecognizable from moment to the next, but because the church is constantly in the 
process of “becoming” in relation to its anthropological and theological constitutions.  
Rahner writes: 
… if there is ‘becoming’ at all…, then ‘becoming’ in its true from cannot be 
conceived simply as ‘becoming other’ in which a reality becomes different but 
does not become more.  True ‘becoming’ must be conceived as something 
‘becoming more’, as the coming into being of more reality, as an effective 
attainment of a greater fullness of being.  This ‘more’ must not be imagined, 
however, as something simply added to what was there before, but, on the one 
hand must be something really effected by what was there before and, on the 
other hand, must be the inner increase of being proper to the previously existing 
reality.  This means, however, that if it is really to be taken seriously, ‘becoming’ 
must be understood as a real self-transcendence, a surpassing of self or active 
filling up of the empty.524 
 
Because the church is in the constant process of becoming what its already is, the people 
of God, the church is continuing called to configure and “reform” itself towards God’s 
                                                 
523 Haight, "Historical Ecclesiology : An Essay on Method in the Study of the Church," 
34. 
524 Karl Rahner, "Christology within an Evolutionary View of the World," in Later 
Writings,  Theological Investigations (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1966), 164. 
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mystery as the origin and end of the church.  ARCIC II attests to reality of church’s 
becoming in Life in Christ: Morals, Communion, and the Church.  ARCIC II writes: 
The Christian life is a response in the Holy Spirit to God’s self-giving in Jesus 
Christ.  To this gift of himself in the incarnation, and to this participation in the 
divine life, the scriptures bear witness (cf. 1 John 1:1-3; 2 Pet. 1:3-4).  Made in 
the image of God (cf. Gen 1:27), and part of God’s good creation (cf. Gen. 1:31), 
women and men are called to grow into the likeness of God, in communion with 
Christ and with one another.525 
 
Christians generally agree that the church is a mystery.  Such general agreement, 
nevertheless, does not exclude a diversity of interpretations and this is rightfully so 
considering that the church exists in a variety of contexts.  Chapter one of Lumen 
Gentium attests to the variety of images and understandings that have been attributed to 
the church throughout its history.  For instance, in the first chapter of Lumen Gentium, the 
church is described as a sacrament, a sheepfold, God’s field, the bride of Christ, God’s 
temple, the body of Christ, the New Jerusalem, and the Pilgrim Church526  Lumen 
Gentium insightfully recognizes that the church is not a problem; it is a mystery.527  
                                                 
525 Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission, "Life in Christ: Morals, 
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God, body of Christ, temple of the Holy Spirit, vine, flock, bride, household, soldiers, friends and 
so forth).”Faith and Order Commission World Council of Churches, The Church: Towards a 
Common Vision (WCC Publications, 2013), ¶ 12.  
527 Acknowledging the mystery of the church and the theological and anthropological 
natures of the church are central themes of the first chapter of Lumen Gentium.  Accordingly, “the 
visible society and the spiritual community, the earthly church and the church endowed with 
heavenly riches, are not to be thought of as two realities. On the contrary, they form one complex 
reality comprising a human and a divine element. For this reason, the church is compared, in no 
mean analogy, to the mystery of the incarnate Word. As the assumed nature, inseparably united to 
him, serves the divine Word as a living instrument of salvation, so, in somewhat similar fashion, 
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Along with Lumen Gentium, the Second Vatican Council’s decree Unitatis Redintegratio 
articulates the broader ecumenical conviction that the unity of Christ’s church is rooted in 
and reflects a mystery that originates with the Trinity:    
This is the sacred mystery of the unity of the church, in Christ and through Christ, 
while the action of the Holy Spirit produces a variety of gifts.  It is a mystery that 
finds its highest model and source in the unity of the persons of the Trinity: the 
unity of the one God, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.528   
 
As a mystery that is infinitely knowable, the church is called to “recollect” Jesus Christ in 
and through the Holy Spirit amidst the diversity of the world.  Hence, reflection on the 
church and its unity requires a method of interpretation that embraces the aporetic nature 
of the church and avoids reducing the mystery of the church to a system of universal 
propositions on the one hand and a completely ungraspable and unknowable reality on 
the other.  
However, a diversity of interpretations ought not exclude the possibility of unity.  
As an inexhaustible reality, the one Church of Christ comes to expression and is 
subsequently interpreted in a variety of ways.  Such variety ought to be expected and 
respected.  Regarding the need to respect and tolerate difference Rahner writes: 
An encounter between two human beings never overcomes an ultimate residue 
that is unfamiliar and not understandable.  Should they perfectly understand each 
other, they would in fact have become one and the same person.  Nor would that 
be most unreal, it would not be at all interesting, Human beings are such that they 
accept the other person as one whom they do not understand perfectly, as 
familiar, as the one who, to some extent seems strange.  This must also be 
recognized and accepted in the Church.529 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
does the social structure of the church serve the Spirit of Christ who vivifies it, in the building up 
of the body (see Eph 4: 16).” Vatican II, "Lumen Gentium." 
528 Second Vatican Council,  909. 
529 Karl Rahner, "Rites Controversy: New Tasks for the Church," in Human Society and 
the Church of Tomorrow,  Theological Investigations (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 137. 
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Distinctions are meaningful, but they do not exhaust meaning.  However, there are limits 
to tolerance as one cannot say yes to everything.   According to Rahner, “The Church and 
theology should not go so far that, impelled by a love and tolerance that make no 
distinctions, they say Yes and Amen to everything. When a theologian seeks not merely 
to reflect on ancient dogma in ever new ways but squarely denies it, then the limit has 
been reached.”530   
Interpreting the church is not only a concern at the level of orthodoxy.  The reality 
of orthopraxis is equally important.  “The mystery of the Church” writes Paul VI, “is not 
a truth to be confined to the realms of speculative theology. It must be lived, so that the 
faithful may have a kind of intuitive experience of it, even before they come to 
understand it clearly.”531   ARCIC II shares Paul VI’s recognition of the significance of 
orthopraxy when its writes, “that authentic Christian unity is as much a matter of life as 
of faith.”532  However, the symbolic nature of the church, which comes to expression 
through its orthodoxy and orthopraxis, must do so within a diversity of socio-cultural and 
intellectual milieus.  
Interpreting the church is not simply an activity of primary reflection, whereby, 
the church can be painstakingly understood and explained through distinction and 
synthesis.  Properly understood, the church belongs within the realm of mystery, which 
calls for “recollection.”  In short, the resources proper for ecclesiological reflection are 
found at the level of secondary reflection, whereby, the complexities of mystery are 
                                                 
530 Ibid., 138. 
531 Paul VI, "Ecclesiam Suam" (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1964), accessed July 30, 
2015, http://w2.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
vi_enc_06081964_ecclesiam.html). 
532 Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission, "Life in Christ: Morals, 
Communion and the Church (1993)," 344. 
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interpreted within the unity of experience.  Hence the chief task of ecclesiological 
reflection is to “recollect” the complex and multifaceted experience of the one, holy, 
catholic, and apostolic Church of Christ that expresses itself as a lived reality through the 
activities of martyria, diakonia, and leitourgia.  Similarly, the admission that the church 
is a mystery warrants neither an attitude devoid of criticism nor an attitude of unbridled 
acceptance.  In short, modern forms of criticism and postmodern mindsets lack the 
hermeneutic resources to interpret the mystery of the church.    
The purpose of the church for Rahner is two-fold and is most clearly disclosed by 
Christ’s mandate to “go into the whole world and proclaim the Gospel to every 
creature.”533  On the one hand, the purpose of the church is to proclaim the Good News of 
salvation within the diversity of the world.  On the other hand, the purpose of the church 
is to unite the diversity of the world to the Good News of salvation.  ARCIC II attests in 
Salvation and the Church: 
... the church participates in Christ’s mission to the world through proclamation of 
the Gospel of salvation by its words and deeds.  It is called to affirm the 
sacredness and dignity of the person, the values of natural and political 
communities and the divine purpose for the human race as a whole; to witness 
against the structures of sin in society, addressing humanity with the gospel of 
repentance and forgiveness and making intercession for the world.  It is called to 
be an agent of justice and compassion, challenging and assisting society’s 
attempts to achieve just judgment, never forgetting that in light of God’s justice 
all human solutions are provisional.534   
 
The church accomplishes its twofold mission when it realizes its nature as the symbol of 
Jesus Christ in and through the activities of leitourgia, diakonia, and, martyria.  As with 
all symbols, however, the church is culturally contingent.535  This does not imply that the 
                                                 
533 NAB Mark 16:15 
534 Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission, "Salvation and the Church 
(1986)," 322-323. 
535 See Chapter One 3.3.1; Rahner’s understanding the symbols are fluid 
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church and its message are not counter-cultural in many respects.  Instead, it is the 
acknowledgement that if the church cannot or refuses to interpret and appropriate the 
“signs of the times” then it cannot achieve its purpose and in fact betrays its symbolic 
nature.  A church that does not recognize itself as a concrete reality of the world and 
detaches itself from the world is a church that reduces its nature to a theological reality 
that lacks the competence to realize itself as the symbol of unity and the symbol of 
salvation.  In short, the symbolic efficacy of the church is also diminished.   
In light of the world’s diversity, the church cannot bring the one Gospel of 
salvation into a diversity of contexts in a manner that is identical to each context.536  The 
church, if it is to achieve its mission and realize its nature as a symbol, must be able to 
proclaim the one Gospel of Christ within the “languages” of the world’s diversity.  The 
Canberra statement succinctly articulates the unitive purpose of the church when it states: 
The Purpose of the Church is to unite people with Christ in the power of the Holy 
Spirit, to manifest communion in prayer and action and thus to point to the 
fullness of communion with God, humanity and the whole creation in the Glory of 
the kingdom. 537 
 
Hence, the church must be a humble student of the various sociocultural and 
spatiotemporal contexts before it can effectively inculturate the Gospel entrusted to it.  In 
order to achieve its purpose, the church must inculturate itself in a variety of contexts.  
Rahner writes: 
… the Church has regarded itself always and everywhere as a real community and 
an institutional society, seeing this institutionality not merely as something 
                                                 
536 Catherin Bell offers an important critique on the “hidden” tendency within theology 
that often unwillingly absorbs plurality under its own categories of thought.  Bell writes that 
“[t]heology must recognize difference, real difference, which is a matter of opening all doors, not 
knowing all the answers.”  Catherine Bell, "Constraints on the Theological Absorption of 
Plurality," in Rahner Beyond Rahner, ed. Paul G. Crowley (New York: Rowan & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2005), 42. 
537 World Council of Churches, "The Unity of the Church as Koinonia: Gift and Calling," 124. 
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humanly unavoidable but as its indispensable essential element, even though this 
essential ‘visibility’ of the Church has been diversely interpreted and put into 
practice in the different Christian denominations.  It is only such an historical 
factor in the word as proclaimed, in the sacramental and the sociological character 
implied in all this, that it can be what it has to be: the permanent historical 
presence of God’s victorious self-promise in Jesus Christ, the sacrament of the 
world’s salvation… 538 
 
Thus, the basic purpose of the church is to “recollect” the mystery of salvation through 
Jesus Christ within the diversity of the world as a symbol.  Thus, the church, called 
together and animated by the Holy Spirit “recollects” Jesus Christ within the particularity 
of a given sociocultural and intellectual context.  To put it another way using Ricoeur’s 
famous dictum, “The symbol gives rise to thought”; the church, in and through the Holy 
Spirit, gives rise to God’s promise of salvation, through Jesus Christ the definitive and 
abiding expression of God’s salvific will, within a plurality of circumstances.539 
2.2 – Conclusion  
                                                 
538  Rahner, "Unity of the Church - Unity of Mankind," 166. 
539 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 348.; The Faith and Order Commission of the WCC that 
the church is the creature of the Word and the creature of the Spirit.  In both instances there is a 
symbolic quality to Faith and Order Commission’s understanding despite the apparent difference 
in language.  “Being the creature of God’s own Word and Spirit, the Church is one, holy, catholic 
and apostolic. These essential attributes flow from and illustrate the Church’s dependence upon 
God. The Church is one because God is the one creator and redeemer (cf. Jn 17:11, Eph 4:1-6), 
who binds the Church to himself by Word and Spirit and makes it a foretaste and instrument for 
the redemption of all created reality. The Church is holy because God is the holy one (cf. Is 6:3; 
Lev 11:44-45) who sent his Son Jesus Christ to overcome all unholiness and to call human beings 
to become merciful like his Father (cf. Lk 6:36), sanctifying the Church by his word of 
forgiveness in the Holy Spirit and making it his own, the body of Christ (Eph 5:26-27). The 
Church is catholic because God is the fullness of life ‘who desires everyone to be saved and to 
come to the knowledge of the truth’ (1 Tim 2:4), and who, through Word and Spirit, makes his 
people the place and instrument of his saving and life-giving presence, the community “in which, 
in all ages, the Holy Spirit makes the believers participants in Christ’s life and salvation, 
regardless of their sex, race or social position” It is apostolic because the Word of God, sent by 
the Father, creates and sustains the Church. This word of God is made known to us through the 
Gospel primarily and normatively borne witness to by the apostles (cf. Eph 2:20; Rev 21:14), 
making the communion of the faithful a community that lives in, and is responsible for, the 
succession of the apostolic truth expressed in faith and life throughout the ages.”  
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Understanding and explaining the church using a logic governed by symbol 
provides the basis for an appropriation of key aspects of an ecumenical church.  The 
phrase ecumenical church is not an ecclesiological expression per se, but instead is 
characteristic of an attitude within a particular ecclesiological understanding that is open 
to ecumenical possibilities.  A logic governed by symbol understands the church as a 
differentiated unity, whereby, unity obtains not through absorption, but through the 
complexities of the relationship between unity and difference.      
By way of summary, Richard Lennan provides six key points to Rahner’s 
symbolic ecclesiology that highlight its significance for envisioning an ecumenical 
church.  Firstly, approaching the church from an ecclesiology governed by a logic of 
symbol shifts the attention from a primary focus on the juridical and authoritative aspects 
of the church towards the church’s theological constitution.  This shift, however, does not 
disregard the juridical and authoritative; it simply understands it in relationship to the 
theological.  Hence, there is attentiveness to what the church communicates, not merely 
who is communicating.540  Secondly, as a differentiated unity, the church exists within a 
dialectical tension between its mystical and institutional characteristics.  As such, 
contrasting the freedom of God’s Spirit and the concrete reality of the church is 
unwarranted.  Instead, both aspects of the church and their relationship to one another 
establish the church’s unity.541  Thirdly, Rahner’s theology of symbol calls attention to 
the significance of pneumatology for ecclesiology.  “The identification of the Church as 
the primary sacrament [symbol] of the Holy Spirit” writes Richard Lennan, “established a 
                                                 
 540 Richard Lennan, "Ecclesiology and Ecumenism," in The Cambridge Companion to 
Karl Rahner, ed. Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 119. 
541 Ibid., 132. 
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link between the church and all manifestations of the Spirit.”542  Fourthly, the church, as 
symbol realizes itself through its faithful expression as both the “bearer of God’s word” 
and the subject of God’s word.543  A symbolic approach recognizes that church is not 
only the expression of God’s Word for the world, the Word is also addressed to the 
church.  Through God’s Word for the church, the church more fully realizes itself.  
Fifthly, a symbolic approach to the church reframes the relationship between the 
Sacraments as activities of the church and the Gospel.  Rahner writes: 
Grace is always there in the form of the word: grace is present always and 
everywhere from beginning to end, from the first word of preaching to the 
sacrament inclusively, in the form of the word. And this one word of grace and 
this one grace in the word has its own proper stages as the word of God, as the 
word accepted existentially in faith, as the word of the Church. And where this 
word attains its absolute climax, as the incarnational and eschatological word of 
God, and absolute self-expression of the Church as a whole and as directed to the 
individual, the word of the Eucharist is heard.544 
 
Lennan acknowledges that, “Rahner’s description of the church and its sacramental 
actions as ‘exhibitive’ words that made present the grace if the spirit demonstrated that 
‘word’ and ‘sacrament’ were not polar opposites.”545  Hence, Word and Sacraments, 
while not identical, are concrete expressions of the same salvific offer.  Lastly, Lennan 
contends that Rahner’s symbolic understanding of the church allows for the recognition 
that the entire people of God are sharers in the Holy Spirit.546  It is precisely because of 
the ‘mystical’ activity of the Holy Spirit that the church is able to gather into a visibly 
structured community.  Hence, while the entire people of God share in the same Holy 
Spirit, they do so in accord with their own gifts and capabilities.  
                                                 
 542 ibid. 
543 Ibid. 
544 Rahner, "Word and Eucharist," 286. 
545 Lennan,  120.  
546 Ibid. 
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When a particular church abstracts and excludes particular aspects of the church it 
is less expressive of the one church of Christ.  Such a context leads to distinct 
understandings and explanations of the church that according to traditional ecumenical 
methods that rely on distinction and synthesis appear irreconcilable. This, unfortunately, 
is the contemporary context of Christendom: a church in search of its unity. However, the 
search for unity amongst the churches entails a logic that thinks of the one church of 
Christ as a church of unity-in-difference.  Rahner writes: 
… this unity of Churches which is being sought and is really possible will be 
much more pluralistic in character, both theologically and institutionally, than 
what we have hitherto known, at least up to recent times and in the Catholic 
Church.  This holds when we are sure and want to maintain that the one Church 
we are seeking cannot be as a result of arbitrarily reducing the number of Catholic 
dogmas, but only through a really forward-thinking fresh understanding of the 
whole substance of dogma and a lively discussion on the part of all Churches in 
their common world-wide developing mental and social situation: a discussion 
which will become more and more urgent for the future.547   
 
3. – A Symbolic Rethinking of Christian Identity and Koinonia  
 
As the previous section demonstrates, there is good reason to think about the 
church from the perspective of symbol.  Particular churches, as symbols of God’s 
mystery, do not originate from orthodoxy and orthopraxis; instead, churches originate 
and are fulfilled by the mystery of God.  Put another way, belief and activity are not 
unique to Christian churches.  It is the relationship of Christian churches to the mystery 
of God, revealed in the person of Jesus Christ and animated by the Holy Spirit, that 
Christian identity and koinonia originate.  However, without the visible expression of 
orthodoxy and orthopraxis there is no church.  Hence, churches are not only called to be 
receptive to God’s mystery, but churches are also called to bring the mystery of God to 
visible expression.  The churches are not solely instruments of God’s grace, but are 
                                                 
 547 Karl Rahner, Shape of the Church to Come (London: SPCK, 1972), 102. 
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symbols in the sense that churches exist at the boundary between the mystery of human 
existence and its fulfillment in God’s mystery.  William Dych writes: 
It follows from Karl Rahner’s understanding of grace as universally offered to all 
people through Christ, and of the Church as the visible, historical sign of this 
grace, that being a Christian and a member of the Church does not separate one 
from those who are not, but gives expression to one’s union with them. Christian 
identity is not exclusive and divisive, but inclusive and unitive.548 
 
Churches give concrete expression to the unifying otherness of God’s mystery that is 
common to all humanity in and through the particularity of Christian belief and activity.   
This section provides a symbolic approach to the concrete and visible identity of 
the church as one, holy, catholic, and apostolic and shared fundamental visible activities 
of the church; martyria, leitourgia, and diakonia.    
3.1 – Christian Identity and Belief 
The unity of the church is not a reality that the church achieves; instead, the unity 
of the church is an already existing reality that the church struggles to visibly express 
amidst a changing world.  Undoubtedly, real divisions have arisen throughout Christian 
history, however, as Rahner rightly acknowledges, the divisions that have arisen at the 
level of belief are not as fundamental as the beliefs that unites Christians within a 
common identity as God’s people.  Rahner writes: 
In and through our profession of faith in the God of Jesus Christ the redeemer, in 
his grace, in his word, and in the eschatological salvation which is given through 
him, we are united in the hierarchy of truths in a unity which is deeper than the 
unity that is hindered by the controversial theological questions which divide the 
churches… Christians are united in a more radical way than they are divided, 
although they are divided in a true and important sense… But as Christians we 
can and must say that what unites us in our profession of faith is more 
fundamental, more decisive and more significant for salvation than what divides 
us.549 
 
                                                 
548 William Dych, Karl Rahner (New York: Wellington House, 2000), 116. 
549 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 367-368. 
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The visible expression of the church’s unity is a symbolic realization.   There is only one 
God, one people of God, one Gospel, one Baptism, one faith, etc.  However, the 
expression or symbol of unity and the already existing reality of unity that is symbolized 
by the church are not identical.  As such, a symbolic interpretation of unity pushes 
beyond, without entirely leaving behind, quantitative reflection so as to move towards an 
analysis of unity that is qualitative.  Whether or not a particular symbol of unity is 
efficacious is determined according to its qualitative relationship to the reality of unity 
that is symbolized. 
 Discussions on the unity of the church within ecumenical dialogue, unfortunately, 
move towards the extremes of institutional communion on the one hand and spiritual 
communion on the other.  In light of the tension between spiritual communion and 
institutional communion, the unity of the church manifests two sets of questions.  Firstly, 
there are questions about what is necessary for the unity of church in terms of its 
structures of authority, propositional statements, celebration of rituals, etc.  Secondly, 
there are questions about what is necessary in terms of faith and belief.  When interpreted 
from the vantage point of the symbol, both the internal and external aspects of the church 
are not only congenial to one another, but also as exist in a real and necessary 
relationship.  What is imperative, however, is the acknowledgement that the 
contemporary state of disunity diminishes and offends the quality and integrity of the 
visible expression of the one Christ of church both in its particular and universal 
expressions.  Rahner and Fries write: 
…the separation of the churches is a violation of the testament of Jesus Christ and 
the apostles, and moreover constitutes a continuing scandal which renders the 
churches themselves – and their message to the world of today – less and less 
credible.  We become guilty all over again if the separation of the churches does 
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not distress us to the greatest extent and does not require an all-out effort of us.550   
 
Hence, the visible disunity of the church expresses a reality that is contrary not only to 
the identity of the church of Christ, but to individual Christians as well.  A logic governed 
by symbol reframes questions regarding the unity of the church.  Accordingly, analysis of 
the unity of the church that is governed by a logic of symbol asks how the spiritual and 
visible structures of the other express the unity of Christ’s church both for itself (ad intra) 
and for the other (ad extra).  This does not imply that all symbols are equally effective; 
symbols can vary in terms of their quality.  However, it does allow for a positive and 
constructive attitude towards the other that fosters the conviction that Christ really is 
present through the Holy Spirit in the church of the other.   
As with the unity of the church, the church’s holiness and the holiness of its 
members do not originate with the church.  The church and its members are holy because 
of their relationship to God’s mystery.  Both the institutional and spiritual approaches to 
the church have difficulty coming to terms with and explaining the sinfulness of the 
church and its members.  A symbolic approach, however, takes account of human 
freedom in such a way that while the church remains holy, its members in freedom 
choose to act (or not act) sinfully.  Rahner writes: 
She [the church] is a whole, from the human point of view, one who is utterly 
incapable by her own power of performing any saving act or reaching a state of 
justice, who is therefore in this sense also sinful; and she is by God prevenient, 
efficacious grace to which she has been absolutely predestined one who has been 
raised to true holiness, even though on earth this divinely bestowed holiness still 
has to grow.551 
 
It is God who brings the church, the people of God, into existence, not human beings.  
This does not negate the influence of a sinful humanity; it simply recalls that the church, 
                                                 
550 Fries and Rahner, Unity of the Churches: An Actual Possibility, 4. 
551 Rahner, "The Sinful Church in the Decrees of Vatican II," 291. 
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as a symbol, is in the process of becoming.  Churches are called by their nature to seek 
out and bring to expression God’s mystery.  Rahner writes: 
The really ultimate thing [about being a Christian] is that he accepts himself just 
as he is, and does this without making anything an idol, without leaving anything 
out, and without closing himself to the totality of what in the ultimate depths of 
reality is inescapably imposed upon man as his task.552 
 
Holiness, for Rahner, is related to the radical openness to God’s ineffable mystery.  
Hence, the church, because of its call to express God’s mystery is called to holiness in so 
far as it exhibits an openness and attentiveness to God’s mystery in the world.  ARCIC II 
attests to this when it writes:  
Since the Holy Spirit is given to all the people of God, it is within the church as a 
whole, individuals as well as communities, that the living memory of the faith is 
active.  All authentic insights as perceptions, therefore, have their place within the 
life and faith of the whole church, the temple of the Holy Spirit.553 
 
When the church and its members refuse to acknowledge God’s mystery, close off 
avenues of God’s mystery, or confuse the symbolic expression of God’s mystery with 
God’s mystery they betray their call to holiness.  Hence, holiness, from the perspective of 
symbol, is oriented towards a radical reception of God’s mystery. 
If the holiness of churches and the members of churches is characteristic of a 
radical receptivity, the catholicity of churches is characteristic of the universality of the 
message of salvation common to all churches.  Hence, the catholicity, or universality, of 
the church, from the perspective of symbol means that the church is non-exclusive insofar 
as the church’s message of salvation in Jesus Christ through the Holy Spirit is for all 
people, at all times, in all cultures, and in all places.  Hence, the catholicity of the church 
                                                 
552 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 402. 
553 Anglican-Roman Catholic Preparatory Commission, "Church as Communion (1990)," 
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is a mark that encapsulates the tension of unity-in-difference.  Because it is universal, the 
one church of Christ is also diverse.554  ARCIC II maintains that: 
Throughout history the church has been called to demonstrate that salvation is not 
restricted to particular cultures.  This is evident in the variety of liturgies and 
forms of spirituality, in the variety of disciplines and ways of exercising authority, 
in the variety of theological approaches, and even in the variety of theological 
expression of the same doctrines.  These varieties compliment one another, 
showing that, as the result of communion with God in Christ, diversity does not 
lead to division; on the contrary, it serves to bring glory to God in the munificence 
of is gifts.  Thus the Church in its catholicity is the place where God brings glory 
to his name through the communion of those crated in his own image and 
likeness, so diverse, yet so profoundly one.555  
 
As with the other marks of the church, the church’s universality originates with God.  
Thus, the catholicity of the church is better understood as a task insofar as the church is 
called to bring the mystery of God to expression in a diversity of ways.    
 Interpreting and appropriating the catholicity of the church using a logic that is 
governed by symbol requires attention to both the particular expression of a particular 
church and the church as a universal reality.  The particularity of churches, which 
emerges out the unique historical circumstances of communities illustrates the intimate 
relationship between human history and salvation  history.  Rahner writes: 
                                                 
554 The catholicity of the Church is not just spatial or geographical; "catholicity” implies 
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Here in Christ and in the Church, saving history reaches its clearest and absolutely 
permanent distinction from profane history and becomes really an unequivocally 
distinct manifestation within the history of the world, thus bringing the general 
salvation-history to self-realization and to its historical reality in word and social 
structures within the history of the world.  
 
The church as it exists within particular concrete circumstances brings about the universal 
message of God’s salvific will for all of humanity, but in a way that is contingent upon a 
diversity of socio-cultural and intellectual contexts.  
The apostolic identity of the church is susceptible to interpretations that highlight 
either spiritual or institutional elements of the church. In the case of the former, for 
instance, faithfulness to the apostolic authenticity of the church is guaranteed through 
faithful adherence to the Christian Scriptures and the lived experience of the early church.  
A symbolic approach acknowledges the need for both the institutional and 
spiritual elements of the church.  As the people of God, the church must be a 
recognizable people.  As a symbolic expression, the apostolicity of the church must point 
to and present as a contemporary reality the apostolic testimony.  Hence, while the 
apostolic testimony does not change, the expression must if it is to become recognizable 
amidst the diversity of the world.   
Interpreting the apostolicity of the church, at least from the perspective of symbol, 
is open to the possibility of a plurality of church structures.  Without claiming that all 
expressions of apostolicity equally express the church’s continuity with the apostolic 
testimony, it is certainly not the case that the church of the other is devoid of apostolic 
testimony.  This is most apparent, for example, in the relationship between the Roman 
Catholic Church and mainline Protestant Churches.   The Roman Catholic Church, until 
recently, almost exclusively stressed the institutional aspects of apostolic succession and 
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tended to minimize the importance of scripture in the daily life of its members.  
Protestants, however, tended to ignore the institutional aspects of apostolic succession, 
but nurtured a sense of the importance of scripture in the daily life of its members.  
However, both manners of expressing the apostolicity of church need not be interpreted 
as mutually exclusive.  According to ARCIC II: 
Faithfulness must be realized in daily life.  Consequently in every age and culture 
authentic faithfulness is expressed in ways and by fresh insights through which 
the understanding of the apostolic preaching is enriched.  Thus the gospel is nor 
transmitted solely as a text.  The living Word of God, together with the Spirit, 
communicates God’s invitation to communion to the whole of his world in every 
age.  This dynamic process constitutes what is called the living tradition, the 
memory of the church.  Without this faithful transmission of gospel is impossible. 
 
The apostolic witness of Jesus Christ that Scripture contains is brought to a variety of 
expressions by the church from one generation to the next.  Hence, the apostolicity of the 
church is intimately connected with both the faithfulness of the church to the teaching of 
the apostles and the contemporary teaching authority of churches.  Apostolic authority is 
fundamentally rooted in the authority of revelation not vice versa.  Rahner writes: 
… the Church is a community with a common faith and creed oriented to the 
unsurpassable salvific significance of Jesus Christ, and thus that the Church has 
something to do with teaching… It should also remain clear that the teaching 
authority, however it is to be conceived…, derives its sustenance and its life form 
the “authority” of the truth to which the Church bears witness.  A mere appeal to 
the formal teaching authority of the ecclesial teaching office, if it is not combined 
with an ongoing, intensive effort to elucidate the meaning of what is proclaimed 
and taught, would ultimately result in the destruction of faith itself…; hence faith 
may not be reduced to mere obedience to the formal teaching authority of the 
Church.  Furthermore, the existence and the claim of an ecclesial teaching 
instance is itself an object and a secondary one at that, of that faith which, 
antecedent to this recognition of the teaching authority, lives from the compelling 
power of the truth contained in God’s revelation of himself in Jesus Christ.556 
 
The teaching authority of the church originates in the authority of God’s mystery as it is 
                                                 
556 Karl Rahner, "Authority," in Final Writings,  Theological Investiagtions (New York: 
Crossroad, 1984), 84. 
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revealed in the apostolic testimony of Scripture.  The need for authoritative interpretation 
of the revelation is integral to bringing about faithful witness to God’s mystery in the 
world.  However, the need for authoritative interpretation ought not overshadow the 
reality that “the ecclesial teaching authority is dependent on the ‘authority’ of revelation 
which ultimately (despite all the reciprocally conditioned relationships that the concrete 
realization of faith involves) sustains the teaching authority and is not sustained by it.”557 
3.2 – A Symbolic Rethinking of Koinonia  
 
Having analyzed the symbolic nature of the church and its identifying marks, it is 
now possible to turn from questions directed at elucidating the symbolic of identity of the 
church and its members towards questions about the symbolic activities of the church 
through which the church expresses itself as the symbol of God’s mystery.  As a symbol, 
the church is fundamentally an expressive reality, which means that the church is not 
static.  From a symbolic perspective, the church is a dynamic reality that consists of an 
original unity, an “other” or medium, and a perfected unity.558  Thus, the symbolic 
activities of the church are those undertakings of the church that “recollect” the mystery 
of God with which the church is identified.  In other words, the symbolic activities of the 
church are those activities of the church whereby the process of emanation and return 
occur.  As the following demonstrates, the activities of the church, from the perspective 
of symbol, accounts for the principal tasks of the church in which the church becomes 
what is claims to be.   Hence, a symbolic approach to the church focuses on how the 
church expresses itself, because it is through the expression that a particular entity comes 
to be known for itself and for the other. 
                                                 
557 Ibid. 
558 Fields, Being as Symbol, 6-7. 
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 The church realizes its symbolic nature through the fundamental activities of 
martyria, diakonia, and leitourgia.  The ARCIC documents identify the church’s 
relationship to the God’s mystery as koinonia.  The understanding of koinonia put forth 
in the Final Report attests to the symbolic relationship between the church and the basic 
mysteries Rahner identifies.  The Introduction to the Final Report of ARCIC I reads: 
Union with God in Christ Jesus through the Spirit is the heart of Christian 
Koinonia.  Among these various ways in which the term koinonia is used in 
different New Testament contexts, we concentrate on that which signifies the 
relation between persons resulting from their participation in one and the same 
reality (cf. John 1.3).  The son of God has taken to himself our human nature, and 
has sent upon us his Spirit, who makes us truly members of the body of Christ 
that we are too able to call God ‘Abba, Father’ (Rom. 8.15, Gal. 4.6).  Moreover, 
sharing in the Holy Spirit, whereby we become members of the same body of 
Christ and adopted children of the same Father, we are bound to one another in a 
completely new relationship.  Koinonia with one another is entailed by our 
koinonia with God in Christ.  This is the mystery of the Church.559 
 
These basic activities of the church manifest the identity of the church as one, holy, 
catholic, and apostolic so that it is recognizable as such.  The church achieves its nature 
as the symbol of unity and the symbol of salvation in and through the activities of 
worship, witness, and service.  Each of these activities is a task that attests to the already 
present reality of salvation on the one hand and its eschatological fulfillment on the other.  
Worship, service, and witness are activities that the entire church shares in common. 
 The activity of witness entails giving authentic expression to faith in Jesus Christ 
as the bearer of the universal salvific will of God.  According to Rowan Crews, “[t]he 
witness of the church and the unity of the church are inseparable” and as symbols, 
“together they arise from and point to the Lord’s own witness, his martyrdom, which 
united God and humanity.”560  Thus, there are two aspects of the church’s activity of 
                                                 
559 Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission, "Final Report (1981)," 65. 
560 Lossky, Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement., s.v. “martyrdom”.  
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witness that deserve attention.  Firstly, witness has political character in far as it is an 
activity of the church directed towards the world.  Secondly, witness, insofar as it is 
accepted is an integral way in the church realizes itself.  Rahner writes:   
The public and social character of this witness is … that of the ‘world’ and that of 
the ‘church’ because and to the extent that, this witness appears as a ‘claimant’, 
i.e. one who demands agreement and who essentially incurs the risk of remaining 
unheeded and being rejected. In other words it is addressed in public to another 
who can also be one who rejects this witness and is called the ‘world’ in the sense 
usually intended in Christian terminology in that here it is… assumed that in 
principle all men can and must be summoned by this witness, i.e. this witness 
cannot be regarded as having, in the fullness of its nature, a particular application, 
but constitutes, rather, a universal message. Wherever, by contrast, this witness is 
expressed and also hearkened to, something is constituted in him who bears the 
witness and him who hearkens to it… which we here call… the ‘Church’.561 
 
The church in and through the Holy Spirit witnesses to the unity of humanity and its 
fulfillment in salvation.  Through the activity of witness, the church realizes itself as an 
effective or transformative symbol.  The Anglican-Roman Catholic Preparatory 
Commission writes: 
The life-giving obedience of Jesus Christ calls forth through the Spirit our 
"Amen" to God the Father. In this "Amen" through Christ we glorify God, who 
gives the Spirit in our hearts as a pledge of his faithfulness (cf. 2 Cor 1.20-22).  
We are called in Christ to witness to God’s purpose (cf. Lk 24.46-49), a witness 
that may for us too include obedience to the point of death. In Christ obedience is 
not a burden (cf. 1 Jn 5.3). It springs from the liberation given by the Spirit of 
God. The divine "Yes" and our "Amen" are clearly seen in baptism, when in the 
company of the faithful we say "Amen" to God’s work in Christ. By the Spirit, 
our "Amen" as believers is incorporated in the "Amen" of Christ, through whom, 
with whom, and in whom we worship the Father.562  
The activity of witnessing to God’s salvific will is unique to the church.  Martyria 
realizes the church’s nature by testifying to the marks of the church’s identity.  The 
                                                 
561 Karl Rahner, "Theological Observations on the Concept of "Witness"," in Theology, 
Anthropology, Christology,  Theological Investigations (New York: Seabury, 1975), 164. 
562 Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission, "The Gift of Authority: 
Authority in the Church III (1998)," 64. 
 245 
church manifests unity when it testifies to the unity of God, humanity, and creation.  The 
church expresses holiness when it testifies to the holiness of God, humanity, and creation.  
The church expresses its catholicity when it testifies that God wills the salvation of all of 
humanity and the redemption of all of creation.563  Finally, the church brings about its 
apostolic nature when it witnesses to the testimony of the apostles.  Thus, the activity of 
witness is a task of the church by which it asymptotically realizes and moves towards its 
fulfillment.     
 The church also realizes its nature through the symbolic activity of diakonia or 
service.  Diakonia is the “responsible service of the gospel by deeds and by words 
preformed by Christians in response to the needs of people.”564  As a symbolic activity, 
diakonia is an efficacious experience of salvation.  The Faith and Order Commission 
attests that service is a symbolic activity of the church: 
As Christ’s mission encompassed the preaching of the Word of God and the 
commitment to care for those suffering and in need, so the apostolic Church in its 
mission from the beginning combined preaching of the Word, the call to 
repentance, faith, baptism and diakonia.  This the Church understands as an 
essential dimension of its identity.  The Church in this way signifies, participates 
in, and anticipates the new humanity God wants, and also serves to proclaim 
God’s grace in human situations and needs until Christ Comes in Glory (cf. Mt 
25:31).565 
 
The activity of service recollects Jesus Christ in a manner that is unique, while not 
altogether removed from martyria.  Through the activity of service, the church is a visible 
tangible expression of salvation in so far as it heals and reconciles the painful effects of 
sin.  In other words, through the activity of diakonia God’s promise of salvation is 
                                                 
 563 We know that all creation is groaning in labor pains even until now and not only 
that, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, we also groan within ourselves 
as we wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies. (Rom 8:22-23, NAB) 
564 Lossky, Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement. s.v. “diakonia” 
565 Nature and Mission WCC Faith and Order Commission, "The Nature and Mission of 
the Church: A Stage on the Way to a Common Statement"  (Geneva: WCC, 2005), ¶38. 
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brought to visible expression and experience.  The diakonia of the church is a response to 
the needs of a people in a particular context.  Thus, while diakonia is the embodiment of 
God’s loving gift of salvation, the experience of salvation must play out as a task of the 
church to specific needs of people.   
 The final basic symbolic activity of the church is leitourgia or worship of the 
church.  The worship of the church is the “public, common action of a Christian 
community in which the church is both manifested and realized.”566 Liturgical activity 
manifests the identity of the church in a unique and central manner.  Through the liturgy, 
or the work of the people, the faith and belief of the church are brought to visible 
expression.  In short, lex orandi, lex credendi. 
 The activity of leitourgia is twofold.  Firstly, the liturgy assembles or “recollects” 
the church at a specific time and place.  Secondly, having “recollected” Jesus Christ’s 
life, death, and resurrection, the liturgy disperses the church into the world.  Rahner 
writes that worship is “the explicit and reflex, symbolic presentation of the salvation 
event which is occurring always and everywhere in the world; the liturgy of the Church is 
the symbolic presentation of the liturgy of the world.”567  Hence, worship expresses 
through the world the hidden presence of God’s mystery that is always and already in the 
world.  Rahner maintains the attentiveness to the symbolic quality of worship means that 
“worship will be seen, not as a strange, reserved, special region in secular life, not as 
divine liturgy in the world, but as the divine liturgy of the world, as manifestation of the 
divine liturgy which is identical with salvation history.”568 
                                                 
566 Lossky, Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement., s.v. “liturgy” 
567 Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of Worship," in Faith and Ministry,  Theological 
Investiagtions (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 146. 
568 Ibid., 149. 
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4. – ARCIC III and Receptive Ecumenism: The Need for Narrative and Cognitive 
Conversion  
In November of 2006, Pope Benedict XVI and the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Rowan Williams, expressed their common desire and commitment to the continuation of 
dialogues between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church despite the 
development of new divisions.  In the 2006 Joint Declaration, the Pope and Archbishop 
wrote: 
In this fraternal visit, we celebrate the good which has come from these four 
decades of dialogue.  We are grateful to God for the gifts of grace which have 
accompanied them.  At the same time, our long journey together makes it 
necessary to acknowledge publicly the challenge represented by new 
developments which, besides being divisive for Anglicans, present serious 
obstacles to our ecumenical progress.  It is a matter of urgency, therefore, that in 
renewing our commitment to pursue the path toward full visible communion in 
the truth and love of Christ, we also commit ourselves in our continuing dialogue 
to address the important issues involved in the emerging ecclesiological and 
ethical factors making that journey more difficult and arduous.569   
 
ARCIC III was formally announced on February 4, 2011 in response to the 2006 joint 
declaration.  The members of ARCIC III met for the first time in May 2011 with the 
mandate to explore the “the church as communion, local and universal, and how in 
communion the local and universal church come to discern right ethical teaching.”570  In 
the Communiqué from the Meeting of ARCIC III at Bose, Italy, the committee 
acknowledged the necessity of a change in method regarding ecumenical dialogue 
between Anglicans and Roman Catholics.  The communiqué reads: 
In considering the method that ARCIC III will use, the Commission was 
particularly helped by the approach of ‘receptive ecumenism’, which seeks to 
make ecumenical progress by learning from our partner, rather than simply asking 
our partner to learn from us. Receptive ecumenism is more about self-examination 
                                                 
569 Benedict XVI and Archbishop Rowan Williams, "Joint Declaration " Origins 36, no. 
26 (2006): 406. 
570 Edmond Brosnan, Ed. "On File " Origins 41, no. 5 (2011): 80. 
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and inner conversion than convincing the other; Anglicans and Roman Catholics 
can help each other grow in faith, life and witness to Christ if they are open to 
being transformed by God’s grace mediated through each other. ARCIC is 
committed to modeling the receptive ecumenism it advocates. It intends to find 
ways to consult with the members of its churches at many levels as its work 
matures.571 
 
The decision to pursue dialogue from the methodological perspective of receptive 
ecumenism is a significant development in the dialogic process between the Anglican 
Communion and Roman Catholic Church.  The shift in method reflects the conviction 
that the present-day ecumenical movement faces a context in which the issues 
surrounding a divided church are not simply doctrinal in nature, but extend to issues of 
the church’s orthopraxis. 
The endorsement of receptive ecumenism by ARCIC III is no doubt influenced by 
Paul Murray, a member of ARCIC III and advocate of the method of receptive 
ecumenism that developed out of the University of Durham.  Murray writes: 
We are at a point where the traditional formal strategies, for all their erstwhile 
success, have for the time being quite possibly gone as far as they can on most 
fronts.  They are fine for problems based either in misunderstanding or the 
erroneous assumption that a point can only be expressed in one way and must be 
expressed in the exact same way failing to appreciate that it is not always 
necessary to choose between alternate expressions.  But many of the problems 
that are now regarded as dividing traditions simply do not lend themselves to 
being resolved in this way.572 
 
As a method, receptive ecumenism seeks to turn the ecumenical process and ecumenical 
thinking on its head by shifting the emphasis of dialogue from asking “what one’s own 
particular church can offer other churches” towards questions that consider “what other 
churches can offer to one’s own particular church.”  Receptive ecumenism advocates a 
conversion of both individuals and churches engaged in ecumenical dialogue similar to 
                                                 
571 ARCIC III, "Communique from the Meeting of ARCIC III at Bose" (Communique, 
Bose, Italy, May 27, 2011). 
572 Murray, "Arcic III: Recognising the Need for an Ecumenical Gear-Change," 207. 
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Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of the movement from recognition as identification to 
recognition of one’s self, which is described in chapter three.573  Murray contends that in 
regards to receptive ecumenism “the primary call is to take responsibility for one’s own 
and one’s own community’s learning in the face of the other, without first demanding 
that the other does likewise.”574   
Receptive ecumenism rightly acknowledges that particular churches have much to 
learn from one another and that ecumenism presupposes a willingness and receptivity to 
learn from one another.  Hence, the activities of learning and reception are intrinsically 
connected to one another.  Murray writes: 
… Catholic learning is intended to be suggestive of the universal, all-extensive 
range of the receptive dynamic… Where Receptive Ecumenism expresses this ad 
intra in relation to Christian ecumenism, Catholic learning voices the claim ad 
extra that is an authentically Catholic instinct to ask – with due discernment, 
criticism, and appropriate concern for integrity intact – after the truth potentially 
to be learned from the other, whomsoever the other might be.575 
 
However, while receptive ecumenism offers a correct diagnosis of the challenges and ills 
of present-day ecumenism and provides a valuable description of what receptive 
ecumenism ultimately entails, it lacks an articulation of what “discernment, criticism, and 
appropriate concern for integrity” involve.  Put another way, Receptive ecumenism and 
ecumenical learning acknowledge the need for a conversion of the narrative disposition 
of individuals and churches within ecumenical dialogue, but it does not adequately attend 
to the cognitive conversion that is also required.  Receptive ecumenism acknowledges the 
need to think differently, but it does not address the logic that facilitates and supports 
thinking differently.   
                                                 
573 See: chapter three pp. 111-114  
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575 Ibid. 
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Without downplaying the importance of receptive ecumenism and ecumenical 
learning, the lack of systematic and logical coherence of both hinders their effectiveness 
as complimentary methodological alternatives to traditional methods employed in 
ecumenical dialogue.576  This section argues that the choice of receptive ecumenism and 
ecumenical learning as methods for furthering the dialogue between the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic stand to benefit from the systematic and logical 
coherence of Rahner’s theology of symbol.  In particular, Rahner’s theology of symbol 
and its accompanying logic provide the resources for facilitating the necessary narrative 
and cognitive conversions that are required to deepen and further the ecumenical 
relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.   
4.1 – The Anglican-Roman Catholic Cognitive and Narrative Impasse 
 Much of the tension that continues to develop between the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Anglican Communion issues from divergent hermeneutical emphases 
regarding Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church.  As the following 
demonstrates, the ongoing tensions and disagreements that exist between both 
communions cannot simply be glossed over nor is there some sort of “hermeneutic key” 
that promises to identify and subsequently unlock a common understanding that will 
somehow bridge the present-day interpretative divide and explain away all tensions and 
disagreements.  Instead, it must be soberly acknowledged that the tensions and 
disagreements that exist between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic 
                                                 
576 The lack of systematic coherence is demonstrated by Paul Murray’s description of 
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Modern Theology 29, no. 4 (2013): 85-88.   
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Church are real and in some respects most likely lasting.  It is necessary and beneficial to 
recognize that over the course of their respective histories the different trajectories of the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church have developed cognitive and 
narrative dispositions in relation to unique sociocultural and intellectual contexts.577  The 
critical questions facing the ecumenical dialogue and relationship between the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion can no longer fixate on the distinctions 
and differences that exist between both communions, but instead must be directed 
towards questions that consider how realizing a common Christian identity and the 
koinonia of Christ’s church can continue with respect to the very real and significant 
differences and distinctions that have developed and continue to develop.   
This section explains that the seemingly unresolvable differences that continue to 
develop are manifestations of divergent emphases in regards to the cognitive and 
narrative dispositions of the Anglican Communion and Roman Catholic Church and that 
these divergent emphases have significant implications for how both communions 
approach the realities of ecumenical learning and ecumenical reception.  In terms of the 
cognitive disposition, the realities of orthodoxy and orthopraxis and their relationship to 
one another are central concerns.  However, there is a tendency to elevate orthodoxy or 
orthopraxis as sort of hermeneutic key for interpreting Christian identity and the koinonia 
of the Christ’s church.  In the case of the Anglican Communion and Roman Catholic 
Church, there is an inclination to interpret orthodoxy through orthopraxis and orthopraxis 
through orthodoxy respectively.  On the other hand, the narrative disposition tends to 
                                                 
577 The term “disposition” is used to characterize the hermeneutical tendencies or 
affinities of a particular church.  The term is used generally and is not meant to suggest that 
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recognize Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church in terms of substantial or 
formal identity (idem) and the dynamic identity of self-constancy (ipse) and their 
relationship to one another.578  As with the cognitive disposition, churches have a 
propensity to elevate one aspect over another; either the idem or the ipse in the case of the 
narrative disposition.  
 The intention of this section is two-fold.  Firstly, this section analyzes how the 
cognitive and narrative dispositions that have developed in the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Anglican Communion evidence both resources and obstacles for furthering the 
ecumenical dialogue and the ecclesial relationship between the communions.  Secondly, 
this section proposes a symbolic reframing of the narrative and cognitive dispositions of 
the Anglican Communion and Roman Catholic Church.  
4.1.1 – The Ontological Cognitive and Narrative Disposition of the Roman Catholic 
Church  
  
In terms of its cognitive disposition, the Roman Catholic understanding of 
Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church tends to prioritizes orthodoxy over 
orthopraxis.  For instance, the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, which 
poignantly illustrate the importance of orthopraxis for Christian identity, are often 
referred to as its “best kept secret.”579  This does not mean, however, that the Roman 
Catholic Church does not take orthopraxis seriously; instead, it is an illustration that the 
Roman Catholic Church is disposed to an understanding that the orthopraxis of the 
church is a function of the orthodoxy of the Church.  From this vantage point, orthopraxis 
is informed by and conforms to the orthodoxy of the Church.  As such, this cognitive 
                                                 
578 See: chapter three pp. 120-124 
579 See: Edward P. DeBerri, James E. Hug, and Peter J. Henriot, Catholic Social 
Teaching: Our Best Kept Secret (New York: Orbis Books, 2003), 3-5. 
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disposition resembles a movement from the content of orthodoxy to its lived expression 
through orthopraxis.  Thus, the Roman Catholic Church’s cognitive disposition tends to 
understand and explain the expressive activities of the church via the nature of the 
church.  Put another way, the substantial nature of the church as one, holy, catholic, and 
apostolic informs the basic and fundamental communicative activities of the church; 
diakonia, leitourgia, and martyria.   
The cognitive disposition of the Roman Catholic Church supports the 
interpretative movement from orthodoxy to orthopraxis through recourse to ontological 
and metaphysical patterns of thought.  The interpretative movement from orthodoxy to 
orthopraxis resembles the cognitive pattern of primary reflection, whereby the 
particularity of Christian living is understood and explained by an appeal to Christian 
doctrine which is universal.  In this way, orthodoxy provides a solid foundation for 
orthopraxis, but the priority of orthodoxy can also overshadow and neglect the 
informative role of orthopraxis in interpreting Christian identity and the koinonia of 
Christ’s church.  “All doctrinal formulations” writes Avery Dulles, “… point beyond 
themselves to the mystery of God’s own truth, which abides in the Church as a living 
subject.  In a certain sense, therefore, even dogmatic declarations cannot be final.”580  
Dulles calls forth the important observation that the orthodoxy of the church, which is 
often formulated in the form of doctrinal propositions, is also informed by the life of the 
church.  In sum, the cognitive disposition of the Roman Catholic Church evidences a 
strong movement from orthodoxy to orthopraxis, but tends to place a weaker emphasis on 
the interpretive movement from orthopraxis to orthodoxy, where orthopraxis informs 
orthodoxy.   
                                                 
580 Dulles, The Craft of Theology, 108. 
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The narrative disposition of the Roman Catholic Church reflects the priority for 
the idem, or the substantial and formal identity of the Church.  As such, the Roman 
Catholic Church demonstrates an affinity for the interpretation of Christian identity and 
the koinonia of Christ’s church in such a way that the ipse, or the identity of self-
constancy through change, of the church is understood to conform to the idem of the 
church.  Put another way, the judge or measurement of self-constancy, from a Roman 
Catholic vantage point, is the substantial unchanging identity of the church. 
The Roman Catholic emphasis on the idem identity of the church, like the 
emphasis towards orthodoxy, tends to situate Christian identity and the koinonia of 
Christ’s church on the stability of metaphysical and ontological patterns of thought.  The 
idem identity of the church is directed towards memory, which is characteristic of the 
Roman Catholic affinity and emphasis for tradition as continuity with the past.  Put 
another way, the Roman Catholic Church demonstrates a propensity for articulating 
Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church in terms of their unchangeable 
features, structures, and characteristics.  Thus, from the vantage point of the Roman 
Catholic Church there is a proclivity to emphasize the unchangeable nature of the church.  
The result is an interpretative movement from the idem to the ipse.  The narrative 
disposition of the Roman Catholic Church is similar to its cognitive disposition in so far 
as it is characterized by a movement from the marks of the church to the communicative 
activities of the church.    
While the Roman Catholic Church exhibits a preference for the idem, one ought 
not conclude that the ipse identity of the church is absent from the Roman Catholic 
understanding Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church.  The Roman 
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Catholic understanding of doctrinal development, the hierarchy of truths, and its history 
of liturgical reforms, to name only a few, are ample evidence to support the Roman 
Catholic Church’s capacity for “self-constancy” through change.  However, it also 
evident that, generally speaking, there is stronger and more consistent emphasis idem 
identity.  In sum, the narrative disposition of the Roman Catholic Church exhibits a 
preference for continuity over change.   
The cognitive disposition of the Roman Catholic Church, which tends towards 
orthodoxy, and its narrative disposition, which tends towards the idem, cultivate an 
emphasis on the objective criteria for Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s 
church.  Thus, the nature of the church as one, holy, catholic, and apostolic supports and 
is logically prior to the expressive activities of martyria, leitourgia, and diakonia.  For 
instance, the unity of the church, which is realized in the celebration of the Eucharist for 
Roman Catholics, is dependent on the apostolic nature of the church.  Lumen Gentium 
reads: 
The bishop, invested with the fullness of the sacrament of orders, is the “steward 
of the grace of the supreme priesthood,” above all in the Eucharist, which he 
himself offers, or ensures it is offered, and by which the church continues to live 
and grow.  The church of Christ is really present in all legitimately organized 
local groups of faithful which, united with their pastors, are also called churches 
in the New Testament.581 
 
As the above acknowledges, the church of Christ is really present in “legitimately” 
organized communities; a community that in communion with their bishop (apostolic) 
gathers together in the celebration of the Eucharist (leitourgia).  However, the legitimacy 
of a community has objective criteria that, for the Roman Catholic Church, are universal.  
It is significant to acknowledge that for the Roman Catholic Church legitimacy is 
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indebted to validity and validity is governed by ontology.  The legitimacy of a church 
community entails that it is in communion with a validly ordained bishop who is in 
communion with the Bishop of Rome.  In most instances, a legitimate church community 
gathers around a validly ordained priest who is in communion with the local bishop and 
validly celebrates the Eucharist.  The above example demonstrates the Roman Catholic 
affinity for orthodoxy while also demonstrating the Roman Catholic propensity for 
ensuring the idem.  
4.1.2 – The Phenomenological Cognitive and Narrative Disposition of the Anglican 
Communion 
 In terms of its cognitive disposition, the Anglican understanding of Christian 
identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church tends to emphasize orthopraxis over 
orthodoxy.  As David Scott acknowledges, “The Church of England, and the churches in 
communion with it composing the Anglican Communion, is not a confessional church… 
neither the theology of one leading figure, nor an official doctrinal confession functions 
as the test of correct doctrine.”582  This is not to imply that the Anglican Communion is 
devoid of orthodoxy, but instead suggests that the orthodoxy of the church is informed 
through the orthopraxis of the church.  For instance, the language of the Anglican 
Communion prefers to speak of the “fundamentals” or “essentials” of faith as opposed to 
common doctrines.  Paul Avis writes: 
Both Scripture and tradition are interpreted by means of reason, not in the spirit of 
the Enlightenment, as an individualistic and analytical instrument, but in a 
cultural and sapiential sense, as the light of God diffused, albeit imperfectly, 
through human knowledge and experience and to be exercised humbly, 
collectively and prayerfully.583 
                                                 
582 David Scott, "The Eucharist: An Anglican Perspective," Journal of Ecumenical 
Studies 13, no. 2 (1976): 224. 
583 Avis, The Identity of Anglicanism : Essentials of Anglican Ecclesiology, 60. 
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Hence, it is the lived experience of the church through leitourgia, diakonia, and martyria 
that take interpretative precedence over the nature of the church insofar as the nature of 
the church can be expressed in a variety of ways and never perfectly.  The Anglican 
vantage point places a greater emphasis on how Christian identity and the koinonia of 
Christ’s church are expressed within the diversity and particularity of churches.  Put 
another way, if the Roman Catholic Church tends to think through orthodoxy, then the 
Anglican Communion tends to think through orthopraxis.    Alan Jones summarizes well 
an Anglican approach to the relationship between orthodoxy and orthopraxis: 
Christian orthodoxy… looks at the world through the prism of the three basic 
doctrines of incarnation, redemption, and communion.  And Christian orthodoxy 
demands a moral response.  Since we can say things falsely, the test of anyone’s 
orthodoxy lies in orthopraxis… in the moral life.584   
 
 The cognitive disposition of the Anglican Communion supports the interpretative 
movement from orthodoxy to orthopraxis through recourse to phenomenological patterns 
of thought.  It is in and through the particularity of one’s unique socio-cultural and 
intellectual context that individuals and communities come to experience and bring the 
Christian message to expression.  The priority of orthopraxis in the Anglican Communion 
supports the rich diversity and plurality of the Anglican Communion; however, the 
Anglican affinity for orthopraxis tends to be suspicious of orthodoxy, at least in terms of 
common doctrinal formulas.  In For the Sake of the Kingdom, The Inter-Anglican 
Theological and Doctrinal Commission writes: 
This unity (of the Anglican Communion) is found, in the first instance, precisely 
through the continuing fellowship of churches that belong in different places. For 
Anglicans, such fellowship is based in a common set of institutions: Scriptures, 
ecumenical creeds, sacraments, the historic threefold ministry. It comes to 
                                                 
584 Alan Jones, Common Prayer on Common Ground: A Vision of Anglican Orthodoxy 
(Harrisburg, Pa.: Morehouse Publishing 2006), 20. 
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practical expression, however, through practical acts of sharing, through mutual 
consultation, and through mutual admonition and criticism… pluralism can serve 
the cause of a deeper and fuller understanding of the Gospel and so of a deeper 
and fuller unity in Christ; but it can do so only on the condition that churches do 
not eschew their responsibility to one another, a responsibility that includes 
hearing as well as speaking, learning as well as teaching. And this in turn can only 
occur, in the Anglican Communion, through a common willingness to take up 
difficult - even divisive - issues for the sake of the truth of the Gospel. For too 
long Anglicans have appeared willing to evade responsible theological reflection 
and dialogue by acquiescing automatically and immediately in the co-existence of 
incompatible views, opinions, and policies.585 
 
The affinity for orthopraxis and phenomenological patterns of thought, as the above 
warns, risks divulging into relativity.  The internal struggles of the Anglican Communion 
over issues of sexual morality and the ordination of women are examples of the desire to 
embrace incompatible views within the communion.   
In sum, the cognitive disposition of the Anglican Communion evidences a strong 
inclination for the interpretative movement from orthopraxis to orthodoxy, but tends to 
place a weaker emphasis on the interpretive movement from orthodoxy to orthopraxis.   
 The narrative disposition of the Anglican Communion is inclined to interpret 
Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church via the ipse.  As such, the narrative 
disposition of Anglican Communion tends to affirm the tentative nature of doctrinal 
formulations of the Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church with respect to 
change and development.  The Anglican Communion demonstrates an affinity for 
“promise” insofar as it understands Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church 
as being governed by self-constancy.  Put another way, Christian identity and the 
koinonia of Christ’s church are not ensured by identical structures, common features, or 
identical characteristics.  Instead, koinonia and identity are brought to expression in and 
                                                 
585 Inter-Anglican Theological and Doctrinal Commission, "For the Sake of the 
Kingdom," (1986). 
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through diversity and particularity.  As the 1968 Lambeth conference articulates, for the 
Anglican Communion, “[c]omprehensiveness demands agreement on fundamentals, 
while tolerating disagreement on matters in which Christians may differ without feeling 
the necessity of breaking communion.”586  In light of the realities of human development 
and fallibility, the Anglican Communion tends to exhibit a suspicion towards the 
overemphasizing the idem identity of the church.    
It is in and through the communicative activities of the church that communities 
and individuals bring to bear the one church and a common Christian identity.  The 
Anglican Communion demonstrates a tendency to interpret the idem by way of the ipse.  
The preference for the ipse, however, ought not exclude Anglican recourse to the idem.  
For instance, while not as developed as the Roman Catholic sense of the idem, the 
Anglican Communion holds that the Sacred Scriptures, the ancient creeds, the sacraments 
of Baptism and Eucharist, and the historic episcopate are all fundamental aspects of 
Christian identity and the koinonia  of Christ’s church.587  In sum, the propensity to 
elevate the ipse supports the notions of comprehensiveness and particularity that have 
come to characterize the distinctiveness of the Anglican Communion.   
4.1.3 – Bridging the Narrative and Cognitive Impasse: The Need for a Symbolic Naïveté  
 The narrative and cognitive dispositions of both the Anglican Communion and the 
Roman Catholic Church evidence different emphases.  The present-day ecumenical log 
jam between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church issues from the 
divergent cognitive and narrative dispositions through which both communions interpret 
and appropriate Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church.  The Roman 
                                                 
586 The Lambeth Conference 1968,  (New York: Seabury Press 1968), 140. 
587 Mark D. Chapman, Anglican Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 192-193. 
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Catholic Church’s narrative and cognitive dispositions demonstrate a preference for a 
logic of the one over the many that is supported and developed via metaphysical and 
ontological categories of thought that advance an interpretation and appropriation of the 
universal and common structures of Christian identity and koinonia.  The Anglican 
Communion’s cognitive and narrative dispositions, on the other hand, demonstrate a 
preference for a logic of the many over the one that is supported and developed via 
phenomenological patterns of thought that advance an interpretation and appropriation of 
the comprehensiveness and particularity of Christian identity and koinonia.  However, 
both the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion envision the 
interpretative and appropriative process in terms of recognition as a function of 
identification.  More specifically, the Roman Catholic Church tends to interpret and 
appropriate Christian identity and koinonia in terms of ontological and metaphysical 
distinctions and synthesis, while the Anglican Communion tends to interpret and 
appropriate Christian identity and koinonia in terms of phenomenological 
comprehensiveness.  Herein lies the basic tension of the ecumenical relationship and the 
challenge of mutual recognition between the Anglican Communion and Roman Catholic 
Church. 
The Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church both affirm that 
Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church are rooted in the ineffable mystery 
of the triune God.  Using the language of previous chapters, both communions insist that 
Christian identity and koinonia are infinitely knowable.  However, both communions tend 
to understand, explain, and appropriate mystery by way divergent unilateral movements.  
The Anglican propensity for the ipse and orthopraxis exhibits an openness to the infinite 
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nature of mystery, but tends to be suspicious of universal claims regarding the 
knowability of mystery.  The Roman Catholic propensity for the idem and orthodoxy 
exhibits an openness to the knowable nature of mystery, but tends to be suspicious of 
claims regarding the significance of the particularity Christianity.  At the risk of 
oversimplifying the complexities involved in the Anglican-Roman Catholic ecumenical 
dialogue, the basic criticism Anglicans level against the Roman Catholic Church is that it 
says too much about Christian identity and koinonia, while the basic critique of the 
Roman Catholic Church leveled against the Anglican Communion is that it doesn’t say 
enough.   
It must be conceded that to a certain extent the above critiques are valid.  For 
instance, there is a historical precedence that supports the claim that the Roman Catholic 
Church has, at times, treated the mystery of Christian identity and koinoina as a 
problem.588  Likewise, the present-day divisions and tensions within the Anglican 
Communion give credence to the claim that the Anglican Communion avoids the 
necessity of common claims regarding the mystery of Christian identity and koinonia.589  
In a positive sense, however, both the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic 
Church have a great deal to learn and receive from one another, but, in order for 
ecumenical learning and ecumenical reception to occur, both the Anglican Communion 
and the Roman Catholic Church must first establish the cognitive and narrative space for 
ecumenical learning and reception.  The development of dialogue as the means for 
reception and learning necessitates the capacity to hear again in a way that extends 
                                                 
588 See: Edward Schillebeeckx, Church : The Human Story of God (New York: 
Crossroad, 1990), xiii-xix. 
589 See: Stephen W. Bp Sykes, "Anglicanism and the Anglican Doctrine of the Church," 
Anglican Theological Review 10 (1988). 
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beyond identification.  As such, there is a need to move beyond the resources of criticism 
towards a postcritical and symbolic naïveté.  
4.1.4 – A Symbolic Cognitive and Narrative Disposition 
 The task of this section is to articulate the basic contours of a symbolic cognitive 
disposition and a symbolic narrative disposition.  In regards to Christianity, a symbolic 
cognitive disposition and symbolic narrative disposition take as their point of departure 
two fundamental principles.  Firstly, the koinonia of Christ’s church and Christian 
identity are rooted and tend towards God’s mystery.  Secondly, as symbols of the mystery 
of God, Christian identity and the koinonia of Church are brought to cognitive and 
narrative expression by particular churches through the dialogical movement between 
orthodoxy and orthopraxis on the cognitive level and the dialogical movement between 
idem and the ipse on the narrative level.   
Symbols give rise to thought and symbols also “speak”.  As such a symbolic 
disposition is at once a cognitive disposition and a narrative disposition.  The 
interpretation and appropriation of Christian identity and koinonia, from an ecumenical 
vantage point, necessitates a narrative disposition and a cognitive disposition that is 
governed by a logic that is neither exclusively ontological nor exclusively 
phenomenological; instead, it requires the capacity to integrate both dispositions into 
one’s own and one’s own community’s thinking and narrative.  The following argues that 
Karl Rahner’s theology of symbol provides the necessary resources for the development 
of both a cognitive disposition and a narrative disposition that integrates both the 
ontological disposition of the Roman Catholic Church and the phenomenological 
disposition of the Anglican Communion.  
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4.1.4.1 – A Symbolic Cognitive Disposition  
Neither Christian identity nor koinonia are in “possession” of God’s mystery.  It is 
the mystery of God that possesses Christian identity and koinonia as its own other, 
whereby in and through the concrete circumstances of the church, the mystery of God 
attains and communicates itself in knowledge and love through a Christian identity that is 
one, holy, catholic, apostolic and through the shared activities of leitourgia, diakonia, 
and martyria.  Thus, a symbolic cognitive disposition does not begin by identifying the 
very real tensions and differences that exist between Christians; instead, a symbolic 
cognitive disposition starts from the conviction that there is already koinonia that exists 
among all Christians in so far as all Christians share a common identity with God’s 
mystery. 
  A symbolic cognitive disposition acknowledges that Christian belief and Christian 
activity exist within a relationship governed by emanation and return.  As such, there is a 
symbolic structure to orthodoxy and orthopraxis insofar as both are expressions that 
originate out of the ineffable mystery of God and seek to return to the very same origin.  
Thus, it is through orthodoxy and orthopraxis that the fundamental mysteries of 
Christianity enter the cognitive horizon of human thought and experience.   
While distinct from divine revelation, the relationship between orthodoxy and 
orthopraxis is similar in structure to divine revelation.  Dei Verbum rightly acknowledges 
that:  
The pattern of this revelation unfolds through words and deeds which are 
intrinsically connected: the works performed by God in the history of salvation 
show forth and confirm the doctrine and realities signified by the words; the 
words, for their part, proclaim the works, and bring to light the mystery they 
proclaim.  The most intimate truth thus revealed about God and human salvation 
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shines forth for us in Christ, who is himself both the mediator and the sum total of 
revelation.590 
 
In an analogous manner, orthodoxy and orthopraxis, as contemporaneous expressions of 
God’s mystery, are intrinsically connected in such a way that Christian orthopraxis 
confirms the mystery of Christian belief and Christian orthodoxy proclaims the mystery 
of Christian action.  Christian orthodoxy and orthopraxis must be interpreted in terms of a 
vertical symbolic relationship to God’s mystery as well as a horizontal symbolic 
relationship to one another.  Hence, a symbolic cognitive disposition envisions orthodoxy 
and orthopraxis as distinct symbols of God’s mystery that between themselves form 
symbolic relationship of unity-in-difference.  The vertical and horizontal dimensions of 
Christian identity can be illustrated in the following diagram:    
  
A symbolic cognitive disposition acknowledges that phenomenologically 
Christian identity and koinonia “looks” different from one particular church to another.  
However, it also acknowledges that ontologically Christian identity and koinonia cannot 
“be” other than symbolic expressions of God’s mystery.  As such, the symbolic cognitive 
disposition attends to the symbolic relationship between orthodoxy and orthopraxis in 
light of Revelation.  Put another way, a symbolic cognitive approach does not attend 
exclusively to the realities of orthodoxy and orthopraxis in themselves; it also attends to 
                                                 
590 Vatican II, "Dei Verbum," 98. 
God's Mystery 
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the symbolic movement of emanation and return that governs the symbolic process.  
Hence, a symbolic cognitive disposition interprets and appropriates Christian identity and 
koinonia within the tension of emanation and return without seeking to dissolve or 
manage them.   
Attention to the vertical dimension affirms that all Christians share a common 
relationship to God’s ineffable mystery.  It is on the horizontal level and in terms of 
orthodoxy and orthopraxis and their relationship to one another that disagreements 
emerge between particular churches.   It is how churches think about and articulate God’s 
mystery on the level of orthodoxy and orthopraxis within their particularity that 
seemingly irresolvable differences develop.   
In sum, firstly, a symbolic cognitive disposition acknowledges that the differences 
between churches are real.  Churches not only look different, but they are different in 
terms of their orthodoxy and orthopraxy.  Secondly, a symbolic cognitive disposition 
acknowledges that the symbolic expressions of orthodoxy and orthopraxy of other 
churches are not the symbolic expressions of one’s own church; they do not belong to the 
network of symbols of one’s own church.  Thirdly, a symbolic cognitive disposition 
acknowledges the need for a temporary suspension of the judgment of the orthodoxy and 
orthopraxy of other churches.  Lastly, the cognitive space for reception of the other’s 
symbolic expression is opened insofar as one’s church acknowledges that despite 
identifiable differences, the symbolic expressions of other churches are real symbols of 
God’s mystery and as such give rise to thought in a manner that possibly extends beyond 
the boundaries of the cognitive awareness of one’s church.  In other words it is “this 
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detour through other”, writes Riccardo Larini,  “[that] leads us to question ourselves and 
deepen our own self-understanding.”591 
4.1.4.2 – A Symbolic Narrative Disposition  
 Symbols not only give rise to thought; symbols also “speak.” As chapter three 
describes, symbols arise out of a complex relationship between literal meaning and 
symbolic meaning, whereby, both meanings are brought to bear upon a symbol.592  It is at 
the narrative level that appropriation, or reception actually takes place.  The task of this 
section is to articulate the basic characteristics of a symbolic narrative disposition.  This 
section accomplishes the task of developing a symbolic narrative disposition by applying 
Rahner’s insights regarding the distinction between a “real symbol” and a “mere sign” to 
Paul Ricoeur’s notion of the idem and the ipse. 
Rahner maintains that the boundary between “real symbols” and “mere signs” is 
fluid because to some extent both are bound up within the socio-cultural milieu of 
particular time and place.  C. Annice Callahan distinguishes signs and symbols when she 
writes: 
An arbitrary sign does not constitute what it signifies and it is separate from what 
it signifies.  It is chosen at random to express a reality in time and space, whereas 
a real symbol expresses intrinsically the reality it signifies.   Furthermore, 
symbols can change to “mere signs,” like the wedding ring of a divorced person.  
For Rahner, a symbol renders another reality present.  It is the way a being comes 
to be known.  Being is and comes to be by being uttering itself in what is other 
than itself.  The symbolic nature of being means that it gives itself away into the 
“other,” and finds itself in knowledge and love.  This movement of giving oneself 
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away and finding oneself presupposes that being expresses itself and possesses 
itself.593 
 
As Callahan articulates, the theoretical distinction between signs and symbols is clear, but 
practically speaking the boundary between signs is symbols is more difficult to articulate.  
What is evident however, is that signs and a symbols are distinguished from one another 
by their respective relationships between one reality and another.  In the case of a sign, 
the relationship between two realities is relatively weak or arbitrary.  However, in the 
case of the symbol two realities are intrinsically related.  The distinction between a sign 
and a symbol is more clearly articulated when one attends to the possibility of how a 
symbol can become a sign or a sign a symbol.  
 The distinction between a sign and a symbol is evidenced by their respective 
relationships to mystery.  A symbol carries and expresses mystery, while a sign does not.  
Hence, signs are arbitrary in so far as they are literally designated to represent a reality.  
Signs do not carry or express mystery.  For instance, a “stop” sign literally points to the 
reality to stop.  It does not express nor is it intended to express the mystery of human 
experience.  Hence, signs are given their meaning.  Symbols on the other hand arise out 
of the fabric of human experience in such a way that they carry and express the mystery 
of human existence.  To use the example of the wedding ring offered by Callahan, the 
ring carries with it the mysterious reality of a shared life.  It draws together the past, 
present, and future of human experience.  The ring is not itself the lived experience, but 
points to the lived experience and to a certain extent the mystery present.  A wedding ring 
of a divorced person, however, points to a reality that is no longer present.  Hence, in a 
certain sense, signs are dead symbols. 
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 All symbols are signs in far as they “point to” or “indicate” a reality other than 
itself.  However, symbols extend beyond being mere signs insofar as they make another 
reality present.  Hence, in order for a symbol to speak in an efficacious manner it requires 
that there is an intrinsic relationship between the literal meaning of the sign and the 
mysterious meaning of the other. 
In terms of the idem and ipse, the idem is akin to the literal meaning of symbol 
and the ipse is akin to the symbolic or mysterious meaning of a symbol.  Hence, the 
expressive nature of the symbol is bound up in the relationship of the idem and the ipse.  
Put another way, symbols require the constancy of appearance of the idem and the 
dynamism of the ipse.  Without the ipse, symbols divulge into signs, and without the 
idem symbols lack the constancy needed for expression.    
4.2 – Anglican-Roman Catholic Ecumenical Dialogue: Dispositional Conversion  
As the above suggests, the ecumenical impasse between the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Anglican Communion is rooted in divergent cognitive and narrative 
dispositions.  Simply put, the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church 
think and act differently in many respects.  The cognitive and narrative divide between 
the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church hinders the capacity of both 
communions to receive one another as expressions of God’s mystery and ultimately 
threatens the possibility of mutual recognition. Karl Rahner acknowledges that the 
disconnect between orthodoxy and orthopraxis is one of the greatest challenges that 
confronts ecumenical activity between churches when he writes that: 
… contemporary Christianity is not just theoretically known but practically lived. 
Here lies our greatest deficiency. If Christians not only thought their truth but 
lived it, if they were as concerned for orthopraxy as for orthodoxy, if this 
orthopraxy meant not only social criticism and social change… but worshipping 
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God in spirit and in truth, since we exist for God and not God for us, then they 
would soon be able to agree about controversial theological questions that, like it 
or not, no longer have the same importance as at the time of the Reformation.594 
 
Properly framed, the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church have much 
to offer one another in terms of Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church.   
The tensions that surround the ecumenical relationship between the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church are found at the intersection of orthodoxy 
and orthopraxis.  It is at this intersection that seemingly unresolvable disagreements 
agonizingly appear.  The issues surrounding the ordination of women to the priesthood 
and episcopate and the role of the bishop of Rome, for instance, are interpreted from 
different vantage points.  For its part, the Anglican Communion’s decision to ordain 
women is informed by orthopraxis, while the Roman Catholic opposition to the 
ordination of women is informed by orthodoxy.  Put simply, the orthopraxis of the 
Anglican Communion shapes its orthodoxy and the orthodoxy of the Roman Catholic 
Church shapes its orthopraxis.  As the 1968 Malta Report recognizes, “[d]ivergences 
since the sixteenth century have arisen not so much from the substance of this inheritance 
[liturgy, theology, spirituality, church order, and mission] as from our separate ways of 
receiving it.”595  ARCIC I addresses the issue of reception in its Elucidation to the 1976 
Venice Statement.  The commission writes:  
By ‘reception’ we mean the fact that the people of God acknowledge a decision or 
statement because they recognize in it the apostolic faith.  They accept it because 
they discern a harmony between what is proposed to them and the sensus fidelium 
of the whole Church.  As an example, the creed that we call Nicene has been 
received by the Church because in it the Church has recognized the apostolic 
faith.  Reception does not create nor legitimize the decision: it is the final 
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indication that such a decision has fulfilled the necessary conditions for it to be a 
true expression of the faith.  In this acceptance the whole Church is involved in a 
continuous process of discernment and response.596 
 
 The ecumenical dialogue between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic 
Church has been dominated by methods identification for achieving mutual recognition 
and in so doing presents significant challenges for reception.   
As Paul Ricoeur demonstrates, the path towards mutual recognition must pass 
from recognition as identification to recognition of one’s-self before mutual recognition 
can be achieved.  Therefore, if mutual recognition is to be reality and possibility for the 
Anglican Communion the Roman Catholic Church, both communions must 1) move 
beyond dialogue that is governed by methods of identification, 2) develop a cognitive and 
narrative disposition that allows for the reception of one another as expressions of God’s 
mystery, and 3) acknowledge that one’s own church “becomes” a fuller expression of 
God’s mystery when in freedom and responsibility it learns from one another.  Put 
simply, the ecumenical relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman 
Catholic Church is need of second naïveté.  As such, a second naïveté requires a 
symbolic approach to ecumenical dialogue that challenges the narrative and cognitive 
dispositions of both the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion. In 
particular, a symbolic narrative and cognitive disposition challenges the Roman Catholic 
Church to attend more fully to the phenomenological dimensions of Christian belief and 
life and Challenges the Anglican Communion to attend more fully to the ontological 
dimensions of Christian life and belief.  
4.2.1 – Ecumenical Dialogue Beyond Identification: The Ordination of Women, Apostolic 
Succession, and the Bishop of Rome 
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 As a final step in demonstrating the import of a symbolic approach for the 
ecumenical dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion, 
this section takes up the ecumenically contentious issues of the ordination of women, 
apostolic succession, the Bishop of Rome.  The intention of this section is develop a path 
for ecumenical dialogue in relation to the principles of the cognitive and narrative 
dispositions developed in this chapter. 
The issue of the ordination of women, which is presently dividing the two 
communions, is an example where, despite the obvious divergent positions of the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church, there is room for fruitful 
dialogue that has, unfortunately, been overshadowed by the polemical discourse.  As the 
following suggests, the Roman Catholic ontological narrative and cognitive disposition 
provides good reasons for its prohibition of the ordination of women.  On the other hand, 
the phenomenological narrative and cognitive disposition of the Anglican Communion 
provides good reasons as to why women should be ordained.  Sara Butler writes: 
The two different approaches [to the ordination of women] are these: the one-
which I shall refer to as “Anglican” – proceeds by way of theological reasoning, 
and has its base in a renewed theological anthropology; the other “Roman 
Catholic” – proceeds by appeal to the will of Christ revealed in history and 
confirmed in the experience of the Church.597 
 
In relation to the their respective cognitive and narrative dispositions the Roman Catholic 
Church’s argument is thin theologically speaking, but gains support in terms of the data 
available in regards to revelation and the tradition of the church, while the Anglican 
argument, on the other hand, has less evident precedents in revelation and tradition, but is 
theologically compelling. 
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 The controversy surrounding the ordination of women has been a part of the 
ecumenical relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican 
Communion since official dialogues commenced with ARCIC I.  The ordination of 
women by churches of the Anglican Communion, which gained momentum in the 
1970’s, reconfigured the ecumenical landscape of between Roman Catholics and 
Anglicans, especially in regards to the hope of mutual recognition of ministries between 
the communions.   
 In 1975, Paul VI wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Donald Coggan, 
outlining the Roman Catholic position on the ordination of women.  He writes: 
She [Roman Catholic Church] holds that it is not admissible to ordain women to 
the priesthood, for very fundamental reasons.  These reasons include: the example 
recorded in the Sacred Scriptures of Christ choosing his Apostles only from 
among men; the constant practice of the Church, which has imitated Christ in 
choosing only men; and her living teaching authority which has consistently held 
that the exclusion of women of women from the priesthood is in accordance with 
God’s plan for his Church.598  
 
Accordingly, the position of the Roman Catholic Church maintains that there is nothing 
to support the ordination of women in either the Scriptural witness or the tradition of the 
church.  The basic logic developed by Paul VI in his letter to Archbishop Coggan was 
further developed in 1977 by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s Inter 
insigniores (Declaration on the Question of Admission to the Ministerial Priesthood).  
Inter Insigniores cites three basic principles in support of the exclusion of women from 
the ministerial priesthood: 1) The church’s constant tradition, whereby, “The Catholic 
Church has never felt that priestly or episcopal ordination can be validly conferred on 
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women.”599, 2) the attitude of Christ, insofar as “Jesus Christ did not call any women to 
become part of the Twelve.”600, and 3) the practice of the apostles in which “The 
apostolic community remained faithful to the attitude of Jesus towards women.”601  
Finally, in 1994, John Paul II issued an apostolic letter on the reserving the ordination to 
priesthood only to men, Ordinatio Sacerdotalis.  The letter reaffirms the principles set 
forth by Paul VI and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, but with added 
authority and decisiveness.  John Paul II closes with the statement “I declare that the 
Church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women and that this 
judgment is to be definitively held by all the Church's faithful.”602 
 As the above demonstrates the Roman Catholic Church’s approach to the issue of 
the ordination of women is in keeping with an ontological cognitive and narrative 
disposition as it outlines above.  The hermeneutical tendency to understand and explain 
Christian identity and koinonia through the church’s memory and orthodoxy 
subsequently informs how the church brings itself to expression amidst changing 
circumstances.  In the case of the ordination of women, the Roman Catholic Church 
confronts the challenges posed by the changing roles of women in society with an 
understanding of the priesthood that takes recourse to doctrine and tradition as basic 
norms.  Thus, the ordination of women offends Christian identity as it is established by 
tradition and the koinonia of Christ’s church.   
 The Anglican approach to the ordination of women is markedly different from 
that of Roman Catholicism.  Firstly, questions regarding the ordination of women 
                                                 
599 Louis Ligier, "On the Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood," Origins 7, 
no. 44 (1978): ¶ 1. 
600 Ibid., ¶ 2. 
601 Ibid., ¶ 3. 
602 John Paul II, "Ordinatio Sacerdotalis," Origins 24, no. 4 (1994): ¶ 4. 
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surfaced within the Anglican Communion at the turn of the twentieth century.  Anglican 
theological reflection on the matter officially developed with respect to the following 
considerations 1) an appeal scripture and tradition, 2) the seemingly divided information 
scripture provides, and 3) the flawed biological assumptions of the church father and 
medieval theologians regarding the nature of woman.603  Paul Avis provides a succinct 
description of the Anglican approach to the ordination of women.  He writes: 
Ultimately,… the ordination of women to the priesthood is an ecclesiological 
matter which must be justified in term of the fullness of Christ in all the baptized 
members of his body.  Because Anglicanism is a reformed as well as a catholic 
expression of the Christian Church, it knows that theological arguments that make 
a case for the reform of the ministry need to be considered candidly and in their 
merits, and they cannot be simply vetoed by the weight of tradition.  Anglicanism 
is ‘catholic and reformed’ and the imperative of reform applies to the structures of 
the ordained ministry, as much as to other areas of the Church’s life.604 
    
The Anglican approach to the issue of the ordination of women is consistent with the 
phenomenological narrative and cognitive disposition that tends towards orthopraxis and 
the ipse.  The Anglican position is not a rejection of the tradition of the church, but 
understands and explains the living tradition through phenomenological encounter with 
the world.  As such, Anglicans have good theological reasons for admitting women to the 
priesthood insofar as women are an intrinsic part of the church that brings God’s mystery 
to expression in Christian identity and the koinonia of Christ’s church.   
 The ecumenical impasse regarding the ordination of women, is certainly a 
significant obstacle confronting the relationship between Anglicans and Roman 
Catholics.  However, despite its significance, from the perspective of a symbolic 
cognitive and narrative disposition, the differing conclusions have been exaggerated to 
                                                 
603 Butler, "The Ordination of Women : A New Obstacle to the Recognition of Anglican 
Orders," 98. 
604 Avis, The Identity of Anglicanism : Essentials of Anglican Ecclesiology, 133. 
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some extent by both communions internally, but largely ignored externally.  For instance, 
both the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church support their respective 
conclusions over and against the conclusion of the other.  However, in terms of the 
official dialogues that have taken place, the issue is largely ignored except in passing or 
by way of descriptive references to the positions of both communions.  In short, the 
ordination of women has been discussed at length within both communions, but the 
respective positions of both communions have not been brought to dialogue. 
 It is apparent that, in regards to the practice of ordaining or not ordaining women, 
both the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church engage one another at 
the level of identification.  To be clear, a symbolic narrative and cognitive disposition is 
not suspicious of ontological and phenomenological identification per se; it is, however, 
suspicious of exaggerations made in light of these dispositions.  Hence, one ought not 
conclude that a symbolic cognitive and narrative disposition does not acknowledge that 
the Roman Catholic prohibition of women’s ordination and the Anglican opening of 
ordination to women are mutually exclusive positions.   
Unlike the ordination of women, the last two issues, apostolic succession and the 
Bishop of Rome, have been addressed at length by ARCIC I and ARCIC II.  While the 
methods of identification have uncovered a certain amount of convergence, the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church evidence divergent understandings and 
explanations of Apostolic Succession and more so in the case of role of the bishop of 
Rome.  It is not surprising that both apostolic succession and the bishop of Rome are 
taken up at length in the documents of ARCIC I and ARCIC II as both issues are deeply 
entrenched in historical development.  Both Anglicans and Roman Catholics agree that 
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apostolic succession and the role of the bishop of Rome have been interpreted differently 
throughout Christian history and as such, these issues are amenable to traditional methods 
of identification used in ecumenical dialogue.  However, the space devoted to apostolic 
succession and the bishop of Rome is also a bit surprising given that issues such as the 
ordination of women are practically more divisive in terms of mutual recognition.  
Apostolic succession has been at the center of the relationship between the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion from the very beginning of the English 
Reformation and became immensely complicated with Leo XIII’s judgment in 1896 that 
Anglican orders are absolutely null and void.   
The official Roman Catholic interpretation of Anglican orders and apostolic 
succession within the Anglican Communion is deeply wedded to an ontological 
understanding of orders and apostolic succession that is characteristic of an 
ontological/metaphysical cognitive and narrative disposition.  Lumen Gentium reads: 
…the apostles were endowed by Christ with a special outpouring of the holy 
Spirit coming upon them (See Acts 1:8; 2:4; Jn 20:22-23), and, by the imposition 
of hands (see 1 Tim 4:14; 2 Tim 1:6-7) they passed on to their collaborators the 
gift of the holy Spirit, which is transmitted to our day through episcopal 
consecration.  The Holy synod teaches, moreover, that the fullness of the 
sacrament of Orders is conferred by episcopal consecration, and both in the 
liturgical tradition of the church and in the language of the Fathers of the church it 
is called the high priesthood, the summit of the sacred ministry.  Episcopal 
consecration confers, together with the office of sanctifying, the offices also of 
teaching and ruling, which, however, of their very nature can be exercised only in 
hierarchical communion with the head and members of the college.605   
 
According to Vatican II, there is an identity between apostolic succession and episcopal 
succession whereby, episcopal consecration confers on the bishop the offices of 
sanctifying, teaching, and ruling.  However, the office of the bishop is also dependent on 
a variety of relationships.  The bishop exercises his office in relation to the bishop of 
                                                 
605 Vatican II, "Lumen Gentium," ¶ 21. 
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Rome and those who are in communion with the bishop of Rome.  Practically speaking, 
the bishop cannot sanctify, govern, or teach in isolation.  However, Lumen Gentium 
continues, “Tradition… makes it abundantly clear that, through the imposition of hands 
and the words of consecration, the grace of the holy Spirit is given and a sacred character 
is impressed in such a way that bishops, immanently and visibly, take the place of Christ 
himself…”606  Thus, Lumen Gentium affirms that apostolic succession is not guaranteed 
only by episcopal consecration, but also the relationship of a bishop to the college of 
bishops.  What is significant, however, is that the relationship of a bishop to the college 
of bishops, from a Roman Catholic perspective, is formed by the episcopal consecration 
which is governed by the laying on of hands (matter) and the words of consecration 
(form).  In short, ontology establishes the relationship of bishops to one another.  In this 
sense, the Roman Catholic understanding of apostolic succession and its significance is in 
keeping with its tendency to situate the unity and identity of the church from the vantage 
point of the idem and orthodoxy.   
 The Anglican understanding of apostolic succession is guided by its 
phenomenological cognitive and narrative disposition, whereby, episcopal ordination is 
first placed within the context of the community and thus takes recourse to the ipse 
orthopraxis.  The Porvoo Statement (1993) reads: 
… the primary manifestation of apostolic succession is to be found in the 
apostolic tradition of the Church as a whole.  The succession is an expression of 
the permanence and, therefore, of the continuity of Christ’s own mission in which 
the Church participates.607 
  
                                                 
606 Ibid. 
607 The Porvoo Common Statement: Text Agreed at the Fourth Plenary Meeting, Held at 
Järvenpää, Finland, 9-13 October 1992 (London: Council for Christian Unity of the General 
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From an Anglican perspective, apostolic succession arises out the apostolicity of the 
entire church community.  Hence it is the apostolic succession of the community that 
provides for context of the succession in terms of ordained ministry.  The Porvoo 
Statement (1993) continues: 
Within the apostolicity of the whole Church is an apostolic succession of ministry 
which serves and is a focus of the continuity of the Church in its life and its 
faithfulness to the words and acts of Jesus transmitted by the apostles.  The 
ordained ministry has a particular responsibility for witnessing to this tradition 
and for proclaiming it afresh with authority in every generation.608   
 
From an Anglican perspective, apostolic succession in terms of the ordained ministry an 
aspect of the apostolicity of the church and only makes sense in relationship to unifying 
fundamentals of the church outlined in the Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral.  These 
fundamentals include: 1) “The Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, as 
"containing all things necessary to salvation," and as being the rule and ultimate standard 
of faith.”609; 2) “The Apostles' Creed, as the Baptismal Symbol; and the Nicene Creed, as 
the sufficient statement of the Christian faith.”610; 3) “The two Sacraments ordained by 
Christ Himself - Baptism and the Supper of the Lord - ministered with unfailing use of 
Christ's words of Institution, and of the elements ordained by Him.”611; 4) “The Historic 
Episcopate, locally adapted in the methods of its administration to the varying needs of 
the nations and peoples called of God into the Unity of His Church.”612 
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611 Ibid., 878. 
612 Ibid. 
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A symbolic narrative and cognitive disposition acknowledges the limits of 
ontology, which is central to Leo XIII’s judgment as well as the limits of the diversity of 
expression that accompanies the Anglican understanding of apostolic succession.  A 
symbolic approach acknowledges that Leo XIII’s judgment rests squarely on ontology in 
regards to matter, form, and intention.  However, a symbolic approach also acknowledges 
that the apostolic nature of the church is not simply transmitted ontologically.  If this in 
fact were the case, it would be difficult if not impossible to verify the validity of any 
bishop given that the early church does not evidence an attentiveness to matter, form, and 
intention.  Put simply, a symbolic approach rightly asks whether or not apostolic 
succession cannot be governed exclusively by ontology.  In this vein, Heinrich Fries 
contends that it is appropriate to distinguish between “apostolic succession” and 
“episcopal succession.”  Fries writes: 
…the apostolic succession in the office of the bishop is a sign of the apostolicity 
of the church, not apostolicity itself.  Nor is it therefore an automatically effective 
guarantee.  History demonstrates how bishops can fall out of apostolic succession 
– for example, at the time of the Arian controversies, where it is not exactly 
certain that the bishops represented correct teaching.  This impression is 
strengthened when one considers the viewpoints and conditions under which 
bishops were appointed during the Middle ages.613 
 
Of course, the distinction between apostolic succession and episcopal succession does not 
entail a complete disconnect between the two.  It does, however, acknowledge that 
apostolic succession can and should be understood in a broader sense.  Hence, 
“[s]uccession in the office of bishop is one sign of the apostolic succession, one sign 
among others.”614  Episcopal succession is a way in which the apostolicity of the church 
is brought to expression; albeit a particularly significant and essential one.  However, the 
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apostolicity of the church is also intimately bound to the proclamation of scripture, 
worship, and service all of which are intrinsically related to the bishop, but not in such a 
way that they are de facto null and void in the absence of an ontologically invalid bishop.  
In particular, the dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox has 
provided important ecumenical insights regarding the relationship of unity-in-difference 
that characterizes episcopal succession and apostolic succession.  The 1986 U.S. 
Theological Consultation affirms the priority of the church’s apostolicity in terms of it’s 
the fidelity to the proclamation and witness of the apostles and warns of reducing the 
apostolicity of the church to “forms and institutional strcutures.”  The Consultation 
writes, “[a]postolicity is experienced not in atemporal isolation but rather in the Church’s 
social nature as a community of faith and in its historical continuity and 
permanence…”615  Hence, while a proper interpretation of the apostolicity of the church 
rightly gives priority to the proclamation and mission of the apostles, the church, 
nevertheless, remains a concrete historical reality through which the proclamation and 
mission of the apostles is manifest. 
An example of approaching apostolic succession from a symbolic cognitive and 
narrative disposition occurred on November 21, 2009.  Pope Benedict XVI presented the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, with a pectoral cross, a symbol of the office 
of the bishop.  Undoubtedly, the gesture was not intended to over turn Leo XIII’s 
judgment, but it was an action that undeniably acknowledged the limits of ontological 
                                                 
615 U.S. Theological Consultation, "Apostolicity as God's Gift in the Life of the Church," 
in The Quest for Unity: Orthodox and Catholics in Dialogue : Documents of the Joint 
International Commission and Official Dialogues in the United States, 1965-1995, ed. J. Borelli 
and J.H. Erickson (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1996), ¶ 10. 
 281 
recognition.  It is gestures such as Benedict XVI’s gift of the pectoral cross that are 
characteristic of a symbolic cognitive and narrative disposition.   
The final issue this section addresses is the role of the bishop of Rome.  As 
chapter four demonstrates, the rupture that occurred between Rome and the Anglican 
Church during the reign of Henry VIII was extraordinarily complicated.  However, 
despite the complexities that surround schism between England and Rome, it is evident 
that the issue of papal jurisdiction was an important factor.  However, since the time of 
English reformation issues surrounding the role of the bishop of Rome have occupied a 
controversial and often polemical space within the ecumenical relationship between the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church.  The ecumenical issues regarding 
the role of bishop of Rome are particularly pronounced in light of Vatican I where the 
Roman Catholic Church affirmed that primacy of the bishop of the Rome is not only one 
of honor but by divine right (de iure divino).616  According to Vatican I, the primacy of 
the bishop of Rome is characterized by universal jurisdiction, but this primacy also 
extends to primacy of judgment, and in certain cases the exercise of the infallible 
magisterium of the church. 
The Roman Catholic understanding of papal primacy is characteristic of the 
ontological narrative and cognitive disposition to which it tends.  The Roman Catholic 
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interpretation of papal primacy is a particularly poignant example of the Roman Catholic 
propensity for interpreting the koinonia of the church and Christian identity via a logic of 
the one over the many.  Put simply, from a Roman Catholic perspective the role of the 
bishop of Rome is at the service of unity, but in such a way as to resolve difference. 
The Anglican narrative and cognitive disposition, however, is not surprisingly ill 
at ease with the Roman Catholic interpretation of the bishop of Rome’s primacy.  
Accordingly, the primacy of the bishop of Rome is one that is understood to be in service 
to the unity of the church.  Put simply, the role of the bishop of Rome emerges out of the 
unity church, not the other way around.  Derick Allen and Macdonald Allchin articulate 
the role of the bishop of Rome within the context of collegiality when they write: 
…the primacy of Peter can never be properly understood, nor exercised fully 
according to God's will, unless it is seen as a primacy within a college, a centre of 
unity at the service of a diversity of gifts and operations, which does not suppress 
but encourages their growth. Where the centre tends, as it were, to monopolise the 
action of Christ and the Spirit in the Church, then the whole structure of the 
Church's life is imperilled and the delicate balance of its different organs is 
upset.617  
 
As Allen and Allchin observe, from an Anglican perspective primacy is at the service of 
diversity.   
 The divergent emphases of the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic 
Church regarding the primacy of the bishop of Rome, unity at the service of diversity in 
the case of the former and unity over difference in the case of the latter, need not be 
understood as mutually exclusive interpretations.  The symbolic complementarity of the 
Anglican and Roman Catholic positions on primacy are masterfully articulated in the 
ARCIC II document The Gift of Authority (1998): 
                                                 
617 Derek William Allen and A. M. Allchin, "Primacy and Collegiality: An Anglican 
View," Journal of Ecumenical Studies 2, no. 1 (1965): 79. 
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We envisage a primacy that will even now help to uphold the legitimate diversity 
of traditions, strengthening and safeguarding them in fidelity to the gospel.  It will 
encourage that churches in their mission.  This sort of primacy will already assist 
the church on earth to be the authentic catholic koinonia in which unity does not 
curtail diversity, and diversity does not endanger, but enhances unity.  It will be 
an effective sign for all Christians as to how this gift of God builds up that unity 
for which Christ prayed.618  
 
The above places the Fries Rahner proposals on the role of bishop of Rome discussed in 
chapter three within a symbolic context.619  Simply put, primacy in an ecumenical 
context, ought to be both unifying and diversifying.  Hence, as the Fries and Rahner 
proposal articulates, the capacity of the bishop of Rome to teach ex cathedra in an 
ecumenical context must be governed by new principles of collegiality whereby the use 
of such teaching authority is limited to ecumenical councils and consultation with the 
larger Christian community of ecumenical churches. 
 In sum, a symbolic narrative and cognitive disposition have the potential to 
reframe the ecumenical relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the 
Anglican Communion in a manner that is bound exclusively to an ontological narrative or 
phenomenological narrative and cognitive disposition.   
Firstly, a symbolic narrative and cognitive disposition acknowledges that every 
church despite all the shortcomings and strengths brings God’s mystery to expression.  
Hence, the churches of the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church must 
acknowledge from the outset of ecumenical engagement that there is a potential for 
learning and reception from one another.  The divergent positions regarding the 
ordination of women, apostolic succession, the role of the bishop of Rome within the 
koinonia of the church are not exceptions to the possibility of ecumenical reception and 
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learning.  However, the acknowledgement that reception and learning are possible does 
not negate the real differences and disagreements that exist.    
Secondly, a symbolic disposition necessitates that churches honestly identify their 
differences and disagreements. In the case of women’s ordination, the positions of the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church not only appear to be different on 
a phenomenological; they are different at the level of ontology.  Hence, it is imperative 
that Anglicans acknowledge that the prohibition of women to the priesthood does not 
belong to their expressed belief and activity while on the other hand, it Roman Catholics 
must acknowledge that the opening of the priesthood to women does not belong to their 
expressed belief and activity.620  
Thirdly, within difference, a symbolic disposition seeks to discover the mystery of 
God as it is expressed by in the difference of the other.  Hence, difference, does not imply 
de facto that the position of the other is “utterly null and void” nor does is it overlook 
difference and disagreement as realities that one must simply be tolerate.  Without the 
necessity of fully accepting the belief and practice of the other, a symbolic narrative and 
cognitive disposition, insofar as it acknowledges that both orthodoxy and orthopraxy are 
expressions of God’s mystery seeks to enter the space between the exaggerated claims 
that emerge at the poles of orthodoxy and orthopraxis.  For instance, the Anglican 
tendency to subordinate orthodoxy to orthopraxis calls attention to the importance of 
women in the life of the church.  The Roman Catholic Church has much to learn from 
this insight given that women have very little influence in the church.  On the other hand, 
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the Roman Catholic tendency to subordinate orthopraxis to orthodoxy calls attention to 
the need to examine and take recourse not only to one’s present situation but also to the 
churches diachronic unity with the past when bringing the living tradition to expression 
in belief and practice.   
Conclusion: 
The ecumenical dialogue between the Anglican Communion and the Roman 
Catholic Church at the level of identification is confined to dealing with ontological and 
phenomenological claims that arise out of exaggerated dispositions.  A symbolic 
disposition, however, seeks to enter the space between the positions arrived at by the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church in order to uncover points of 
intersection that, while not resolving, ignoring, or dismissing the ultimate positions of 
both communions, can provide resources for receiving and learning from the ecumenical, 
who, despite all disagreements, brings the mystery of God to expression. 
Ecumenical reception and learning are developed develop and uncovered in the 
symbolic space between orthodoxy and orthopraxis.  Simply put, the Anglican concern 
for orthopraxis and the Roman Catholic concern for orthodoxy can potentially provide 
resources for both communions.  For instance, the Roman Catholic Church and the 
Anglican Communion need not come to full agreement ontological or phenomenological 
agreement in order for reception and learning to occur.  However, as the above 
acknowledges, the space for receptive ecumenism and the ecumenical learning is not 
imposed by the ecumenical other.  It is a space that is created by one’s church for one’s 
own church.  The establishment of such a space however, requires the cognitive and 
narrative dispositional resources of the symbol.   
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CONCLUSION 
The contemporary ecumenical landscape is fraught with new challenges and 
possibilities.  The preceding study is rooted in the conviction that these challenges and 
possibilities are brought into clearer relief when one considers them from the context of 
the fundamental mysteries of Christianity as the origin and goal of Christian belief and 
activity that are brought to expression by particular churches.  The preceding study 
undertook the development of a symbolic approach to the ecumenical relationship 
between the Roman Catholic Church and Anglican Communion in several steps.   
Firstly, it was necessary to acknowledge the general contours and limits of 
Western thought and theology in regards to the relationship between unity and difference.  
It was argued that the various cognitive constructs employed by Western thought and 
theology to interpret and appropriate the relationship between unity and difference tend to 
reduce the reality of mystery to either a problematic reality in need of a solution or a 
reality that is utterly beyond human reason.  The Western difficulty with mystery is 
particularly evident in regards to contemporary Western commitments to ontology or 
metaphysics on the one hand and phenomenology on the other hand.  Ontology and 
phenomenology are characteristic of a thinking that is governed by a logic of the one over 
the many and the many over the one respectively.  The common thread running through 
contemporary Western thought and theology is the dependence upon criticism.  It was 
maintained that in light of modern and postmodern commitments the ecumenical activity 
between Christian churches in the West suffers from a deficiency of cognitive and 
narrative resources that are necessary for interpreting and appropriating the complex 
reality of mystery.  Thus, the tendency in Western thought to interpret and appropriate 
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mystery as a problem in need of a solution or as a reality that escapes human reason 
ultimately places unnecessary limits on God and human reason respectively.  It was 
argued that properly comprehended the interpretation and appropriation of mystery are 
activities that are postcritical insofar as mystery extends beyond the boundaries of critical 
patterns of thought.   
Secondly, it was suggested that Karl Rahner’s theology and in particular his 
theology of symbol provide postcritical resources for interpreting and appropriating the 
realities of unity and difference; not as mutually exclusive, but instead, as mutually 
enriching.  The central theme of Rahner’s theology is the reduction to mystery.  For 
Rahner, the mystery of human and Christian existence is animated by God’s holy 
mystery.  Rahner demonstrates that as spirit-in-the-world human existence is 
characterized as self-related otheredness.  As such, human experience is always 
transcendental insofar as the human being’s encounter with the mysterious other brings 
forth human questioning and knowledge.  It is the radical openness to God’s infinite 
mystery within the finite and concrete circumstances of the world that ultimately gives 
rise to human existence for Rahner.  According to Rahner, all beings are symbolic.  Being 
achieves its nature by entering into its own other so as to express itself.  However, being 
is not only expressive, but being also realizes itself in its own other.  Hence, the symbolic 
nature of existence, for Rahner, is governed by both a process of emanation and return 
and unity-in-difference.  Every being expresses itself in own other, but every being also 
returns to itself through its own other.  Thus, all finite beings are in the process of 
becoming. 
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Thirdly, it was argued that the need in the West for a second or symbolic naïveté 
extends to ecumenical dialogue.  Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of recognition provided a 
basic structure from which a critique of the contemporary ecumenical landscape in the 
West could be undertaken.  It was shown that the ecumenical goal of mutual recognition 
necessitates a movement from recognition as identification to recognizing one’s-self.  It 
was argued that the traditional strategies employed by ecumenical dialogue (distinctions, 
synthesis, and a phenomenology of difference) have likely run their course.  Thus, the 
ability to recognize one’s-self is ultimately a question of one’s own identity having been 
confronted by the mystery of the other.  It was maintained that the constructive 
appropriation or reception of the ecumenical other requires resources that extend beyond 
the critical attitudes of modernity and postmodernity.  Ecumenism is often construed 
either as a movement that seeks to establish mutual recognition between churches 
through a conformity characterized by “substantial agreement” or via a 
“comprehensiveness” that overlooks or tolerates difference for the sake of unity.  
Mystery, however, is properly interpreted and appropriated as a reality that is infinitely 
knowable.  As such, the logic of the one over the many that characterizes Western 
ontological and metaphysical thought and the logic of the many over the one that 
characterizes Western postmodern phenomenological thought cannot provide sufficient 
resources for an ample interpretation of mystery within ecumenical dialogue.  Rahner’s 
theology of ecumenical dialogue and his theology of symbol were developed as resources 
for overcoming the contemporary ecumenical log jam by reframing ecumenical concerns 
using Rahner’s logic of symbol and in so doing provided postcritical resources for 
rethinking ecumenical dialogue. 
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Fourthly, some of the significant social, theological, and historical developments 
of the ecumenical relationship between the Anglican Communion and the Roman 
Catholic Church were considered.  It was demonstrated that the Anglican preoccupation 
with comprehensiveness and the Roman Catholic fascination with unity were important 
factors in developing how both communions have come to interpret themselves and one 
another.  Anglican comprehensiveness is supported by phenomenological patterns of 
thought that are sensitive to diversity and cautious of unity while Roman Catholic unity is 
supported by metaphysical and ontological patterns of thought that are sensitive to visible 
unity and cautious of diversity.   
Lastly, a symbolic approach to ecumenical dialogue was brought to bear on the 
ARCIC dialogues.  It was maintained that a symbolic rethinking of the relationship 
between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church requires both a 
cognitive and narrative conversion.  Hence, the challenge confronting the present day 
ARC dialogues is one of reception.  Put as a question, “how can the Anglican 
Communion and the Roman Catholic Church receive one another in responsibility and 
charity?”  It was maintained that both communions are in need of a cognitive and 
narrative conversion that is characterized by the dynamism of the symbol and rooted in 
the humble recognition of one another as real expressions of God’s holy mystery.   
The preceding study was primary directed towards developing Karl Rahner’s 
theology as a resource for fostering the movement of the ARC ecumenical dialogues 
from methods of identification towards methods governed by a logic of symbol.  Hence, 
the primary focus of this study was concentrated on the need for a paradigmatic shift 
towards new ways of approaching ecumenical dialogue symbolically.  However, the 
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proposed symbolic paradigm for rethinking how the Anglican Communion and the 
Roman Catholic Church engage and receive one another is not an end in and of itself, but 
is a moment along the path towards mutual recognition.  Hence, this study affirms the 
sober reality that the goal of mutual recognition is not an immanent reality for the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion.  How mutual recognition between the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic will come about is uncertain.  What is 
certain, however, is that it will not be established and maintained simply through 
conformity.  What has been proposed is the possibility for a new beginning for the 
dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican Communion; a second 
naïveté whereby the energy, enthusiasm, goodwill, and hope that directed and animated 
the initial stages of dialogue between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic 
can be reinvigorated in a new context. 
It is evident as ARCIC III begins to delve into the complex differences and 
commonalities that exist between the Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican 
Communion that a humble and honest appraisal of the challenges and possibilities of 
mutual recognition must be assessed.  However, the more immediate need is an honest 
and humble appraisal of what can be done at present.  It is appropriate and somewhat 
ironic that this study ends by recalling the prophetic and instructive words of the 1968 
Malta Report of the Anglican-Roman Catholic Preparatory Commission regarding mutual 
recognition.  The Preparatory Commission writes, “[w]e cannot envisage in detail what 
may be the issues and demands of the final stage in our quest for the full, organic unity of 
our two communions.  We know only that we must be constant in prayer for the grace of 
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the  Holy Spirit in order that we may be open to his guidance and judgment, and receptive 
to each other’s faith and understanding.”621 
While the preceding study was limited in scope to the relationship between the 
Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church, the ecumenical framework that 
was developed has implications that extend into the ecumenical relationship between the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Churches of Eastern Orthodoxy.  In particular, the 
symbolic framework that was developed in the preceding pages has the potential provide 
a renewed ecumenical space between Catholic and Orthodox that draws together the 
mystical and pneumatological disposition of the East with the ontological and 
Christocentric disposition in the West. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
621 Anglican-Roman Catholic Preparatory Commission, "The Malta Report (1968)." 
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